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ESSAY
DISRUPTING DEATH: HOW SPECIALIZED CAPITAL
DEFENDERS GROUND VIRGINIA’S MACHINERY OF
DEATH TO A HALT
Corinna Barrett Lain *
Douglas A. Ramseur **
Virginia’s repeal of capital punishment in 2021 is arguably the
most momentous abolitionist event since 1972, when the United
States Supreme Court invalidated capital punishment statutes nationwide.1 In part, Virginia’s repeal is momentous because it marks
the first time a Southern state abolished the death penalty.2 In
* S.D. Roberts and Sandra Moore Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of
Law. Special thanks to the University of Richmond Law Review for partnering with us on
this piece and, in particular, Tesia Kempski for her superb work in ushering this piece
through the publication process. Thanks also to Alyssa Thompson for her excellent footnote
and research work, and Eric Berger, Will Berry, Dale Brumfield, John Douglass, Matthew
Engle, Brandon Garrett, Jim Gibson, Alex Klein, Michael Meltsner, Jake McMahon, Michael Radelet, Scott Sundby, and Jerry Zerkin for helpful comments on a prior draft. We
intentionally use gender-neutral pronouns. This piece is dedicated to Michael Meltsner,
whose LDF advocacy in Furman v. Georgia inspired me to write in this field and whose
friendship makes me better.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law, and owner of The
Ram Law Firm, P.L.L.C., in Richmond, Virginia. For further introduction and a discussion
of Doug Ramseur’s experience as a capital litigator, see infra text accompanying note 27,
text following infra note 363, and text accompanying infra note 436.
1. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (invalidating the death penalty
as it was then administered).
2. This point was not lost on the media’s coverage of the repeal. See Hailey Fuchs,
Virginia Becomes First Southern State to Abolish the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/24/us/politics/virginia-deathpenalty.html [https:
//perma.cc/45X5-ZUG6]; Amanda Golden & Geoff Bennett, Virginia Becomes First Southern
State to Abolish Death Penalty as Governor Signs Law, NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2021, 5:28 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/virginia-becomes-first-southern-state-aboli
sh-death-penalty-governor-signs-n1261974 [https://perma.cc/8LYP-PB9A]; Laura Vozzella
& Gregory S. Schneider, Lawmakers Vote to Make Virginia First Southern State to Abolish
Death Penalty, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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part, it is momentous because even among Southern states, Virginia was exceptional in its zeal for capital punishment. No state
executed faster once a death sentence was handed down.3 And no
state was more successful in defending death sentences, allowing
Virginia to convert death sentences into executions at a higher rate
than any other state in the Union.4 Sure, Texas holds the record
for the most executions in the modern era of capital punishment.5
But Virginia was next in line with the second most executions in
the modern era, and it holds the record for the most executions in
the history of the United States, period.6 Granted, Virginia had
been executing people for over 400 years,7 so it had a head start.
But that just makes its repeal of the death penalty all the more
remarkable. How did Virginia go from all-in on the death penalty
to abolition?

local/virginia-politics/virginia-death-penalty-ban/2021/02/22/742eed3e-7146-11eb-93be-c10
81 3e358a2_story.html [https://perma.cc/JZY6-G3SV]; Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, Virginia
Becomes the First Southern State to Abolish the Death Penalty, THE APPEAL (Mar. 24,
2021), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/virginia-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/Q98W
-62FJ].
3. See King Salim Khalfani & Stephen A. Northup, Virginia and the Death
Penalty: A Disturbing Legacy, AM. FORUM OP. ED. (Mar. 7, 2012), https://amforumbackl
og.blogspot.com/2012/03/virginia-and-death-penalty-disturbing.html?m=1 [https://perma.cc
/7JF8-24 Y7] (“The average time between conviction and execution in Virginia is less than
eight years, by far the shortest in the nation.”). For a more detailed discussion of the point,
see infra text accompanying notes 234–35.
4. See James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates
in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, COLUM. L. SCH., PUB. L. RSCH. PAPER NO. 15, at 14, 47, 53, 57
(2000). For a more detailed discussion of the point, see infra text accompanying notes 232–
33.
5. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., EXECUTIONS BY STATE AND REGION SINCE 1976,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/number-of-executions-by-state
-and-region-since-1976 [https://perma.cc/F86M-DMTY]. As of 2021, Texas has conducted
572 executions in the modern era; Virginia has the next highest number with 113. The modern era of capital punishment began in 1976, after the nation’s Supreme Court-ordered hiatus from capital punishment from 1972–1976. For a discussion of the modern era, see infra
text accompanying notes 87–100.
6. Virginia’s 113 modern era executions and 1277 early era executions bring its total
number of executions to 1390, far more than any other state. See DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., EXECUTIONS BY STATE AND REGION SINCE 1976, supra note 5; History of the Death
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. [hereinafter History of the Death Penalty], https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/virginia [https://perma.cc/Y6AU7GED].
7. Virginia’s first execution was in 1608. For details, see text accompanying infra notes
41–42.
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Most obviously, Virginia’s governing coalitions aligned in favor
of repeal. The governor introduced the repeal measure, and his
party had a majority in both chambers of the Virginia General Assembly.8 A few Republicans joined in but, by and large, the vote
was along party lines.9 Democrats controlled the state legislative
process, and that was the tipping point for legislative repeal.
But the real story lies in developments long before the 2021 vote.
Advocacy groups worked tirelessly on public information campaigns for decades, changing hearts and minds.10 Family members
of slain victims became outspoken voices against the death penalty.11 Supreme Court decisions restricted the death penalty’s use
8. See Virginia Legislators Poised to Attempt Death Penalty Repeal as Governor Sponsors Abolition Bill, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
news/virginia-legislators-poised-to-attempt-death-penalty-repeal-as-governor-sponsors-abo
lition-bill [https://perma.cc/QM89-NSG5]; Dale Brumfield, How Virginia’s Death Penalty Finally Ended, WASH. MONTHLY (May 7, 2021), https://washingtonmonthly.com/people/dalem-brumfield/ [https://perma.cc/WXH4-HY4R] (noting that Democrats controlled both chambers of the General Assembly for the first time since 1995).
9. Three Republicans in Virginia’s House of Delegates voted for abolition; otherwise,
the vote was entirely on party lines. See Madeline Carlisle, Why It’s So Significant Virginia
Just Abolished the Death Penalty, TIME (Mar. 24, 2021, 3:24 PM), https://time.com/593
7804/virginia-death-penalty-abolished/ [https://perma.cc/XKX6-5WA9].
10. Particularly prominent in this regard was the longstanding work of Virginians for
Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation, the Virginia
Catholic Conference, and the Virginia ACLU. Dozens of individual activists likewise played
leading roles, although we refrain from listing names here as any list would be incomplete.
See Brumfield, supra note 8 (discussing coalition of advocacy groups against the death penalty and explaining “how a small group of activists helped turn the tide against capital punishment”); Michael Stone, Virginia Abolishes the Death Penalty After 413 Years and 1,390
Executions, VIRGINIANS FOR ALTS. TO DEATH PENALTY (2021), https://www.vadp.org/virgin
ia-abolishes-the-death-penalty-after-413-years-and-1390-executions/ [https://perma.cc/5GC
L-G8QV] (noting lobbying work, information campaigns, and partnering with victims’ family members, faith leaders, and civil rights advocates to end the death penalty in Virginia).
For a discussion of the importance of the work that these advocacy groups did, see text
accompanying infra note 515.
11. Whittney Evans, Virginia Governor Signs Law Abolishing the Death Penalty, a 1st
in the South, NPR (Mar. 24, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/24/971866086/virg
inia-governor-signs-law-abolishing-the-death-penalty-a-1st-in-the-south [https://perma.cc/
F8HN-9ZZQ] (noting that many victims’ family members have taken a stand against the
death penalty, saying that it actually makes healing more difficult, and quoting one such
family member as saying, “There are many of us, and we have continually spoken out. This
is not what we want”). For an excellent read, see generally TIM BUCKLEY & JANVIER SLICK,
NOT IN OUR NAME: MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY
(Oregonians for Alts. to Death Penalty eds., 2017). For an account of the abolition work in
Virginia by Marie Deans, who founded Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation after her
mother-in-law was murdered, see generally TODD C. PEPPERS WITH MARGARET A. ANDERSON, A COURAGEOUS FOOL: MARIE DEANS AND HER STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY
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over time,12 and Virginia adopted the option of life without the possibility of parole.13 Meanwhile, crime rates declined,14 death-seeking prosecutors retired or lost elections,15 and support for the death
penalty in Virginia softened16—in part because high-profile death
row exonerations shattered public confidence in capital convictions,17 and in part because changing demographics shifted Virginia’s party politics from reliably red to purplish blue, and that
shifted the Commonwealth’s death penalty politics, too.18
Then came 2020. Virginia’s governor was fresh off the heels of a
blackface scandal the year before, and criminal justice reform was
his path to redemption.19 The murder of George Floyd at the hands
(2017).
12. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating the death penalty
for intellectually disabled offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (invalidating the death penalty for juvenile offenders).
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Repl. Vol. 2021).
14. The FBI’s collection of data shows that the homicide rate in the United States has
declined from 9 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 1994 to 5 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019. See FBI CRIME DATA EXPLORER, https://crime-data-explorer.app.cloud.gov/
pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend [https://perma.cc/JQM2-DC5Z].
15. See Liliana Segura, The Long Shadow of Virginia’s Death Penalty, INTERCEPT (Apr.
11, 2021, 8:20 AM), https://theintercept.com/2021/04/11/virginia-death-penalty-abolition/
[https://perma.cc/SK2Q-DVXC] (discussing Virginia’s election of numerous prosecutors who
ran on promises of criminal justice reform, and the retirement of Paul Ebert, the elected
prosecutor in one of the most death-sentencing counties in the nation). For a note on the
progressive prosecutors who took their place, see infra text at notes 517–18.
16. A February 2021 poll conducted by Christopher Newport University found that
fifty-six percent of registered voters in Virginia supported repeal of the death penalty. See
State of the Commonwealth, CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT UNIV. WASON CTR. CIVIC LEADERSHIP
(Feb. 2, 2021), https://cnu.edu/wasoncenter/surveys/archive/2021-02-02.html [https://perm
ma.cc/B9E4-RW 8E].
17. The exoneration of Virginia death row inmate Earl Washington is a prime example.
For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 296–305. For a discussion of the effect of death
row exonerations on public support for the death penalty more generally, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 43–51 (2007).
18. A 2020 Gallup poll found that just 39% of Democrats support the death penalty,
compared to 79% of Republicans. Support for the death penalty among both Democrats and
Independents has dropped 7 to 8 percentage points since 2016, while support for the death
penalty among Republicans has remained unchanged since 2016 and is only slightly lower
than the 80% approval rating registered by Republicans between 2000 and 2010. See Jeffrey
M. Jones, U.S. Support for Death Penalty Holds Above Majority Level, GALLUP (Nov. 19,
2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/325568/support-death-penalty-holds-above-majority-lev
el.aspx [https://perma.cc/W5SU-S DLU]. For data on Virginia’s voting history since 1976
and, specifically, its shift from voting reliably Republican in national elections to voting
reliably Democrat, see Virginia, 270 TO WIN, https://www.270towin.com/states/virginia
[https://perma.cc/ZLJ3-GKUQ].
19. In a 2021 interview, Governor Northam made the point explicitly. See Astead W.
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of police added a sense of urgency to proposals already gaining momentum, creating a consensus for criminal justice reform almost
overnight.20 Even backlash to the Trump Administration’s unseemly rush to execute in the waning days of his presidency may
have played a role.21 The more developments we name, the more
we fear we have missed something along the way. Plenty of forces
deserve plenty of credit. As the saying goes, it takes a village.22
Our focus is but one part of this larger story—the part that specialized capital defender offices played in ending Virginia’s death
penalty. A critical consideration in the abolition calculus was the
fact that Virginia had not seen a new death sentence in ten years
and had only two people left on death row.23 The death penalty was
dying on the vine, and that was in large part due to Virginia’s specialized capital defenders, who literally worked themselves out of
a job by litigating the death penalty to death. In a myriad of ways,
these lawyers fundamentally changed the landscape of capital defense, gumming up the works of Virginia’s well-oiled “machinery of

Herndon, Black Virginians Took Ralph Northam Back. Neither Has Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/14/us/politics/ralph-northam-virginia.
html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/P5DP-GPJT].
See also Segura, supra note 15 (“It didn’t hurt that the governor himself had something to
prove when it came to his commitment to racial justice. Northam faced calls to resign in
2019 after a photo emerged from an old yearbook that appeared to show him in blackface.”).
20. See Evans, supra note 11 (discussing the impact of the murder of George Floyd on
interest in criminal justice reform).
21. See Carlisle, supra note 9 (noting that the Trump Administration’s execution spree
of thirteen death row inmates in the last seven months of his presidency helped to create
the “perfect storm” for support for repeal); Weill-Greenberg, supra note 2 (noting that the
Trump Administration’s spate of executions, which broke a de facto moratorium that had
existed for seventeen years, showed that moratoriums are insufficient).
22. See It Takes a Village To Change the World, ADDITIVE AGENCY (Dec. 18, 2015),
https://theadditiveagency.com/it-takes-a-village-to-change-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/U5
YT-CR4M] (“Many of us are familiar with the African proverb, ‘it takes a village to raise a
child.’ The truth is, it ‘takes a village’ to achieve just about any meaningful change in our
world.”). We return to this point in infra text preceding note 515.
23. The last death sentence handed down in Virginia was in 2011, and it was reversed
on appeal. The defendant, Mark Lawlor, ultimately received a life sentence, leaving just two
people on death row. For the story, see Tom Jackman, Va. Man Sentenced to Death in 2011
Gets New Hearing, and New Prosecutor Agrees to Life Sentence, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/03/12/va-man-sentenced-death-2011-gets
-new-hearing-new-prosecutor-agrees-life-sentence/ [https://perma.cc/U49Q-BTW2]. For a
discussion of the ruling that overturned his death sentence, see infra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
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death”24 and grinding death sentences to a halt. They disrupted
death.
We are not the first to recognize the role of Virginia’s specialized
capital defenders in the decline of capital punishment in the Commonwealth. Professor Brandon Garrett’s work in 2017 compared
transcripts of capital trials before and after Virginia’s newly
formed capital defender offices started taking cases in 2004, documenting differences in the length of the sentencing phase of those
cases and stark differences in the sentencing outcomes.25 And Garrett’s excellent work followed excellent work from a colleague of
ours in 2015. Examining capital murder indictments, Professor
John Douglass documented a sharp decline in post-2004 cases going to trial, showing that after the capital defender offices started
taking cases, the vast majority of capital charges were resolved by
plea-bargaining instead.26
We view these data points as two sides of the same coin. One
study showed the difference that specialized capital defenders
were making at trial, while the other showed how specialized capital defenders were making a difference in whether those cases
went to trial in the first place. The two impacts were not unrelated,
but how were they happening? What is the story behind the stories
that these studies tell?
That’s where we come in. One of us is a former capital defender
with “boots on the ground” experience as to what was happening
in the trenches and how those developments made a difference.27

24. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (“I no longer shall tinker with the
machinery of death.”).
25. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty,
105 GEO. L.J. 661 (2017).
26. See John G. Douglass, Death as a Bargaining Chip: Plea Bargaining and the Future
of Virginia’s Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 873, 873–74 (2015).
27. In addition to being an adjunct law professor, Doug Ramseur is founder of The Ram
Law Firm, P.L.L.C., in Richmond, Virginia. He has practiced law for twenty-five years,
eighteen of which he has spent specializing in capital defense, mostly in Virginia but also in
Georgia and federal courts around the country. Doug has served as lead counsel for more
than thirty people facing a death sentence without a single client being executed. In 2019,
he was awarded the Bill Geimer Award by the Capital Case Clearinghouse at Washington
and Lee University School of Law for his dedication and commitment to the defense of capital cases. Doug is also faculty with the National Capital Voir Dire Training Program, see
infra note 436 and accompanying text. For a discussion of his work as a regional capital
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One of us is a law professor who has written on the death penalty
for over a decade.28 Together, we tell the story behind the story—
what the transcripts and plea deals don’t show. This is the inside
story as we know it, and we share it here both to better understand
Virginia’s journey and to serve as a resource for others still navigating theirs.
Before proceeding, a few points of clarification merit mention.
First, our claim is not that Virginia’s capital defender offices were
solely, or even mostly, responsible for the repeal of the death penalty in the Commonwealth. As discussed above, a number of factors
were clearly in play, and, as discussed below, even the drop in
death sentencing can hardly be attributed solely to the capital defenders.29 Other actors played a part as well.
Second, our discussion of how Virginia’s capital defender offices
made a difference is not to suggest that court-appointed counsel in
capital cases was not superb, because it was—at times. This, too,
is a point we discuss more fully below,30 but here we simply note
that both before the advent of specialized capital defender offices
and after, other attorneys were also defending capital cases, and a
number of them could easily be counted as among the best capital
defenders in the Commonwealth.31
Third, although our focus is on the change that came with the
advent of capital defender offices in Virginia, we pause to recognize
that this change was related to another that came before it. Long
defender, see infra text following note 362. For a note from Doug about his role in this project, see infra note 363 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 17; Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2007); Corinna Barrett Lain, Lessons Learned from the Evolution of “Evolving Standards,” 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661 (2010); James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain,
Death Penalty Drugs and the International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L. J. 1215 (2015);
Corinna Barrett Lain, The Politics of Botched Executions, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 825 (2015);
Corinna Barrett Lain, Madison and the Mentally Ill: The Death Penalty for the Weak, Not
the Worst, 31 REGENT U. L. REV. 209 (2019); Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Observations about
the Worst of the Worst, Virginia-Style, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 469 (2021) [hereinafter Lain, Three Observations about the Worst of the Worst, Virginia Style].
29. See supra notes 8–21 and accompanying text (discussing numerous factors); infra
section III.A (recognizing the role of other factors that almost certainly had an impact on
the drop in death sentencing).
30. See infra notes 280–88 and accompanying text.
31. Here again, we refrain from listing names, lest we inadvertently leave someone off
the list.
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before the capital defender offices were a twinkle in Virginia’s legislative eye, the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse (“VC3”),
housed at Washington and Lee University School of Law, provided
high-end support for aggressive capital representation by court-appointed lawyers.32 It provided consultations, trainings, and comprehensive litigation guides, and it published the Capital Defense
Journal, providing a wealth of research on capital defense-related
issues.33 To the extent we can pinpoint the origin of high-quality
capital defense in Virginia, it is here with VC3.34 Indeed, when the
capital defender offices started taking cases in 2004, VC3 supported them, too. “Those offices had a lot to learn, too. They were
new to this,” said David Bruck, who directed VC3 after its founder,
Bill Geimer, retired.35 All this is to say that although our focus is
on the difference that specialized capital defender offices made, we
recognize that they stood on the shoulders of giants.
Fourth and finally, we would be remiss without recognizing the
other giant in Virginia capital defense: the Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center (“VCRRC”).36 The VCRRC provided
post-conviction representation that tied capital cases in knots for
years, obtaining reversals and retrials under notoriously unfavorable appellate review conditions.37 Its work was what created the
32. The VC3 was established in the 1987–88 academic year, and remained open until
2021, when it disbanded—“a victim of its own success in many ways.” Jeff Hanna, Farewell
to the VC3 (Aug. 23, 2021), https://columns.wlu.edu/farewell-to-the-vc3/ [https://perma.cc/
F3QB-AWTA]. For the VC3 website, see https://www.vc3.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/N6Q
V-J2NS].
33. Indeed, we cite to the Capital Defense Journal on numerous occasions in the pages
that follow. See generally Capital Defense Journal, WASH. & LEE, https://scholarlycom
mons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/ [https://perma.cc/4YRC-KMA3]. For a particularly prescient article arguing for the creation of a specialized capital defender unit, see Jeremy P. White, Establishing a Capital Defense Unit in Virginia: A Proposal to Increase the Quality of Representation for Indigent Capital Defendants, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 323 (2001).
34. See Hanna, supra note 32 (quoting David Bruck as explaining, “For the most part, it
was amateur hour on the defense side in case after case . . . In the years before I got there,
I think VC3 helped establish what you could call a standard of care for capital defense in
Virginia that hadn’t been there”).
35. Id.
36. For a history of the VCRRC, which was initially established as a federal death penalty
resource center in 1992 and is the only former federal resource center in the country to keep
its doors open after the elimination of federal funding, see History of the Virginia Resource
Center, VA. CAPITAL REPRESENTATION RESOURCE CTR., https://vcrrc.org/history.
37. For a discussion of Virginia’s appellate review in the capital context, see infra Part
I.B.3.
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risk of reversal on appeal that capital defenders used as leverage
to take death off the table at trial.38 Moreover, to the extent that
capital defenders had favorable law to lean on in capital trials, it
was often the work of the VCRRC that created it. Here again, all
this is to say that while our story focuses on the difference that the
capital defender offices made, we recognize that those offices did
not make a difference alone. Their work was in tandem with other
capital defense representation targeting other parts of the machinery of death. It did not exist in a vacuum.
This brings us more pointedly to what is our focus—explaining
the dynamics that were driving the difference that specialized capital defender offices made. We know empirically that the advent of
capital defender offices made a difference in Virginia, both in the
percentage of capital cases that went to trial and what happened
once they were there.39 We also know empirically that the same
impact has occurred elsewhere—states that created capital defender offices experienced faster declines in death sentencing than
states that didn’t, controlling for a range of other factors.40 In short,
what happened in Virginia was not unrepresentative. But why did
it happen? That is the story we tell, some of which is intuitive but
most of which is not, with much going in the category of unintended
consequences.
To set the stage, we start with what capital defenders were up
against: Virginia’s longstanding commitment to capital punishment. Part I begins with a brief account of the early era of capital
punishment in Virginia, then turns to the death penalty in the
modern era, explaining how Virginia’s capital punishment system
worked. We do this not only to show what an incredible feat Virginia’s repeal was, but also to create a record for posterity—to preserve an account of what the most lethal death penalty in the country looked like and how it actually operated.
Part II marks a turn, both in our analysis and in Virginia’s machinery of death. We start with the concerns that precipitated Virginia’s creation of four regional capital defender offices in 2002. We

38. See infra notes 460–62 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
40. See Ankur Desai & Brandon L. Garrett, The State of the Death Penalty, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1255 (2019).
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then turn to the difference that having capital defender offices
made in the trial, pretrial, and (most importantly) plea-bargaining
context. Readers also will find a shout-out to the talented and hardworking mitigation specialists and investigators who were part of
the capital defender offices here.
Part III concludes with the qualifications and implications of our
analysis. We first qualify our account by circling around to other
players who made a difference in the trenches of capital litigation.
We then pause to reflect on what we see as the takeaways of our
analysis. The full account of Virginia’s repeal of capital punishment is much larger than the piece we provide here, but the story
of how specialized capital defenders ground the most well-oiled machinery of death in the country to a halt is a story that deserves to
be told. We now turn to telling it.
I. VIRGINIA’S LONG LOVE AFFAIR WITH DEATH
Virginia is for lovers, and we begin our journey by recounting
Virginia’s longstanding love affair with death. Our discussion
starts in section A with a brief account of the early era of the death
penalty in Virginia, from its colonial start to its status on the eve
of the modern death penalty era. We continue in section B with a
discussion of the structure and workings of Virginia’s capital punishment scheme in the modern era. In section C, we step back to
provide a big picture view of the challenging context in which capital defenders were operating, presenting data points that attest to
Virginia’s unwavering commitment to death. As we will see, there
is a reason why Virginia was notoriously prolific in getting death
sentences, and notoriously efficient in carrying them out: every aspect of its statutory scheme was unambiguously skewed towards
death.
A. The Early Years
Established in 1607, Virginia was the first (and, for a time, only)
colony in North America, and it wasted no time getting to what
would be the first execution in the New World, which came the
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following year in 1608.41 (For trivia buffs, the condemned was Captain George Kendall, an alleged Spanish spy who was shot rather
than hanged, a mercy reserved for those with rank or status).42 For
the early colonists, the death penalty was a way of life—in part
because it was what they knew from England, in part because they
had no way to imprison serious offenders, and in part because abiding by society’s rules was viewed as necessary for their survival.43
In a world where survival was already hanging by a thread, rulebreaking was more than an indiscretion. It was an existential
threat.
So it came to be that the colonists brought with them all of England’s capital crimes, and then added a number of their own. Virginia’s earliest criminal code—the aptly named Laws Divine,
Moral and Martial—was devised sometime around 1609 and listed
fifty-four capital offenses, many of which made little sense without
an appreciation for just how precarious a position the colonists
were in at the time.44 Boat-stealing was a capital offense because
it would have left the colonists stranded.45 Hog-stealing was a capital offense because hogs were, well, hogs and could provide sustenance for a population on the brink of starvation.46 Pocket-picking,
price-gouging, buoy-sinking, and returning-from-banishment were

41. History of the Death Penalty, supra note 6.
42. See id. For the story, see Natasha Frost, Was the Colonies’ First Death Penalty
Handed to a Mutineer or Spy? HIST. (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/deathpenalty-jamestown-virginia-colony [https://perma.cc/6QHM-WRNB]. Apparently, Kendall’s
high rank spared him from death by hanging. Id. See also 1610: HENRY PAINE: SHIPWRECKED MUTINEER, https://www.executedtoday.com/tag/jamestown/ (quoting contemporary account of Henry Paine’s execution in 1610, noting that Paine had been condemned to
be “instantly hanged” but “he earnestly desired, being a gentleman, that he might be shot
to death” instead).
43. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 7–8 (2002) (discussing the death penalty in early colonial Virginia).
44. See Richard A. Rutyna, The Capital Laws of Virginia: An Historical Sketch 2–3
(1973), https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/1973/RD1/PDF [https://perma.cc/7YB7-UXCE]
(discussing code and noting, “[I]ncluded among these [provisions] were a number of offenses
which a modern reader—not understanding just how desperate and precarious the situation
in the colony was at the time—would regard as much too trivial to warrant the death penalty.”).
45. See id. at 8.
46. See id. at 13 (noting, in addition, that “[t]he hog only was ‘something of an institution’ in colonial Virginia, and as such was the subject of special, protective legislation”).
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also illustrative of the offenses deemed death-worthy in colonial
Virginia.47
Then there were the religious offenses, which tended to be more
forgiving. Crimes in this category included taking God’s name in
vain, breaking the Sabbath, failing to attend divine services, and
speaking against the Holy Trinity, the Bible, or “known Articles of
the Christian Faith.”48 While some of these offenses called for
death on the first violation, others were considered capital only
upon the second or even third offense.49 Religion and authority
were intertwined in the colonial period, and an affront to one was
considered an affront to the other. Neither could be tolerated.
By the late 1690s, capital offenses had begun to reflect the existence of slavery in the Commonwealth, and as the enslaved population in Virginia grew, so did its slave-specific capital offenses.50 By
1750, enslaved people comprised nearly half the population of Virginia.51 With that demographic, it is hard to overestimate the role
of Virginia’s death penalty as a tool of racial control. Enslaved people were already captive, already doing forced labor, and already
subjected to a baseline of abject cruelty.52 Their lives were one of
the few things they had left. Typical of the offenses in this category
was Virginia’s 1748 law making it a capital crime for enslaved people to prepare or administer medicine without the taker’s consent,

47. See id. at 22–23, 25. Interestingly, Virginia’s capital crimes resulted in relatively
few executions in the 1600s, suggesting that they may have had more bark than bite. For a
list of executions in Virginia and other colonies in the 1600s, see DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
EXECUTIONS IN THE U.S. 1608-2002: THE ESPY FILE, https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/leg
acy/documents/ESPYyear.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ7J-28Q9] (listing just seven executions in
Virginia between 1608 and 1658).
48. See id. at 10, 24–26.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 29–30 (“With respect to slaves, it should be noted that by the 1690s a dual
legal system—which would be expanded and elaborated further—had clearly begun to
emerge in Virginia.”).
51. See BANNER, supra note 43, at 8.
52. See id. at 9. For an excellent discussion of how slave executions acclimated Southern
Whites to the brutality of the death penalty, preventing the abolitionist conversations and
movement taking hold in the North from getting even a toe hold in the South, see id. at 142–
43. For a famous account of the death penalty in response to Nat Turner’s slave rebellion in
the 1830s, see generally Alfred L. Brophy, The Nat Turner Trials, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1817
(2013).
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an obvious reflection of the fear that servants might try to poison
their masters.53
Even after the revolution of 1776, when Virginia celebrated its
newfound independence with a full-scale revision of its criminal
code that limited the death penalty to murder, the reform was explicitly reserved for crimes committed by non-enslaved people.54
Virginia’s slave codes remained. “Conceptions of appropriate punishment were changing,” historian Stuart Banner writes, “but in
the South they changed only so far. The problem of managing large
numbers of captives—in Virginia, nearly half the population—prevented further reform.”55
By the mid-1850s, Virginia had a long list of slave-specific capital crimes—sixty-six by one count56—and one of them was a catchall provision that authorized the death penalty for any offense that
would carry a sentence of three years or more when committed by
a free person.57 Virginia did not hesitate to put these provisions to
use. In the antebellum period from 1790 to 1865, Virginia executed
more than 730 slaves—just over eighty-five percent of all slave executions in the country during that time.58
By the mid-1850s, Virginia’s criminal code also accounted for the
prospect of “free Blacks.” For example, it made rape a capital crime

53. See Rutyna, supra note 44, at 30 (discussing offense); BANNER, supra note 43, at 9
(also discussing offense).
54. The revision work began in 1776 and was led by Thomas Jefferson, but when it was
finally was ready for consideration in 1785, Jefferson was traveling abroad and unable to
usher it through. The reform measure ultimately passed in 1796. For a more detailed discussion, see BANNER, supra note 43, at 95–96; Rutyna, supra note 44, at 31, 33. Within ten
years of the reform measure’s passage, treason and arson were re-added to the list of Virginia’s capital offenses. See Rutyna, supra note 44, at 33.
55. BANNER, supra note 43, at 99.
56. See id. at 141.
57. See id. at 112–13.
58. See Brumfield, supra note 8. Records show that a number of these executions included juveniles, including a slave named Rebecca, who was eleven or twelve when she executed in 1825. See id. As Stuart Banner notes, these numbers do not fully communicate
the extent to which the death penalty was used to control enslaved people, in part because
the official count does not include the number of condemned slaves that were sold abroad,
largely because owners of executed slaves were entitled to compensation from the government upon execution. Nearly 900 condemned slaves were transported out of Virginia between 1801–1858. See BANNER, supra note 43, at 142.
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when committed by a free Black against a White.59 Free Blacks
were viewed as especially dangerous in states with bulging slave
populations like Virginia, and Virginia used the death penalty to
try to control them, too.
Then came the Civil War. On the backside, Virginia no longer
had slaves, but it had a massive former-slave population that, for
Southern Whites, posed a threat of its own. Virginia quickly began
restoring the death penalty for crimes like burglary, armed robbery, rape, and attempted rape.60 This time, however, it added a
provision making the death penalty discretionary, which meant
that all-White juries and judges could decide who would receive
it.61
The numbers speak for themselves. From 1908 (when Virginia
centralized its executions, as well as its record-keeping system
tracking them)62 to 1972 (the end of the early era of capital punishment), forty-one of the forty-one people executed for rape were
Black; fourteen of the fourteen people executed for attempted rape
were Black; and five of the five people executed for armed robbery
were Black.63 Apparently, no one was executed for burglary during
this time (at least not officially), but if there had been executions
for burglary, everything we know suggests that the people executed would have been Black.
Murder was a different story, but only slightly. Of the 176 people
executed for murder in Virginia during this time, 34 (20%) were

59. See K.M.M. & A.J.S., Capital Punishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REV. 97, 103–04
(1972) (discussing VA. CODE ch. 200, §§ 1, 4, vol. II at 753 (1849)).
60. See Rutyna, supra note 44, at 33.
61. See K.M.M. & A.J.S., supra note 59, at 106.
62. See id. at 112 (discussing why most reliable data begins in 1908). For an excellent
account of Virginia’s 1908 switch from local executions by hanging to centralized executions
by the electric chair, driven both by progressive reformers searching for a more humane
execution method and segregationists, who wanted to prevent the Black community from
congregating to celebrate the condemned as martyrs, see DALE M. BRUMFIELD, RAILROADED:
THE TRUE STORIES OF THE FIRST 100 PEOPLE EXECUTED IN VIRGINIA’S ELECTRIC CHAIR
(2020).
63. See K.M.M. & A.J.S., supra note 59, at 142 (providing table of executions by race for
all capital offenses since 1908). These figures are a conservative estimate. See History of the
Death Penalty, supra note 6 (noting that forty-eight of the forty-eight people executed in
Virginia for rape were Black, twenty of the twenty people executed for attempted rape were
Black, and all five of the five people executed for armed robbery were Black).
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White, and 142 (80%) were Black.64 Murder was a crime for which
White people were being executed, but as was true of Virginia’s
other capital offenses, the death penalty for murder was, by and
large, reserved for Black offenders.
Not included in this tally were lynchings in Virginia, which
peaked between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and served as a separate, unofficial form of capital punishment
that augmented the formal practice.65 As Stuart Banner notes in
his discussion of lynching in the post-civil war period, the line between official and unofficial executions was remarkably thin. Capital trials of Black defendants were perfunctory events that happened “astonishingly fast”—a mere fifty minutes in one case from
the time the jury was sworn to the time the defendant was
hanged—and lynch mobs were all too often led by the same people
who, in their official capacity, worked in the criminal justice system.66 The two worked in tandem, Banner writes, noting that “[a]
culture that carried out so much unofficial capital punishment
could hardly be squeamish about the official variety.”67
Understanding the close connection between official and unofficial executions provides some perspective on Virginia’s seemingly
progressive move as the first state in the Union to pass an antilynching law in 1928 (incredibly, efforts to pass such legislation at
the federal level remain stalled, despite attempts as late as 2020).68
“There is no excuse for lynching in a State where the enforcement
of the law in cases likely to provoke mob violence has been prompt
and rigorous,” Virginia’s governor at the time stated in support of
the measure,69 almost saying the quiet part out loud. As author
64. See JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S
SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT at 6 (2002), [hereinafter 2002 JLARC STUDY] https://j
larc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt274.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8HT-KJYV].
65. See BANNER, supra note 43, at 229.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See Brumfield, supra note 8 (discussing Virginia’s landmark anti-lynching law). For
the status of current efforts, see John Wagner & Mike DeBonis, Sen. Paul Acknowledges
Holding Up Anti-lynching Bill, Says He Fears It Would Be Wrongly Applied, WASH. POST
(June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/sen-paul-acknowledges-holding
-up-anti-lynching-bill-says-he-fears-it-would-be-wrongly-applied/2020/06/03/29b97330-a5bf
-11ea-b619-3f9133bbb482_story.html [https://perma.cc/56AD-DHW5].
69. Brumfield, supra note 8 (quoting then-Governor Harry Byrd).
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and activist Dale Brumfield has noted, “Platitudes such as ‘let the
law take its course’ and ‘justice will prevail’ were correctly interpreted by mobs [to mean] ‘the courts will do the lynching for you,
legally.’”70 (And, apparently, they did.)
In light of this history, it is not quite right to say, as some have,
that the death penalty in Virginia was “a direct descendant of . . .
lynching.”71 To be sure, some capital crimes—attempted rape is one
example—were explicitly justified on the notion that if the law did
not impose the death penalty, lawless mobs would.72 But capital
statutes existed long before lynching became a feature of Virginia’s
cultural landscape, and, if anything, the rise of lynching was in
response to the demise of slave codes, reflecting an impatience with
the post-Civil War death penalty statutes designed to take their
place.73 In short, Virginia’s death penalty was not “birthed out of
lynching,” nor was it “lynching’s stepchild”74—although the two are
clearly close relatives, so perhaps we are just splitting hairs. Indeed, the two were so intimately interconnected that perhaps incestuous is a better way to describe their relationship (at least if
we’re sticking with the family tree analogy).
This brings us almost to the end of the early era of capital punishment in Virginia, but for two additional points. One is that Virginia continued to add to its list of capital statutes throughout the
mid-twentieth century, even as the national trend by the 1960s

70. Id.
71. See Dakin Andone, Why Virginia’s Abolition of the Death Penalty Is a Big Deal for
the State and the US, CNN (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/29/us/virginiadeath-penalty-abolition-significance/index.html [https://perma.cc/H5Y2-QZZN] (quoting
one advocate as saying, “Capital punishment is a direct descendant of slavery, lynching and
Jim Crow”).
72. See K.M.M. & A.J.S., supra note 59, at 107 (noting “the General Assembly authorized the death penalty for attempted rape because of fears that failure to do so would risk
the lynching of persons accused of that crime”). See also BANNER, supra note 43, at 229
(noting argument that without capital punishment, Southerners would result to more lynching in an effort to satisfy their desire for retribution for crime).
73. Here, too, attempted rape is a prime example. Attempted rape was a capital offense
both for slaves and free Blacks before the civil war. See K.M.M. & A.J.S., supra note 59, at
108.
74. Andone, supra note 71 (quoting advocate saying that capital punishment was
“birthed out of lynching”); Virginia Abolishes the Death Penalty, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE
(Mar. 24, 2021), https://eji.org/news/virginia-death-penalty-abolition/ [https://perma.cc/SM
K9-CUNL] (calling the death penalty “lynching’s stepchild”).
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was going the opposite way.75 Documenting the point, a study of
Virginia’s death penalty in 1972 noted that, “[c]ompared with other
states that continue to authorize the death penalty, Virginia authorizes its use for an extremely high number of crimes.”76 At the
time, only three other states had as many as ten capital offenses.77
Virginia had eleven, and it was an outlier in the type of offenses
that were death-eligible in several ways.78 Virginia was one of only
four states in the country to make arson a capital crime, and the
same was true of burglary.79 Virginia was also the only state in the
Union to make attempted rape a capital crime, along with some
random offenses like use of a machine gun or sawed-off shotgun in
a crime of violence, and entering a bank with intent to commit larceny while armed with a deadly weapon.80 As the 1972 study of
Virginia’s death penalty noted, other states were in the midst of
abolishing or at least limiting their death penalty, while Virginia
was repeatedly expanding it.81
The second point goes to these statutes’ application. While most
of the crimes on Virginia’s prodigious list of capital offenses did not
produce an execution in the early era, those offenses that did produce executions did so in an unequivocally racialized way. As noted
above, executions for nonmurder capital offenses in the early era
were reserved exclusively for Black offenders, while executions for
murder in the early era were reserved predominantly for Black offenders.82 All told, Virginia executed 236 people between 1908 and
1972, and 202 of them—85%—were Black.83
75. For a discussion of state legislative trends on the death penalty in the 1960s, see
Lain, Furman Fundamentals, supra note 28, at 22–24.
76. K.M.M. & A.J.S., supra note 59, at 99.
77. See id. at 99–100.
78. See id. (“Only three crimes which are currently punishable by death in Virginia are
capital offenses in a majority of the states: murder, kidnapping, and treason. For the remainder of the eleven offenses which Virginia considers capital, only a small minority of the
states permit the death penalty.”).
79. See id. at 100.
80. See id. For most of these capital crimes, the study could find no explanation for
Virginia’s deviation from the norm. See id. at 11.
81. See id. at 98. For a list of Virginia’s capital statutes and when they were added, see
Rutyna, supra note 44, at 34.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.
83. See K.M.M. & A.J.S., supra note 59, at 142. For an extended discussion of Virginia’s
racially charged death penalty in the early era, see id. at 112–22.
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If those numbers did not speak volumes, Virginia’s notorious execution of the “Martinsville Seven” in 1951 did. The case concerned
seven Black men who were accused of raping a White woman and
sentenced to death by all-White, all-male juries in trials that lasted
less than a day each.84 Their mass execution marked the largest
mass execution for rape in United States history, and the largest
mass execution in Virginia history.85 The message was loud and
clear: Virginia was fiercely committed to its racial mores and would
not hesitate to use the death penalty to enforce them. (In 2021,
Virginia’s governor issued posthumous pardons for all seven.)86
That brings us to the end of the early era of capital punishment
in Virginia, and this much was undeniably true: Virginia was allin on its death penalty, and its death penalty was doing work as a
tool of racial control. The two were not unrelated, and neither was
new. The question was what, if anything, would change when Virginia was forced to start anew in the modern era.
B. The Modern Era
In this section, we turn to Virginia’s death penalty in the modern
era of capital punishment. We begin by briefly explaining how the
early era ended and how the modern era of the death penalty in
Virginia began. We then document what Virginia’s machinery of
death looked like and how it worked in practice. First, we examine
Virginia’s modern era capital punishment statute, explaining the
ways that it worked to maximize death sentences. Then we examine Virginia’s post-conviction capital case review process,

84. See History of the Death Penalty, supra note 6. For an in-depth account of the case
and its backstory, see ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE, AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1998).
85. See History of the Death Penalty, supra note 6. Virginia executed four of the seven
men in one day, adding another execution from an unrelated case to bring its one-day tally
to five, and then executed the three remaining men three days later. See Eric W. Rise, Race,
Rape, and Radicalism: The Case of the Martinsville Seven, 1949-1951, 58 J. SOUTHERN HIST.
461, 487–88 (1992).
86. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., ‘Martinsville 7’ Granted Posthumous Pardons 70
Years After Their Executions (Sept. 3, 2021), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/martinsville
-7-granted-posthumous-pardons-70-years-after-their-executions [https://perma.cc/B4LU8PFZ].
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explaining the ways that it worked to turn death sentences into
executions.
1. Getting to the Modern Era
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia invalidated
death penalty statutes nationwide, ending the early era of the
death penalty by forcing the entire country to take a time-out on
capital punishment.87 In Furman, the Justices ruled that the death
penalty as it was then administered was arbitrary and capricious
(and “pregnant with discrimination,” at least in the minds of three
of the five majority Justices).88 For the ultimate penalty to be “so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed,”89 the Justices concluded, was
a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments” clause.90 The root of the problem, the Justices explained,
was that judges and juries had unfettered discretion in deciding
death.91 They could do whatever they wanted, and that was fundamentally incompatible with the rule of law.
If the problem was unfettered discretion, Virginia had a solution: it would simply make the death penalty mandatory, removing
discretion altogether. And that’s what it did, enacting a mandatory
death penalty in 1975 for first-degree murder when committed

87. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
88. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“[I]f any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of race.”); id. at 365–66 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“It
is also evident that the burden of capital punishment falls on the poor, the ignorant, and
the underprivileged members of society.”).
89. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems
that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”).
90. Id. at 239–40 (per curiam) (“The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed.”); id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t smacks of little
more than a lottery system.”).
91. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice
that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one
man or of 12.”).
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under one of six specified circumstances.92 Three of the six made
murder a capital crime when committed in the course of committing another felony. Rape, robbery, and abduction were the ancillary offenses in this category.93 The other three made murder a
capital crime based on the circumstances of the murder itself. Murder for hire, murder by an inmate in a penal institution, and murder of a police officer were the capital offenses in this category.94
A year later, in 1976, the Supreme Court reconsidered the death
penalty in light of states’ new and improved capital statutes. In
Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases, the Court upheld three
“guided discretion” statutes that purported to eliminate arbitrary
death sentencing by guiding the death-sentencing decision in some
way.95 But in Woodson v. North Carolina and its companion case,
the Court invalidated two state statutes that had eliminated discretion entirely by making the death penalty mandatory for select
crimes.96 Mandatory death penalties exceeded “the limits of civilized standards,” a plurality of the Justices wrote,97 saving words
like “abhorrent” and “monster” for their closed conference discussions.98 The Justices explained that society had evolved away from
such draconian punishments, and it had done so largely because
juries that did not want to impose the death penalty were simply
refusing to convict, which added an arbitrariness of its own.99 In
short, the problem with mandatory death penalties was not only
that they were anachronistic, but also that they were ineffectual in
solving the arbitrariness problem. States that had rewritten their
capital punishment statutes to provide for mandatory death

92. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 9 (discussing statute).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976); accord Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 259–60 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276–77 (1976).
96. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
97. Id. at 288.
98. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985) 621 (Del. Dickson ed., 2001)
(quoting Justice Stevens in conference after the Woodson oral arguments as saying, “To
have created a monster like North Carolina, which increases the incidence of the penalty,
is abhorrent”).
99. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 290–93 (discussing history of mandatory death penalties).
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penalties—and there were ten of them, including Virginia100—
would need to try again. And that is exactly what Virginia did.
2. Virginia’s Modern-Era Death Penalty Statute: How to Get
Death
In 1977, the year after Woodson, Virginia again revamped its
death penalty statute.101 In this version, Virginia kept its six capital offenses, but replaced its mandatory death penalty with a discretionary one, guiding discretion by requiring the jury to find one
of two aggravating circumstances before a death sentence could be
imposed. One of these copied an aggravating circumstance that the
Supreme Court of the United States had upheld in 1976 in a companion case to Gregg. In Jurek v. Texas, the Court validated the
Texas guided-discretion statute, which essentially asked juries to
determine whether the defendant posed “a continuing threat to society.”102 Virginia copied the wording of the Texas “future dangerousness”103 aggravator nearly verbatim, requiring the jury to find
that the defendant posed a “continuing serious threat to society”
before imposing a sentence of death.104 But where Texas would go
100. See id. at 313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The plurality concedes, as it must, that
following Furman 10 States enacted laws providing for mandatory capital punishment.”).
101. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2; 19.2-264.4(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
102. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (discussing and quoting TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC., art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975–1976)). Technically, the jury was required to answer three
questions: (1) whether the defendant’s conduct was deliberate and with the reasonable expectation that death would result; (2) whether the defendant constitutes a continuing threat
to society; and (3) whether the defendant’s conduct was unreasonable if in response to provocation by the victim. See id. The answer to the first and third questions will always be yes
for first-degree murder, so the second question is the essence of the determination. Under
the Texas scheme, the death penalty would be imposed if the jury answered all three questions in the affirmative, and that made it much closer to a mandatory death penalty than
the other guided discretion statutes. See id.; see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 315 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (“The Texas system much more closely approximates the mandatory North
Carolina system which is struck down today.”).
103. For a history and critique, see Lara D. Gass, Virginia’s Redefinition of the “Future
Dangerousness” Aggravating Factor: Unprecedented, Unfounded, and Unconstitutional, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1887 (2013). The text of both Virginia Code sections is reproduced in
id. at 1906.
104. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(c) (Repl. Vol. 2008); see Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 473, 248 S.E.2d 135, 146 (1978) (noting that Virginia’s revised capital
punishment scheme “follow[ed] the pattern approved in Jurek”). Virginia’s statutory scheme
was different from that of Texas in important ways. It did not ask jurors to answer questions
and then impose the death penalty if the answer was yes, and it recognized statutory
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big, Virginia would go bigger. The Commonwealth added a second
aggravating circumstance that would also allow the jury to return
a death sentence: a finding that the offense was “outrageously or
wantonly vile.”105
It is worth pausing to appreciate just how broad each of these
aggravating circumstances were. Juries could look to the offense
itself to satisfy either of the required findings,106 and it was hard
to imagine how the facts of a capital murder would not show that
the defendant was dangerous to society, or that the murder was
vile. Virginia did not have a mandatory death penalty (because it
couldn’t), but it did have two aggravating circumstances that
would almost always be met. The Commonwealth would guide sentencing discretion because it had to, but in most every case, it
would guide the discretion towards death.
And that’s just the aggravators on their face. In practice, both
were even more skewed toward death than they looked at first
glance. Start with future dangerousness. Under the theory “the
best predictor of the future is the past” (as one prosecutor told the
jury in closing argument),107 Virginia recognized three types of evidence relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry: the defendant’s prior history, the defendant’s criminal record, and the facts
of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.108
Notably not on the list were clinical risk assessments informed
by empirical research and diagnostic evaluations that went to the
defendant’s actual future dangerousness. Those were not admissible in Virginia,109 and, in this regard, Virginia stood alone—it was
mitigators. See § 19.2-264.4(c) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
105. § 19.2-264.2(c) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
106. See § 19.2-264.4(c) (Repl. Vol. 2008) (allowing findings to be based on “the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which [the defendant] is accused”); see
also Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 151, 295 S.E.2d 643, 655 (1982) (holding that
the “heinous circumstances surrounding this homicide” were themselves sufficient to support a finding of future dangerousness).
107. See Garrett, supra note 25, at 701 (quoting prosecutor as arguing to the jury, “The
best predictor of future conduct, ladies and gentlemen, is past conduct”).
108. See Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 252, 661 S.E.2d 415, 440 (2008) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony on future dangerousness because it did not go to “the defendant’s prior history, prior criminal record and/or the circumstances of the offense”).
109. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 248–51, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882–84 (2013);
accord Porter, 276 Va. at 252–54, 661 S.E.2d 415, 440–41; Morva v. Commonwealth, 278
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the only jurisdiction in the country to employ the “future dangerousness” aggravator, but not allow clinical evidence on the very
thing that the jury was being asked to decide.110 Even Texas allowed risk assessment evidence on the issue of future dangerousness.111
Part of the problem was the fact that risk assessments assess
risks in specific contexts. In a capital case, for example, the question of whether a defendant posed a “continuing serious threat to
society” would depend heavily on whether they were being housed
in a secure facility or were out on the street with ready access to
alcohol and drugs. Risk is contextual, and risk assessments are too.
In Virginia, considering context cut in a capital defendant’s favor
because as of 1995, when Virginia adopted life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”), LWOP was the only alternative to a
death sentence in a capital case.112 As such, if capital defendants
lived, they would live to die in prison with no chance whatsoever of
re-entering society. That meant the only place they could actually
be dangerous was a high-security prison, and it turns out that the
risk of dangerousness, even for the most dangerous of offenders, is
exceptionally low in that environment—0.2% in a study of Texas
convicted murderers.113
All that is important because it sets up what this clinical risk
assessment evidence looked like. It was not the prosecutor aching
to admit this evidence. The prosecutor had the defendant’s

Va. 329, 350–51, 683 S.E.2d 553, 565–66 (2009); see also Garrett, supra note 25, at 672
(noting that “future dangerousness in Virginia is not carefully informed by empirical research on the actual dangerousness of, say, a prisoner confined to prison for life without
parole”).
110. See Gass, supra note 103, at 1927–28.
111. See id. at 1928; see also Garrett, supra note 25, at 701 (noting that in Virginia,
“there has rarely been a battle of future dangerous experts, as is common in Texas”).
112. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Repl. Vol. 2014); Virginia Abolishes Life Without Parole for Children, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/news/virginia-abolishes-life-witho
ut-parole-for-children/ [https://perma.cc/ZX9J-SVE3].
113. See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk Assessment of
Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1256–
57, 1262 (2000); see also Mark D. Cunningham, Dangerousness and Death: A Nexus in
Search of Science and Reason, 2006 AM. PSYCHOL. 828, 832 (discussing research showing
that the rate of violent crime in prisons is “quite low” despite a “concentration of individuals
whose community conduct had been recurrently criminal and violent”).
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criminal record and past misdeeds, plus the facts of the murder
itself.114 That was plenty for a jury to find future dangerousness in
any case. It was the defendants who desperately wanted to get clinical risk assessment evidence to the jury, not only because the base
rate of violence for capital offenders in a secured facility was exceedingly low, but also because individualized assessments almost
invariably showed that when placed in a secure, structured environment without ready access to drugs or alcohol, the defendant
posed little, if any, threat to others.115
Virginia would have none of it, literally. Defendants were not
allowed to submit evidence that violent recidivism is pretty much
non-existent in capital offenders imprisoned for life, and, more importantly, they were not allowed to present individualized risk assessments of their proclivity for future violence because those assessments were based on the fact that they would be living the rest
of their lives in prison.116 The question, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained, was not whether the defendant could be dangerous, but rather whether they would be if given the chance.117 Indeed, capital defendants were not even allowed to instruct the jury
that a life sentence meant life—at least until the Supreme Court
required states to give an LWOP instruction118—and, even then,
114. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of what this evidence actually looked like, see Lawlor v. Zook, 909
F.3d 614, 619–23 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing expert evidence as to the defendant’s future
dangerousness in a high-security prison setting).
116. See supra notes 109–13. Capital defendants were entitled to present evidence that
they were well-behaved prisoners under Skipper v. South Carolina, but that evidence went
to mitigation and not to rebut evidence of future dangerousness. 476 U.S. 1, 4–5, 7 (1986);
see also Lawlor, 285 Va. 187, 249, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882 (2013).
117. Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 339–40, 541 S.E.2d 872, 893 (2001) (“[T]he
relevant inquiry is not whether [a defendant] could commit criminal acts of violence in the
future but whether he would.”); Morva, 278 Va. at 349, 683 S.E.2d at 564; see also Lawlor,
285 Va. at 248, 738 S.E.2d at 882 (quoting Morva and Burns and noting that “the issue is
not whether the defendant is physically capable of committing violence, but whether he has
the mental inclination to do so.”).
118. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding where a state makes
a claim of future dangerousness, the capital defendant is constitutionally entitled to inform
the jury that the defendant would be subject to life without parole). The following year, in
Mickens v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized Simmons and applied
it. See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 423, 425, 457 S.E.2d 9, 9 (1995) (“Simmons requires a remand of the case for resentencing. ‘Future dangerousness’ was an issue in the
sentencing phase of the capital murder trial; therefore, the jury was entitled to be informed
of Mickens’ parole ineligibility.”). In Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
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capital defendants were not allowed to instruct the jury that in determining whether they would be a “continuing serious threat to
society,” the relevant “society” was a high-security prison. Society
meant society as a whole, the Supreme Court of Virginia held, repeatedly upholding jury instructions that told jurors to consider
society at large in determining future dangerousness—a place that
the Court knew full well a capital defendant would never be.119
It merits mention that Virginia’s refusal to allow individualized
risk assessments of a defendant’s future dangerousness was so patently unreasonable that, in 2018, the Fourth Circuit ruled that it
was “an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law.”120 Virginia could define “society” as all of society if it wanted,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, but surely all of society included the
prison society, and the Supreme Court of the United States had
explicitly held that capital defendants were entitled to submit evidence of their dangerousness in the prison setting.121 “Virginia is
still part of the Union, right?” one of the Fourth Circuit judges
Virginia went a step further and held that jurors must be instructed that a life sentence
means life without the possibility of parole even in a case where future dangerousness is
not in issue. 258 Va. 347, 368–69, 519 S.E.2d 602, 613 (1999) (“[T]his appeal presents our
first opportunity to consider whether the granting of an instruction on parole ineligibility is
required in a capital case in which the Commonwealth relied on the vileness aggravating
factor alone.”); id. at 374, 519 S.E.2d at 616 (“Accordingly, we hold that in the penalty-determination phase of a trial where the defendant has been convicted of capital murder . . .
where the defendant asks for such an instruction . . . the trial court shall instruct the jury
that the words ‘imprisonment for life’ mean ‘imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.’”).
119. See Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 517, 537 S.E.2d 866, 879 (“The statute
does not limit . . . consideration to ‘prison society’ when a defendant is ineligible for parole,
and we decline Lovitt’s effective request that we rewrite the statute to restrict its scope.”);
accord Lawlor, 285 Va. at 249, 738 S.E.2d at 882 (reaffirming Lovitt on this point); Porter,
276 Va. at 256, 661 S.E.2d at 442 (upholding trial court’s instruction to the jury that society
meant “[e]verybody, anywhere, anyplace, anytime”).
120. See Lawlor v. Zook, 909 F.3d 614, 618 (4th Cir. 2018); id. at 626 (noting that to
reverse, “the ruling must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error
will not suffice . . . a litigant must show that the state court’s ruling was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement”).
121. See id. at 630–31 (agreeing with defendant’s argument that “evidence of future dangerousness in prison is part of the society inquiry” and ruling that the trial court erred when
it “effectively held that evidence of Lawlor’s dangerousness in prison was per se irrelevant”
and the Supreme Court of Virginia erred in agreeing); id. at 618 (“It is well established that
‘evidence that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be
considered potentially mitigating,’ and ‘such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer’s consideration.’”) (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986)).
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asked the lawyer for Virginia at oral arguments, clearly incredulous at the stance that Virginia had taken.122 In its written opinion,
the Fourth Circuit stated that Virginia had “attempted to circumvent [binding precedent] by relying on baseless interpretations of
state law that themselves contravened longstanding Supreme
Court law.”123 And that was true. But the Fourth Circuit’s ruling
came too late in the game to have much of an impact. By then,
Virginia had not seen a new death sentence in seven years, and it
would not see another.124
Virginia’s “vileness” aggravator played out in a similarly skewed
fashion. By statute, vileness was just shorthand for a murder that
was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the
victim.”125 Thus, in order to find vileness, the jury had to find one
of the three listed factors: torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated
battery. But jurors did not have to agree on which one of those descriptors applied,126 and they were still virtually all-encompassing.
Indeed, the Supreme Court invalidated the exact same statutory
language in Godfrey v. Georgia for being too broad to minimally
guide the jury’s discretion.127
Virginia dodged Godfrey by interpreting depravity of mind to
mean more than “ordinary legal malice,” and interpreting an aggravated battery to mean more than “the minimum necessary to

122. See Oral Argument at 20:20–23, Lawlor, 909 F.3d 614, https://storage.courtlistener.
com/mp3/2018/09/25/mark_lawlor_v._david_zook_cl.mp3 [https://perma.cc/S8P5-TPTZ].
123. See Lawlor, 909 F.3d at 633.
124. See supra note 23. Ironically, that case was Lawlor, 909 F.3d 614.
125. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(c) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
126. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 213, 257 S.E.2d 784, 792 (1979); accord
Lawlor, 285 Va. 187, 256, 738 S.E.2d 847, 886 (2013); Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149,
180–81, 721 S.E.2d 484, 503 (2012). For an argument that the sub-factors of the “vileness”
aggravating factor should be subject to the unanimity requirement, see Douglas R.
Banghart, Vileness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 77 at 98–99 (1999).
127. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980) (“There is nothing in these few
words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize
almost every murder as ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.’”); see also
Lawlor, 285 Va. at 257, 738 S.E.2d at 887 (“Virginia’s vileness aggravating factor is identical
to the State of Georgia’s aggravating factor reviewed by the Supreme Court in Godfrey v.
Georgia.”).

2021]

DISRUPTING DEATH

209

accomplish an act of murder.”128 But, here again, it is hard to imagine a capital murder that did not satisfy one of those findings.
The egregious facts of any capital murder would suggest that the
defendant acted with more than ordinary malice (whatever that
is), and it is especially hard to imagine a capital defendant who
stuck to the minimum force necessary to kill someone. What does
that even look like—I’m going to kill you now, so please be still so I
can do this as quickly and with the least amount of force possible?129
To imagine it is to see how preposterously small the chance is that
a capital murder would not also involve an aggravated battery.130
Indeed, for capital murder offenses based on the commission of
other felonies—rape, robbery, abduction—the force used in the
commission of the felony was enough to satisfy this element without any further showing.131
Moreover, should a jury be on the fence about whether the vileness showing had been met, Virginia allowed victim impact evidence to be considered in determining whether the offense demonstrated depravity of mind.132 For the uninitiated, victim impact evidence in the capital context is evidence about how a murder has

128. The actual language that the Supreme Court of Virginia used to define depravity of
mind was a glom of words sure to surpass any juror’s understanding. See Smith, 219 Va. at
478, 248 S.E.2d at 149 (“[W]e construe the words ‘depravity of mind’ as used here to mean
a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.”). The language used to define aggravated battery was better, but not by much. See id. (“[W]e construe the words ‘aggravated
battery’ to mean a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than
the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.”).
129. Doug Ramseur submits that even this would be considered vile because telling the
victim that they are about to be murdered would add an element of fear, and that would
count as torture even if it would not count as an additional battery. Corinna Lain cannot
believe that the most ridiculous law professor hypothetical doesn’t work. Readers should
trust Doug.
130. The aggravated battery can even occur after the victim is dead. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 448, 323 S.E.2d 554, 565 (1984). See generally Banghart, supra
note 126 (arguing that Virginia’s vileness aggravator is all-encompassing).
131. See Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 339, 513 S.E.2d 634, 640 (1999) (holding that the force used in the commission of the defendant’s ancillary offenses satisfied the
aggravated battery finding).
132. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Repl. Vol. 2015); see also Weeks v. Commonwealth,
248 Va. 460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (1994) (finding victim impact evidence relevant to
depravity of mind inquiry); accord Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 291, 699 S.E.2d
237, 271–72 (2010); Prieto, 283 Va. 149, 167–68, 721 S.E.2d 484, 495–96 (2012).
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impacted the friends and family of the murder victim.133 Knowing
that, it is difficult to see how the effect of a murder on the friends
and family of the victim could shed light on the inquiry into a defendant’s state of mind. One might imagine a defendant killing
someone for the very purpose of torturing the friends and family
left behind. Now that would demonstrate depravity of mind. But
those were not the facts of any of the Supreme Court of Virginia
cases asserting the relevance of victim impact evidence to the depravity of mind inquiry.134 In the absence of any logical connection
between the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the murder
and the impact of a murder on a victim’s friends and family, the
admission of this evidence did nothing but inflame the jury’s emotions, infusing the deliberative process with a passion that the law
did not countenance or allow.135
A final point about Virginia’s aggravators merits mention, and
it regards how juries understood them to work. The Capital Jury
Project, a National Science Foundation consortium of studies that
interview jurors in capital cases to understand their decision-making, found that 53% of Virginia’s capital jurors mistakenly believed
that a death sentence was required if they found the murder to be
vile, and 41% mistakenly believed that a death sentence was required if they found that the defendant would be dangerous in the
future.136 A study of mock jurors in Virginia largely confirmed
these findings, revealing that 44% of mock jurors who were given
Virginia’s standard capital jury instructions erroneously thought
that the death penalty was required upon a finding of vileness, and
46% erroneously thought it was required upon a finding of future
dangerousness.137 In short, a shockingly large percentage of
133. For an example from the case ruling that victim impact evidence was constitutionally admissible, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (validating admission of victim
impact evidence regarding slain victim’s young son).
134. For the cases, see Weeks, 248 Va. at 460, 450 S.E.2d at 379; accord Andrews, 280
Va. at 231, 699 S.E.2d at 237; Prieto, 283 Va. at 149, 721 S.E.2d 484.
135. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 856–57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Evidence that serves no
purpose other than to appeal to the sympathies or emotions of the jurors has never been
considered admissible.”); see also ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 102 (Benjamin
Jowett trans.) (1885) (“The law is reason unaffected by desire.”).
136. See William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure to Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 73 (2003).
137. See Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Paul Marcus, Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 638–39
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ordinary people confused a finding that authorized a death sentence with a finding that required one, raising the sickening possibility that a number of Virginia’s death sentences were not even
sentences that the jury actually chose (at least in any real sense of
the word).
Part of the problem was Virginia’s limited recognition of mitigating circumstances. Virginia statutorily recognized six mitigating circumstances in the sentencing determination, but three of
them were circumstances that likely would have taken the offense
out of the category of capital murder,138 and the other three—the
defendant’s age, intellectual functioning, and lack of prior criminal
activity—were often not applicable.139 The more relevant mitigating circumstances, such as a capital defendant’s own brutalization
as a child, were not listed in Virginia’s statute, which didn’t prevent them from being considered,140 but did prevent defendants
from pointing to them as a circumstance that the Legislature explicitly recognized as worthy of serious consideration in a capital
case. As a practical matter, that meant Virginia’s statutory mitigators did not play much of a role in death sentencing one way or
the other. The real mitigation battle was being fought off-list.
The other part of the problem was how Virginia instructed its
capital juries. Virginia did not tell jurors to weigh the finding of an
aggravating circumstance against any relevant mitigating circumstances.141 It did not tell jurors that they did not need to find
(2000).
138. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015) (recognizing mitigating circumstances where “the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance”; where “the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of [their] conduct or to conform [their] conduct to the requirements of [the] law was significantly impaired”; and where “the victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to
the act”).
139. See id. (recognizing mitigating circumstances where “the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity” and recognizing “age of the defendant at the time of
the commission of the capital offense” and “the sub-average intellectual functioning of the
defendant” as mitigating circumstances).
140. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (defendants on trial for their lives are not
limited to presenting evidence on statutorily recognized mitigating circumstances).
141. See ABA, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 299 (2013), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratorium/va_complete_repo
rt.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS7S-CNAA].
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mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, or unanimously, in order to consider them.142 Most importantly, Virginia
did not tell jurors that they could return a life sentence simply because they did not believe the defendant should receive the death
penalty, even if they found an aggravator and did not find any mitigating circumstances.143 Worse yet, when jurors communicated
their confusion and asked for clarification as to what was required,
Virginia trial courts typically responded by telling them to reread
the instructions rather than just answering their question (at
which point they usually returned a sentence of death).144 An ABA
report documented all these deficiencies in 2013.145 Virginia stayed
the course.
In short, Virginia’s capital sentencing structure was like the
mouth of a whale—capable of swallowing everything in sight—and
this meant that the only constraint on Virginia’s use of the death
penalty was the fact that it was limited to six capital offenses, for
a time. Virginia added another capital offense in 1981, then another in 1985, and then another in 1989146—and it was just getting
started. By 2002, Virginia had modified or expanded its definition
of capital crimes fourteen times.147 Some of the added capital offenses were in response to particularly gruesome murders that had
captured the public’s attention.148 Some were more attributable to
political pressure that legislators were feeling to show that they
were “tough on crime.”149 All told, Virginia listed fifteen separate
capital offenses by the time of its repeal in 2021,150 but that number did not account for the fact that many of those offenses included

142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 295 (“[A] review of capital cases in Virginia indicates that trial courts
typically respond to juror questions by instructing jurors to review the instructions already
given, or by directing them to review a specific instruction.”); id. at 295–96 (discussing cases
where this was instruction and jury shortly thereafter returned a sentence of death).
145. See generally id.
146. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 11 (listing amendments).
147. See id. at 10.
148. See Hammad S. Matin, Expansion of Section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 7, 33–34 (1999) (discussing well-publicized murders that resulted in amendments
adding capital offenses).
149. See id. at 33.
150. See ABA, supra note 141, at 10–11 (listing offenses).
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attempts as well as completed auxiliary offenses, along with other
variations. In 1999, counting each of these variations brought the
true number of capital offenses to twenty-seven.151 And that was
just the tally in 1999. Whatever that number was by 2021, the
point is this: Virginia’s death penalty in the modern era was less
restrictive than it was in 1972, when the Supreme Court invalidated state statutes for not restricting the imposition of death.
This, then, was the statutory scheme for imposing Virginia’s
death penalty, but the real death-dealing magic was what happened next. Assuming that the trial court did not set aside the
death sentence for “good cause shown” (which almost never happened),152 condemned capital defendants turned to the post-conviction review process. That is where the mouth of the whale snapped
shut.
3. Virginia’s Post-Conviction Review Process: How to Keep Death
In theory, appellate and habeas review of death sentences operate as a series of veto gates, weeding out weak and constitutionally
infirm death sentences that somehow make it out of the trial and
sentencing process. Not so in Virginia. In Virginia, those veto gates
were more akin to through gates, propelling death sentences along
in a process that gathered momentum for death.
Start with the direct appeal. Defendants who received a death
sentence in Virginia had a right of appeal, and it was directly to
the Supreme Court of Virginia.153 This eliminated the Court of Appeals’ of Virginia middleman, fast-tracking the direct appeals process while removing the potential veto gate that would have come
with intermediate review. The Supreme Court of Virginia further
expedited the review process by giving death sentence appeals first
151. See A Quarter Century of Death: A Symposium on Capital Punishment in Virginia
since Furman v. Georgia, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 1, 2 (1999).
152. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Repl. Vol. 2015); see also Douglass, supra note 26,
at 878 n.36 (“I have found no record of a Virginia trial court reducing a jury verdict of death
penalty to a lesser sentence based on ‘good cause.’ Accounts of practitioners suggest it almost
never happens.”). We know of just one such case. See Winckler v. Com., 32 Va. App. 836,
842 (2000) (“The trial court set aside the death sentence and imposed a sentence of imprisonment for life on the capital murder conviction. This appeal followed.”).
153. See § 17.1-406(B) (Repl. Vol. 2020).
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priority on its docket—and it was quick on the backside too, deciding appeals in a median time of less than a year after trial and
often issuing opinions in a little over three months.154
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
claims of trial error and also performed a statutorily-required “automatic review.”155 This portion of its review occurred whether the
defendant appealed or not, and it was to determine whether a
death sentence was influenced by “passion, prejudice or any other
arbitrary factor” or was “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.”156 If the Supreme Court of Virginia
found either of those things to be true, it had the authority to commute the defendant’s sentence to life or remand the case back to
the trial court for resentencing.157 But that never happened. As in,
never. Not once, in the well over 100 death sentences reviewed
since 1977, did the supreme court overturn a death sentence on
proportionality review.158 The title of one article said it all: Great
Myths: Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny & Virginia’s Proportionality
Review.159
Part of the reason was the cases that the Supreme Court of Virginia was using for its proportionality review. The Court considered only those capital cases that came to it, and those fell into just
two categories: cases that resulted in a death sentence, which came
to it on direct appeal, and cases that did not result in a death sentence, which came to it on discretionary review from the Court of
Appeals of Virginia.160 As a result, the vast majority of the cases
that the Supreme Court of Virginia used for comparison were cases
that resulted in a sentence of death. Indeed, a 2002 study showed
that 45% of the Supreme Court of Virginia’s automatic review

154. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE 118, 220 (2017).
155. See § 17.1-313(A) (Repl. Vol. 2020).
156. § 17.1-313(C) (Repl. Vol. 2020). Apparently, victim impact evidence did not count.
See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
157. § 17.1-313(D)(2)–(3) (Repl. Vol. 2020).
158. See ABA, supra note 141, at 218 (“[T]he Supreme Court of Virginia has never reversed a death sentence on proportionality grounds.”).
159. Deborah A. Hill, Great Myths: Santa Claus, The Easter Bunny & Virginia’s Proportionality Review, 10 CAP. DEF. J. 33 (1997).
160. See ABA, supra note 141, at 217–18. The ABA found that poor record-keeping practices made more meaningful review impossible. See id. at 223.
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rulings considered only other cases where the death penalty was
imposed.161 As the 2002 study concluded, consideration of only (or
even mostly) death sentence cases “skew[s] the Court’s analysis in
a way that assures a finding supporting the proportionality of the
lower court sentencing outcomes.”162 Virginia’s comparative review
was systematically excluding the cases needed for a comparative
review.
The supreme court’s proportionality review of a juvenile death
sentence in 1998 illustrates the point. In Jackson v. Commonwealth, the supreme court upheld the death sentence of a sixteenyear-old defendant convicted of capital murder and robbery on automatic review.163 Justice Leroy Hassell dissented, noting that
“[s]ince 1987, ten sixteen-year-old offenders have been convicted of
capital murder, and only one defendant, Chauncey J. Jackson, has
been sentenced to death.”164 Because juries imposed a life sentence
in the other cases, those cases went to the court of appeals rather
than the supreme court and thus were not considered in the high
court’s review.165
The supreme court proportionality review was problematic for
other reasons as well. The Court typically limited its comparison
to cases that had the same aggravator, paying little attention to
the actual facts of the case.166 Since there were only two
161. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 68.
162. Id. at 55. Unfortunately, Virginia was not alone in this regard; other states have
problematic proportionality review processes too. For a survey of state practices and discussion of the problem, see William W. Berry, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687
(2012).
163. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998). The Supreme Court
ruled that executing juvenile offenders was unconstitutional in 2005. See Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
164. Jackson, 255 Va. at 652, 499 S.E.2d at 555 (Hassell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. See id. at 652–55, 499 S.E.2d at 555–57 (discussing five cases where sixteen-yearolds were convicted of capital murder but spared the death penalty); see also ABA, supra
note 141, at 218–19 (discussing Jackson and noting sixteen cases involving juveniles convicted of capital murder that were not included in the supreme court’s proportionality review because the juries imposed life sentences). The defendant’s sentence in Jackson was
ultimately reversed on habeas and ended as a life sentence. See ABA, supra note 141, at 219
n.62.
166. See id. at 219 (“Frequently, the [Virginia Supreme] Court’s analysis is restricted to
a comparison of other cases based on shared predicate capital felonies or aggravating circumstances, with little examination of the attendant facts surrounding the crime or the
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aggravators and both were breathtakingly broad, the Court had
plenty of cases to support any affirmance, and that became even
more true as the pool of death sentences grew over time.167 Moreover, even when its comparison included non-death sentences, the
Court explicitly gave “particular emphasis” to those cases in which
a death sentence was returned.168 This is how it came to be that
not once in the entire modern era did Virginia reverse a death sentence on proportionality review. For a sense of perspective, Florida
reversed thirty-seven death sentences on proportionality review
from 1989 to 2003 alone, and Florida is no friend to capital defendants.169
Virginia’s overall reversal rate on direct appeal—that is, its reversal rate including claims of trial error as well—was higher in
that it was more than non-existent, but not by much. A 2002 Virginia study found that the state’s reversal rate on appeal was just
7%.170 The supreme court upheld the conviction and death sentence
93% of the time. From 1977 to 2001, for example, it reversed in
only 9 of 132 capital cases considered on direct appeal.171 A national study led by Professor James Liebman at Columbia Law
School two years earlier reported similar results, putting Virginia’s
reversal rate on direct appeal at 10%—by far, the lowest in the
country.172 For a sense of perspective, the Liebman study found
that the reversal rate in Texas on direct review was 31%, and put
the national average at 40%.173 Virginia was a whopping 30 percentage points below the national average.
defendant’s life.”).
167. See Legislative Study Review, A Positive First Step: The Joint Legislative Audit and
Review Commission’s Review of Virginia’s System of Capital Punishment, 14 CAP. DEF. J.
349, 360 (2002).
168. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 301, 302 S.E.2d 520, 528 (1983) (“[W]e
have examined the records in all capital-murder cases reviewed by this Court, with particular emphasis given [to] those cases in which the death sentences were based upon the
probability that the defendants would be continuing threats to society.”).
169. See ABA, supra note 141, at 218 n.56.
170. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 55 (“This analysis revealed that the Supreme Court [of Virginia] affirmed the judgment of the trial court, including the death sentences, in 93 percent of the death cases that it has reviewed.”).
171. See id. at 58.
172. See Liebman et al., supra note 4, at 45.
173. See id. at 45; see also id. at 47 (“[T]he Supreme Court [of Virginia] finds error only
10% of the time—7 percentage points below Missouri, 16 percentage points below where the
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And that was just the direct appeal process. If a capital defendant’s direct appeal failed (as it almost always did), then, assuming
that the Supreme Court of the United States did not grant certiorari, the defendant’s next step was to challenge their conviction
and/or sentence through the habeas process, starting in state
court. Prior to 1995, that meant filing a petition for habeas corpus
relief in the state court where the defendant was tried.174 In 1995,
however, Virginia “streamlined” its habeas process and gave the
supreme court original jurisdiction over state habeas petitions,
eliminating the trial court veto gate.175 That’s right, Virginia sent
capital defendants seeking habeas relief back to the exact same
court that had just denied their direct appeal. Oh, you again.
Virginia’s process for considering state habeas petitions went a
long way towards ensuring that a capital defendant’s second trip
to the supreme court would end the same way the first one did.
Aside from Virginia’s strict and notably limited time and space constraints for filing a habeas petition (especially when compared to
other states),176 Virginia allowed for habeas petitions to be decided
on affidavits and other “recorded matters,” and they almost always
were.177 Although the supreme court had the authority to order the
trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing,178 it rarely did so. The
ABA’s 2013 study of Virginia’s death penalty found that only five
habeas petitions had been granted an evidentiary hearing since
1995, when the supreme court’s original jurisdiction over them began.179 This was “particularly troublesome,” the ABA report
distribution becomes continuous, and 31 percentage points below the national average. . . .
Missouri’s rate is only 40%, and Virginia’s is less than 25%, of the national average.”).
174. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 57 (discussing Virginia’s habeas process
prior to 1995).
175. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1995). It is tempting to say that
the move eliminated two veto gates in one shot—the trial court and Court of Appeals of
Virginia—but Virginia’s habeas process prior to 1995 already had eliminated the Court of
Appeals of Virginia by providing for a direct appeal to the supreme court. See 2002 JLARC
STUDY, supra note 64, at 57.
176. See ABA, supra note 141, at 230–32 (discussing “[i]nsufficient [t]ime and [s]pace to
[a]dequately [p]resent [s]tate [h]abeas [c]laims” and noting, “[o]ther jurisdictions—including those with a higher volume of capital cases than Virginia—do not impose such limitations”).
177. § 8.01-654(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
178. See § 8.01-654(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
179. See ABA, supra note 141, at 233. (“Since the Supreme Court of Virginia gained exclusive jurisdiction over capital habeas cases in 1995, it has granted evidentiary hearings
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concluded, because habeas proceedings are typically the place
where non-record claims are first presented, and it is difficult to
develop those claims in the absence of an evidentiary hearing
where witnesses testify and are cross-examined.180
More troubling still was the fact that no court had jurisdiction
over a capital defendant’s case on habeas until the habeas petition
was actually filed.181 That meant there was no right to discovery in
order to develop habeas claims because there was no court that had
jurisdiction to grant it.182 “Virginia law effectively bars discovery
in most capital state habeas proceedings,” the ABA wrote in its
2013 report.183 Under Virginia law, discovery was only possible in
the context of an evidentiary hearing, and that only happened after
a petition was filed, which meant it was too late to assist in filing
the petition itself.184
For the same reason, capital defendants had no access to funding
for investigators, mitigation specialists, or mental health and other
experts to assist them in developing their claims on state habeas
review. No court had jurisdiction to grant the request before the
petition was filed,185 and by the time a court did have such
in only five cases, a small fraction of the total number of capital habeas petitions it has
reviewed. The Court did not explain why it ordered hearings in only these cases, nor does
there appear to be a common issue that distinguishes these five cases from the cases in
which hearings were not granted.”).
180. Id. at viii; see also id. at xxv (noting that on habeas review, the supreme court “typically relies on affidavits and other documents, which are a poor substitute for an evidentiary hearing in which witnesses must appear, testify, and be cross-examined”); id. at 233
(“[M]any claims that are commonly presented in state habeas proceedings involve complex
factual considerations that typically require the court to consider evidence that is not in the
trial record and that cannot be fully developed in the absence of an evidentiary hearing,
such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.”).
181. See id. at xxv (“Virginia law provides that no court has jurisdiction over a death row
inmate’s case until after his/her habeas petition is filed.”); id. at 239 (discussing Virginia
law on this issue).
182. See id. at xxv (“[D]eath row inmates have no right to discovery in capital habeas
proceedings, because there is no court with the jurisdiction to grant it.”); id. at 239 (reiterating point and noting that “[i]n addition, habeas petitioners may not obtain discovery
through use of the Commonwealth’s Freedom of Information Act, as Virginia’s prosecutors
are exempt from the Act’s provisions.”).
183. Id. at 240.
184. Id.
185. See id. at xxv (Because no court has jurisdiction over a condemned capital defendant’s case until after the habeas petition is filed, “[d]eath row inmates are also unable to
seek the appointment of mitigation specialists, investigators, and experts, who are often
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authority, it was the Supreme Court of Virginia, which always said
no. Always. As in, not once did the supreme court approve funding
for mitigation, investigative, or expert assistance in a capital case
petitioning for habeas relief.186 Shockingly, that sort of assistance,
which was critical in developing off-record claims (as well as identifying them in the first place) was left to the VCRRC, which often
requested pro bono assistance from these service providers.187
Little wonder, then, that the Liebman study reported Virginia’s
rate of reversal on state habeas claims in capital cases to be three
percent, and a 2002 Virginia study reported that figure to be a
mere two percent.188 The 2002 Virginia study found that of the
fifty-six state habeas petitions in capital cases that were filed between 1995 and 2002, the supreme court granted relief in just
one.189 The ABA looked again in 2013 and reported that the number was still one, although it missed a few cases and the actual
number is three.190 Yet this is a minor quibble, and the ABA’s
needed to fully develop state habeas claims.”).
186. See id. at viii (noting that, from 1995–2012, “no court has approved funding for mitigation, investigative, or expert assistance in a death row inmate’s case for state habeas
relief”).
187. See id. at viii–ix (“Instead, the Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center—
the entity responsible for representation of most death row inmates—must often request
pro bono assistance from such service providers.”). Now is a good time to reiterate that we
stand in awe of the excellent and important work of the VCRRC, and indeed, rely on its
work in our discussion of the Ricky Gray case. See infra notes 481–501 and accompanying
text.
188. See Liebman, et al., supra note 4, at 48; 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 54–
55. The Liebman study reported that the total reversal rate for capital cases in Virginia
courts (direct appeal and state habeas review combined) was thirteen percent. See Liebman,
et al., supra note 4, at 51. Again, that figure was by far the lowest in the country. See id. at
53 (“As in other analyses, Virginia is a distinct anomaly. Its courts’ capital error-detection
rate during the study period was less than a third the national average, and 35% below the
next nearest state, Missouri—which itself has an error-detection rate 31% below the next
lowest state, after which the differences among states are small.”).
189. See id. at 57–58. Although the 2002 Virginia study does not name the case, we presume from its description (specifically, its disposition on remand after habeas relief was
granted) that the defendant was Chauncey Jackson, discussed at supra text accompanying
note 163–65. See Jackson v. Warden, 259 Va. 566, 529 S.E.2d 587 (2000) (granting habeas
relief); see also ACLU OF VA., BROKEN JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY IN VIRGINIA 39 (2003)
(discussing disposition of Chauncey Jackson case after habeas relief was granted).
190. See ABA, supra note 141, at 233. The ABA report listed the one exception as Lenz
v. Warden, a case in which the Supreme Court of Virginia granted a new sentencing hearing
for ineffective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase of trial. 265 Va. 373, 579 S.E.2d
194 (2003). See ABA, supra note 141, at 233 n.58. But the supreme court reversed itself and
denied the writ in that case after a rehearing several weeks later, so that is not a case we
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conclusion still rang true: “Virginia’s capital habeas procedure is
structured in a manner that makes it difficult or, in some cases,
impossible for a death row inmate to develop and present evidence
essential to meaningful habeas review.”191 This was a problem not
only because Virginia did not allow successive state habeas petitions—one shot was all a condemned inmate had—but also because
it resulted in an extremely limited record to consider claims on federal habeas corpus review.192 Indeed, we suspect that was the
point.
Federal habeas review of Virginia’s capital cases was the next—
and, for all practical purposes, last193—chance for a court to reverse
a death sentence, and here, too, relief was almost never granted (at
least not until the last decade).194 The 2002 Virginia study found
that of the 111 federal habeas petitions that were filed in Virginia
capital cases between 1977 and 2001, federal district courts
granted a new trial or sentencing in fifteen, denying relief in the
count. See Lenz v. Warden, 267 Va. 318, 593 S.E.2d 292 (2004). However, the supreme court
of did grant habeas relief in three other cases in the 2000s. See, e.g., Jackson v. Warden, 259
Va. 566, 529 S.E.2d 587 (2000); Morrisette v. Warden, 270 Va. 188, 613 S.E. 551 (2005);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 53, 591 S.E.2d 47 (2004) (noting as procedural posture
of the case that the supreme court awarded the writ of habeas corpus, remanding for a new
capital sentencing proceeding, and on resentencing the defendant was again sentenced to
death). We thank Matthew Engle for bringing these cases to our attention, and Rob Lee for
verifying that the supreme court granted habeas relief in just three cases.
191. ABA, supra note 141, at xxiv.
192. See id. at xxiv–xxv (“[T]he substance of habeas claims often go unaddressed, death
sentences are rarely overturned, and inmates are left with a limited record for federal courts
to review in subsequent proceedings. . . . Virginia law . . . does not permit successive habeas
petitions under any circumstances.”).
193. A condemned capital inmate can petition for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court of the United States upon denial of the state habeas petition, and again upon denial
of the federal habeas petition, but the chances of the Supreme Court granting certiorari to
even review the case are exceedingly small. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 60
(noting that of the 111 petitions for federal habeas review in Virginia capital cases, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in just two). See generally id. at 56 (mapping out judicial
review of death sentences in Virginia).
194. For a detailed discussion of the exceedingly low success rate of capital cases on federal habeas review in the Fourth Circuit, see John H. Blume, The Dance of Death or (Almost)
No One Here Gets out Alive: The Fourth Circuit’s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 61
S.C. L. REV. 465 (2010). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s shift over the last decade
from a staunchly conservative court to a court that leans in a moderate/liberal direction, see
Ann E. Marimow, There’s a Word That No Longer Describes the Federal Appeals Court in
Richmond, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safe
ty/theres-a-word-that-no-longer-describes-the-federal-appeals-court-in-richmond/2017/04/1
2/3a82e0c4-193c-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html [https://perma.cc/M448-GA9D].
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other ninety-six.195 Of those fifteen, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s ruling in just two.196 That is an
overall reversal rate of just under 2%. The Liebman study put the
rate of reversal on federal habeas review of Virginia capital cases
at 6%, three times the teeny number that the Virginia study reported.197 But it also had this to say: “Virginia is again an anomaly
in this analysis. The 6% error-detection rate among Virginia capital habeas cases is well under half that of the next lowest state
(South Carolina at 14%), and is exactly 15% of the national average.”198 Once again, Virginia’s reversal rate was, by far, the lowest
in the nation—at least among states that were actually doing federal habeas review.199
Worse yet, these record-low reversal rates were in part the product of rules that prevented claims from being considered on the
merits. Virginia has the strictest procedural default rules in the
country, and it made no exceptions for capital cases.200 Virginia’s
rules prevent the consideration of any claim on direct review that
has not been properly preserved at trial,201 and Virginia courts interpret the requirements for properly preserving a claim at trial in
a hyper-technical way. In one capital case, for example, the defense
attorney objected to a prosecutor’s statement during closing argument, and also made a motion for a mistrial—but the attorney did
not make the motion for mistrial at the same time as the objection,
so the claim was dismissed as procedurally defaulted.202 In another
195. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 59–60.
196. See id.
197. See Liebman et al., supra note 4, at 55.
198. Id. at 57.
199. Id. at 55. Technically, Delaware was the lowest reversal rate in the nation, as its
reversal rate was zero, but it also had just two federal habeas cases from 1973–1995. Id. at
app. 17.
200. See James S. Liebman, Jeffery Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1858 n.57 (2000)
(“The explanation [for Virginia’s outlier status on reversal rates] may lie in the unusual
extent to which Virginia courts limit review of capital judgments by, for example: (1) enforcing the region’s (and nation’s) strictest procedural default doctrine (the rule permitting even
egregious error to be ignored on appeal if it was not objected to at trial).”).
201. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 (Repl. Vol. 2021) (“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be
considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty
at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the
ends of justice.”).
202. ABA, supra note 141, at 244–45 (discussing Rogers v. Commonwealth, unpublished
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capital case, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed thirteen assignments of error as procedurally defaulted because the record
where they were preserved was the first sentencing hearing, not
the second.203 Virginia’s procedural default rules do have narrow
exceptions, but these essentially require defendants to show that,
were it not for the error, they would not have been convicted, or
that they could not have made the claim at trial because they did
not know about it.204 Outside one of those circumstances (and not
once in the entire modern era did the Supreme Court of Virginia
reverse a death sentence on a procedurally defaulted claim),205 a
capital defendant was out of luck. However meritorious, those
claims were gone.
Moreover, Virginia’s strict procedural default rules, combined
with its draconian page limitations on briefs filed in capital cases,
added a second way for condemned capital defendants to default
on their claims. Before 2010, when the page limit on briefs filed in
capital cases was raised to 100 pages (which was still quite limited
given the host of issues in a capital case), a condemned capital defendant’s brief in Virginia was capped at 50 pages.206 That made it
exceedingly difficult for defense counsel to comply with the rules
for preserving assignments of error, which were deemed defaulted
if not fully developed for review.207 “It is not the role of the courts
. . . to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for
[them],” the Court of Appeals of Virginia has stated, adding:
“where a party fails to develop an argument in support of [their]
contention and merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is

decision by the Court of Appeals of Virginia).
203. See Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 160–61, 721 S.E.2d 484, 491–92 (2012)
(dismissing assignments of error 14, 81, 82, 85, 90, 93, 101, 130, 131, 139, 172, 185, and 186
as procedurally defaulted).
204. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 64–65 (discussing exceptions to Virginia’s
procedural default doctrine).
205. See ABA, supra note 141, at 245.
206. See R. 5:22, 5.26, 5:7A(g) (Repl. Vol. 2021); see also ABA, supra note 141, at 232 n.45
(noting page limits prior to 2010 and adding that capital defense counsel reported that “requests for page extensions were frequently denied”).
207. See R. 5A:20(d)–(e) (Repl. Vol. 2021) (requiring that opening brief include “[a] clear
and concise statement of the facts that relate to the assignments of error” and “[t]he standard of review and the argument (including principles of law and authorities) relating to each
assignment of error”).
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waived.”208 That left counsel in capital cases squeezed between
rules that required the full development of claims lest they be procedurally defaulted, and rules that strictly limited their ability to
do so. The ABA’s 2013 report on Virginia’s capital punishment system documented the problem, noting that the exceedingly short
page limits in capital cases led to claims being “pled more
thinly.”209 Indeed, in several capital cases, attorneys desperate to
save pages simply cross-referenced a memorandum of law filed
with the trial court, or transcript pages where the argument was
fully presented, but the supreme court held that doing so rendered
those claims procedurally defaulted, too.210
Whatever impact these procedural default rules had on the supreme court’s direct review of capital cases,211 that impact was only
magnified on habeas review. Any claims that a capital defendant
did not make at trial and direct appeal were deemed procedurally
defaulted on state habeas review, with important exceptions for
non-record claims like ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.212 And any claims that a capital defendant did
not make on state habeas review were deemed procedurally defaulted on federal habeas review, absent a set of narrow and
208. Bartley v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 740, 746, 800 S.E.2d 199, 202 (2017).
209. See ABA, supra note 141, at 232 n.47.
210. See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 319, 541 S.E.2d 872, 881 (2001)
(“[O]n brief, [defendant] relied solely on his memorandum presented to the circuit court with
regard to this issue. Burns’ reference to argument that he made in the circuit court is ‘insufficient and amounts to procedural default.’”) (quoting Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va.
445, 461, 423 S.E.2d. 360, 370 (1992)); Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 138, 547
S.E.2d 186, 194 (2001) (“[O]n brief, [defendant] refers solely to his motion presented to the
trial court with regard to this issue. Schmitt’s references to arguments that he made in the
trial court are insufficient and amount to procedural default of this issue.”); Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 336, 513 S.E.2d 634, 638 (1999) (where capital defendant on appeal
referenced a memorandum of law filed with trial court regarding claim, “[w]e hold that the
defendant’s assertions are insufficient and constitute a procedural default”).
211. The 2002 Virginia study concluded that just nine percent of claims rejected by the
Supreme Court of Virginia on direct review were procedurally defaulted, but it did not categorize a claim as procedurally defaulted where the supreme court ruled that it was procedurally defaulted but stated that the claim would have nevertheless failed on the merits. As
a result, the study did not report the percentage of claims that were actually deemed procedurally defaulted. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 65–66.
212. See Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29–30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974); see also
ABA, supra note 141, at 243 (“The Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly held that
claims of trial error that could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal are ‘not cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’”) (quoting Teleguz v. Warden, 279 Va. 1,
7–8, 688 S.E.2d 865, 872 (2010)).
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exceedingly complicated exceptions.213 Moreover, any claim that a
state court on direct or habeas review ruled was procedurally defaulted was also deemed procedurally defaulted on federal habeas
review (again, absent a set of narrow and exceedingly complicated
exceptions).214
The numbers speak for themselves. The 2002 Virginia study
found that a third of all claims made in capital cases on state habeas review—33%—were deemed procedurally defaulted and dismissed without consideration on the merits.215 A slightly higher
percentage—35%—of all claims made in capital cases on federal
habeas review at the district court level were deemed procedurally
defaulted and dismissed without consideration on the merits, while
another 20% were deemed procedurally defaulted and dismissed
without consideration on the merits at the federal appellate
level.216 In several of the federal habeas cases, the court lamented
that procedural default rules forced the affirmance of a death sentence where the defendant clearly did not receive a fair trial.217
One final point about the procedural rules that governed posttrial review of a capital case merits mention, and it is Virginia’s
“21-day rule.” The 21-day rule deprives trial courts of jurisdiction
to set aside the verdict in a case after 21 days have passed from the
entry of a final order.218 The rule has no exceptions for capital cases
and, until 2001, Virginia had no other mechanism by which courts
213. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (failure to exhaust all state remedies available on direct
appeal and state habeas review is grounds for dismissal of claim, with exceptions).
214. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note
64, at 75 (discussing exceptions).
215. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 55.
216. See id. at 55, 76 fig.28.
217. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Jabe, 874 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1995) (“In closing, the
court would like to make it clear that it believes Dana Ray Edmonds did not receive effective
assistance of counsel. . . . Nevertheless, bound by case precedent and the enigmatic doctrine
of procedural default, the court must deny the Petitioner’s motion for stay of execution and
writ of habeas corpus. Edmonds’ claim that his 6th Amendment rights were violated is procedurally barred from a collateral review on the merits.”); Order at 21–22 n.4, Jenkins v.
Angelone, No. 96CV934 (E.D. Va. Jan 22, 1998) (“More troubling than the sheer number of
defaulted claims is that on its face, at least one of these claims appears to have merit. . . .
The claims concerning Clendenen cry out for further inquiry but this Court is prohibited
under the law from heeding these claims. Despite the number and apparent weight of the
petitioner’s defaulted claims, Jenkins is nevertheless unable to present a viable ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. This impresses the court as a significant gap in the law.”).
218. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:15(b) (Repl. Vol. 2021).
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could consider newly discovered evidence.219 Newly discovered evidence was not a trial court error that could be raised on direct appeal, and Virginia did not recognize claims of actual innocence on
state habeas review.220 Claims of actual innocence were also generally not cognizable on federal habeas review,221 which meant that
a convicted capital defendant’s only way to get a court to set aside
a conviction based on newly discovered evidence was a motion that
had to be made within 21 days of the sentence of death.
As a point of comparison, 33 states give condemned capital inmates 6 months after their appeals have ended to challenge their
conviction based on newly discovered evidence, while another 7
states place no time limit at all on such claims.222 Virginia gave
condemned capital defendants a mere 3 weeks from the date their
death sentence was entered—by far the shortest deadline in the
country.223 Even if a condemned capital inmate found unassailable
evidence of innocence, if it came on day 22, the inmate’s only available option was to ask for executive clemency. To borrow from Sister Helen Prejean’s articulation of the point: “Virginia has this incredible 21-day rule that says if you don’t present evidence in 21
days, they’ll let an innocent guy die. That’s just atrocious when you
think of it.”224 In 2001, Virginia addressed this problem by creating
a writ of actual innocence, initially limiting the writ to claims of
innocence based on biological evidence, then expanding it in 2004
to claims based on nonbiological evidence under limited circumstances.225 But for decades of death penalty practice, 21 days was
all condemned capital defendants had to get newly discovered evidence of their innocence before a court for consideration.
So there it is—the basic structure of Virginia’s capital punishment system and how it played out in practice. All that remains
219. In 2001, Virginia established Writs of Actual Innocence to fill this gap. See infra
text accompanying note 225.
220. See Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 585 S.E.2d 801 (2003).
221. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S 390 (1993).
222. See ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATH QUEST 221 (4th ed. 2011).
223. See id.
224. Anne E. Duprey, Virginia’s “21 Day Rule” and Illinois’ Death Row Debacle: A Comparative Study in Capital Justice and the Relevance of Innocence, 10 CAP. DEF. J. 82, 94
(1998) (quoting Sister Helen Prejean).
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (writ of actual innocence based
on biological evidence); id. § 19.2-327.10 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (writ of actual innocence based on
nonbiological evidence, where the defendant did not plead guilty at trial).
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are some data points to show just how lethal Virginia’s death penalty was when considered as a whole, and just how committed Virginia was to the execution enterprise. We turn to those next.
C. The Big Picture View: Facts and Figures of Fealty to Death
Understanding the structure of Virginia’s machinery of death is
the start of understanding just how committed Virginia was to its
death penalty, but the big picture view is what drives the point
home. Start with executions. Virginia was the second most executing state in the country in the modern era of the death penalty,
with 113 executions since 1976.226 Only Texas had more executions
during this time, and Texas has way more people—twenty million
more in 2020227—so everything is going to be bigger in Texas. Indeed, when adjusted for population, Virginia had more executions
pound for pound (of flesh) than even Texas in the modern era, at
least before 2000.228 At its peak in 1998 and 1999, Virginia was
executing thirteen to fourteen people per year, accounting for
nearly a quarter of all executions nationwide.229

226. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE AND FEDERAL INFO: VIRGINIA, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/virginia [https://perma.cc/R59A-6V7J].
227. Compare DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE AND FEDERAL INFO: TEXAS, https:
//deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/texas [https://perma.cc/GNM32ZW7] (570 executions since 1976), with DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE AND FEDERAL
INFO: VIRGINIA, supra note 226 (113 executions since 1976); compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
QUICK FACTS: TEXAS (reporting population in Texas as 29,145,505 as of 2020 census),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/TX [https://perma.cc/6BXR-PXQF], with QUICK FACTS:
VIRGINIA (reporting population in Virginia as 8,631,393 as of 2020 census), https://www.cens
us.gov/quickfacts/VA [https://perma.cc/AB6T-ARUA].
228. See Stephen C. Fehr, Virginia’s Efficient System of Death, WASH. POST (Apr. 4,
1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/daily/april99/penalty4.htm [https://
perma.cc/VD2S-URH5] (“Virginia’s politicians and courts have set up such an efficient system of carrying out the death penalty that Virginia now executes more murderers, given its
population, than any other large state.”). We note here that the structure of capital punishment in Texas has its own built-in biases designed to get death sentences and move them
along. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the Death Penalty in “Executing” versus “Symbolic” States in the United States,
84 TEX. L. REV. 1869 (2006).
229. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE AND FEDERAL INFO: VIRGINIA, supra note
226; 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 13 fig.3 (showing number of executions carried
out in Virginia as a percentage of executions carried out nationwide and noting that Virginia
accounted for 19% and 23% of all executions in 1998 and 1999, respectively).
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Here is how the gears of Virginia’s machinery of death
churned—at least before 2004, when Virginia’s capital defender offices started taking cases. Prosecutors obtained capital murder indictments in eight out of every ten murders eligible to be charged
as capital murder and took over a third of them to trial.230 The vast
majority of those cases ended in a death sentence. Between 1976
and 2004, Virginia tried 166 capital defendants, 140 of whom were
sentenced to death—a death-sentencing rate of 84%.231
Then there were the gears that turned death sentences into executions. The overall reversal rate of death sentences in Virginia
(all three levels of review combined) was just 18%—half the rate of
the state with the second lowest reversal rate (Missouri), and just
a fourth of the national average, which is a shockingly high 68%.232
That made Virginia by far the most successful state in the Union
at converting death sentences into executions. With an overall execution rate that was five times the national average,233 Virginia
did not mess around. It also did not like to be kept waiting. The
average time between death sentence and execution in Virginia
was just under eight years in 2012 (with a number of inmates being
executed in under five).234 The national average at that time was
nearly double that—15.8 years—and since 2012, it has grown exponentially.235 Putting it all together, Virginia’s death penalty
230. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 17 fig.17 (showing that from 1995–1999,
170 of the 215 murders eligible for a capital murder indictment resulted in a capital murder
indictment, and of those 170 cases, prosecutors sought the death penalty in sixty-four).
231. See ABA, supra note 141, at 142 (“[P]rior to 2004, the year in which the [regional
capital defenders] began accepting appointments, Virginia tried 166 defendants at a capital
trial since 1976, of which 140 were sentenced to death. This is a death-sentencing rate for
cases that went to trial of approximately eighty-four percent.”).
232. See Liebman et al., supra note 4, at 66–69; see also id. at 68–69 (“Virginia is a
distinct outlier here, falling almost literally ‘off the charts’ on the low side of error detection. . . . In technical terms, Virginia’s overall-error detection rate is nearly 3 standard deviations below the mean . . . .”).
233. See id. at app. E-2 (appendix showing that Virginia’s execution rate is 28%; the
national average is 5%).
234. See Khalfani and Northup, supra note 3; ACLU OF VA., UNEQUAL, UNFAIR AND IRREVERSIBLE: THE DEATH PENALTY IN VIRGINIA 4 (2000), https://acluva.org/sites/default/fil
es/field_documents/unequalunfairandirreversible2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM5V-6AFK]
(noting that Virginia executed nine condemned inmates within five years of their sentencing
between 1998–2000).
235. See U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., TABLE 12: AVERAGE ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN SENTENCING AND EXECUTION, 1977–2019, https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media
/document/cp19st.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG68-DPHC] (reporting average time between
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produced the most executions (per capita, for a time), the least reversals, and the fastest time to execution. It was, to turn a Hobbesian phrase, “nasty, brutish, and short.”236
Naturally, this is not how Virginia officials saw the situation.
When asked about Virginia’s “highly anomalous” low reversal
rates in the wake of the well-publicized Liebman study,237 a spokesman for Virginia’s then-Attorney General told the press: “Virginia
has the most fair, balanced and carefully implemented death penalty system in the country.”238 “Virginia prosecutors do a good job
of trying their cases with few errors,” he explained, adding that
“Virginia’s capital statutes are well written and narrowly defined.”239
Professor Liebman had a different take. “It’s a combination of
things,” he said when asked the same question, explaining:
Virginia, in my view, has the broadest death penalty statute in the
country. It has a court system in which . . . post-trial review is very
limited. It’s got a conservative bench, both at the trial level and at the
[s]upreme [c]ourt level. And then it has the Fourth Circuit. When it
comes to getting and keeping death sentences, the planets are just
really aligned over Virginia.240

Virginia was able to get death sentences with a capital murder
statute that swallowed most everything in sight, and it was able to
keep them with a post-sentencing review process that, as Brandon

death sentence and execution in the United States in 2012 at 190 months (15.8 years), and
average time between death sentence and execution in the United States in 2019 at 264
months (22 years)).
236. THOMAS HOBBES, Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery, in LEVIATHAN 76, 78 (1651).
237. Liebman et al., supra note 4, at 14. The Liebman study is discussed supra text accompanying notes 172–73, 188, 197, 232–33.
238. ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 7 (quoting David Botkins, spokesman for Attorney
General Mark Earley).
239. Id. at 31. See generally Gaslighting, URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictiona
ry.com/define.php?term=Gaslighting [https://perma.cc/3B79-73XD] (defining “gaslighting”
as “systematically withholding factual information from, and/or providing false information”).
240. ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 7 (quoting Columbia Law Professor James Liebman). We note that the Fourth Circuit is not the conservative bench that it was in 2000, and
that may have played a role in its receptiveness to capital defendants’ claims in later cases.
For an example, see supra text accompanying notes 120–23.
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Garrett writes, was “ruthlessly efficient.”241 The combination was
a killer.
Virginia’s resolve in carrying out death sentences and its ability
to do so with such remarkable dispatch were markers of its fealty
to capital punishment, but there were other markers as well, and
one of them was who Virginia was willing to execute. Most states
have little interest in executing women, although women comprise
roughly ten percent of all homicide offenders.242 But Virginia was
willing to do so, executing a woman in 2010 whose intellectual
functioning was assessed to be among the bottom three percent of
society.243
The same was true of juvenile offenders. Very few states imposed
the death penalty on juvenile offenders, even before the Supreme
Court prohibited the practice in 2005.244 But, here again, Virginia
was one of them. Indeed, in 2003, Beltway sniper Lee Boyd Malvo
was tried in Virginia (instead of Maryland or the District of Columbia) for the very reason that Virginia allowed the death penalty for
juvenile offenders.245
The same could be said of Virginia’s willingness to execute intellectually disabled offenders and offenders who were severely mentally ill. Virginia had no prohibition against executing the severely
mentally ill.246 Indeed, its last execution before repealing the death

241. GARRETT, supra note 154, at 3.
242. As of 2021, only seventeen women have been executed in the forty-plus years of the
modern era. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., EXECUTIONS OF WOMEN (listing women executed and the nine states that executed them); see also BOHM, supra note 222, at 274–75.
(discussing data and noting that states’ reticence to execute women reflects a widespread
perception that women are the “gentler sex”).
243. See Segura, supra note 15 (discussing condemned capital murderer Teresa Lewis,
who was convicted and sentenced to death in a murder for hire to kill her husband and his
son for insurance money).
244. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lain, Deciding Death, supra note 17, at
52 (“Even in the 1990s, when public support for the juvenile death penalty peaked, there
were only around ten juvenile death sentences per year. By 2001, there were just seven, and
in the two years before Roper—2003 and 2004—the annual tally was two.”).
245. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE AND FEDERAL INFO: VIRGINIA, supra note
226; see Lain, Deciding Death, supra note 17, at 52 (“Not even Washington beltway sniper
Lee Boyd Malvo received a death sentence, and he was tried in Virginia just to maximize
the chance that he would.”).
246. See ABA, supra note 141, at 393 (“Virginia law does not prohibit the application of
the death penalty to persons who suffer from severe mental disorders or mental disabilities
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penalty was of a man who was actively psychotic and suffering
from paranoid delusions, a long-standing condition that predated
his offense.247
Moreover, Virginia was downright dug-in on the death penalty
for intellectually disabled offenders, even after the Supreme Court
in Atkins v. Virginia ruled that the practice was unconstitutional
in 2002.248 Virginia responded to Atkins by adopting a strict I.Q.
cut-off score to determine who could benefit from the ruling, an approach expressly rejected by the relevant professional organizations and that was adopted by only one other state.249 Indeed, Virginia’s approach to identifying the intellectually disabled was so
miserly that, in 2014, the Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional, too.250
Virginia also had the jury make the determination of whether a
capital defendant was intellectually disabled at the sentencing
phase of trial, rather than having a judge make the determination
in a pretrial ruling.251 As a practical matter, this meant that the
jury was deciding whether a defendant was exempt from the death
penalty at the same time as it was hearing evidence on the reasons
why the defendant should receive it. The ABA’s 2013 assessment
of Virginia’s death penalty noted the clear advantages of

other than [intellectual disability].”).
247. For a discussion of William Morva, see Lain, Three Observations About the Worst of
the Worst, Virginia-Style, supra note 28, at 473–74.
248. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
STATE AND FEDERAL INFO: VIRGINIA, supra note 226 (noting that on remand, Atkins was
again sentenced to death when the jury rejected his claim that he was intellectually disabled, but prosecutorial misconduct was then discovered and the case was reversed and remanded again, at which time the prosecution agreed to plead the case for a life sentence).
249. See ABA, supra note 141, at x (noting that Virginia’s adoption of a strict I.Q. cut-off
score “has been expressly rejected by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD”) and is contrary to the modern, scientific understanding of
[intellectual disability]”); id. at 380–82 (discussing Virginia’s approach to intellectual disability and noting its nonconformity with stance of professional organizations); see also Hall
v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 718 (2014) (“In summary, every state legislature to have considered
the issue after Atkins—save Virginia’s—and whose law has been interpreted by its courts
has taken a position contrary to that of Florida.”).
250. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 724 (2014).
251. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (“[T]he issue of intellectual disability . . . shall be determined by the jury as part of the sentencing proceeding
. . . .”). The danger of Virginia’s system is illustrated by the fact that the very defendant in
Atkins was again sentenced to death, despite having an I.Q. of 59). See supra note 248.

2021]

DISRUPTING DEATH

231

determining death eligibility pretrial.252 Knowing that a capital defendant was ineligible for the death penalty up front would spare
the state “a long, expensive, and ultimately unnecessary capital
proceeding,” the report noted, and jurors may be “strongly influenced” by aggravating circumstances when making the eligibility
determination at sentencing.253 Virginia’s implementation of Atkins by having the jury determine intellectual disability at sentencing simply made no sense, other than as a way to resist the
ruling.
Just two more points merit mention here to complete the big picture view. The first goes to the relationship between Virginia’s
death penalty and race: what, if anything, changed between the
early and modern eras? A Virginia ACLU report answered that
question in 2000, concluding that the impact of race on Virginia’s
death penalty was more subtle in the modern era than it was before
1972, but it was just as present.254 In the modern era, the report
showed, what mattered most was the race of the victim in capital
murder cases. In lieu of race playing a role in deciding whose lives
Virginia would take, race played a role in deciding whose lives it
would protect and whose deaths it would avenge.
The facts and figures tell the tale. Prosecutors were over three
times as likely to seek the death penalty in a capital murder-eligible case if the victim was White.255 And death sentencing rates were
two to three times higher when the victim was White (depending
upon the crime), and four times higher when the defendant was
Black and the victim was White.256 Of Virginia’s 113 executions in
the modern era, 93 of them—82%—involved a White victim.257
252. See ABA, supra note 141, at xxxvi; see id. at 353–55 (discussing Virginia’s statutory
scheme for implementing Atkins and the ways in which it is problematic).
253. Id. at x.
254. See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 41.
255. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 43. Astoundingly, this study concluded
that such race effects were not statistically significant when the “character” of the victim
was taken into account, noting that Black murder victims were themselves more likely to
have been involved in criminal activity than their White counterparts. See id. We agree with
the ABA that controlling for the “character” of the victim was an “unsuitable control variable.” ABA, supra note 141, at 337.
256. See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 39–41 (discussing death sentencing rates by
race of the victim and race of the offender for various capital offenses).
257. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., EXECUTION OVERVIEW: EXECUTIONS BY RACE AND
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The cross-race comparison was particularly stark. Setting aside
multiple-victim murders (every one of which involved at least one
White victim), thirty-six Black offenders were executed for killing
a White victim, while just four White offenders were executed for
killing a Black victim.258 That’s it. In the entire modern era spanning over forty years of death penalty practice and encompassing
113 executions, Virginia had just 4 executions for White-on-Black
crime.
In fairness, the race of the victim was not the dominant determinant of decisions to seek the death penalty in Virginia—that dubious distinction went to location, reflecting massive disparities
among local prosecutors in their inclination to seek death.259 “Location, More than Any Other Factor, Is Most Strongly Associated
with the Decision by Commonwealth’s Attorneys to Seek the Death
Penalty,” a subheading read in the 2002 Virginia study’s report,
which went on to state: “Perhaps the key finding of this study is
that Commonwealth’s Attorneys in different-sized localities handle capital murder cases differently, even when these cases appear
strikingly similar on the facts.”260 Some prosecutors sought a capital murder indictment every time they could; others did so some of
the time, and a few never did.261 One prosecutor had even stated
that he would “charge capital murder even if it’s questionable as to
whether or not it fits in that category.”262 The ACLU’s study had
shown that a third of the death sentences in Virginia were coming
out of just 8 jurisdictions (of 133 in the state), and those jurisdictions accounted for just 10% of the pool of possible capital murder
indictments.263 If the goal in the modern era was to make death
RACE OF VICTIM, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/executionsby-race-and-race-of-victim [https://perma.cc/VH9G-GTKQ?type=image] (select “State”; deselect “All”; and select “Virginia”).
258. See id. (Select “State”; de-select “All”; select “Sex”; de-select “All”; select “White”;
select “Race of Victims”; de-select “All”; and select “Black”).
259. For an excellent discussion of the issue more generally, see Adam M. Gershowitz,
Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010).
260. 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at iv, vi.
261. See id. at 31 (finding that 60% of prosecutors surveyed said they always seek a capital murder indictment when eligible, 38% reported they sometimes seek a capital murder
indictment, and 2% indicated that they never seek a capital murder indictment).
262. ABA, supra note 141, at 118.
263. See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 9.
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sentencing less arbitrary and capricious, the 2002 Virginia study
concluded, “then it has not achieved this goal.”264
The second point goes to an issue that has been conspicuously
absent from the discussion thus far: the role of capital defenders.
It should come as no surprise that in a capital punishment system
as skewed towards death as Virginia’s was, capital defense was not
structured in such a way that would seriously challenge the state’s
pursuit of death, at least not at first. When Virginia reinstated the
death penalty, it had no standards governing the qualifications of
capital defenders and capped their fees at $650 per case.265 That’s
it: $650 for representation in a capital case, no matter how much
work the attorney did (and at that rate, it was hard to justify
much). Of course, private attorneys who had been retained for their
services made more than that, but ninety-seven percent of those
who receive the death penalty are indigent, so indigent capital defense is pretty much the whole ball game.266
In 1982, Virginia removed the cap on attorney fees in capital
cases,267 but the pay was still abysmal. A study in the 1990s concluded that after taking into account overhead expenses, the
hourly rate for capital defense counsel in Virginia was effectively
thirteen dollars per hour.268 By 2000, pay in capital cases had substantially improved, even as Virginia’s pay for indigent defense in
non-capital cases ranked lowest in the nation.269 The Virginia
264. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 28 (“Nonetheless, if the goal of the General Assembly in revising the State’s capital punishment statutes was to create a statewide
system in which death cases are distinguished from non-death cases by concrete and relevant factors such as the vileness of the crime, the future dangerousness of the criminal, and
the nature of the evidence then it has not achieved this goal.”).
265. See id. at 24. Anecdotally, one lawyer who was trying capital cases back in the 1970s
remembers the pay caps being even less than that. He remembers the caps being $400 at
the very beginning, and he remembers this because of a five-day capital trial in which he
and his co-counsel were paid just $450 each (and the $50 was for expenses).
266. See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 4.
267. See id. at 14.
268. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1853 (1994); see also BOHM, supra note
222, at 233 (“A paralegal working on a federal bankruptcy case is paid more per hour than
a defense attorney in a capital case in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia.”).
269. See THE SPANGENBERG GRP., A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN
VIRGINIA at 1–2 (2004), https://www.a mericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/downloads/indigentdefense/va_report2004execsum.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KC4C-6KWW] (prepared for the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid
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ACLU’s study that year found that the average fees in a capital
case were just short of $30,000, while the average hours on a capital case were just short of 250.270 That worked out to be a little less
than $120 per hour, although this was an extremely rough estimate given that the hours and fees in any given case did not necessarily match either of those averages.271 By the time Virginia repealed the death penalty, it was paying court-appointed capital defenders an amount “deemed reasonable” by the trial court, with
hourly rates up to $200 per hour for in-court work, and $150 per
hour for out-of-court work.272 That was not law firm pay, but it was
also not abysmal.
If pay was one-half of the problem, mandatory competency
standards for court-appointed counsel in capital cases were the
other. Prior to 2004, the vast majority of capital defenders were
court-appointed; salaried public defenders took a slice of capital
cases, but the lion’s share of capital defense was performed by local
attorneys appointed by the court with jurisdiction over the case.273
In the 1990s, Virginia adopted a set of minimum qualifications for
appointing counsel in capital cases and created a list of attorneys
who met those qualifications.274 Courts were expected to choose
from this list when appointing counsel in a capital case.275

and Indigent Defendants).
270. See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 14 (“Overall, the average number of hours
expended by this group of court-appointed lawyers was 249 total hours per case. The average total fees approved by the courts were $29,800 per case.”).
271. See id. (“The condition of these vouchers was, in a word, inadequate. . . . In very few
cases did the vouchers include the attorneys’ time records. Accordingly, any firm conclusion
on the adequacy of the fees paid to appointed counsel is not possible.”).
272. See VA. OFF. OF THE EXEC. SEC., SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA CHART OF ALLOWANCES 9 (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.vacourts.gov/courtadmin/aoc/fiscal/chart2020_0101.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6XE-MCBY].
273. See Jeremy P. White, Establishing a Capital Defense Unit in Virginia: A Proposal
to Increase the Quality of Representation for Indigent Capital Defendants, 13 CAP. DEF. J.
323, 342 (2001) (“Salaried public defenders represented thirteen indigent capital defendants
in 2000 and the remaining seventy or so indigent capital defendants obtained representation through appointed counsel paid at an hourly rate.”).
274. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 24–25. See also id. at app. B-1–3 (listing
qualifications for serving as capital counsel, which included being an active member in good
standing of the Bar, having at least five years of experience in defense work, and attending
a training session).
275. See id. at 24.
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Virginia tightened those standards in 2002 and again in 2004,276
but there were gaps in this regulatory framework. Lawyers who
wanted to be on the list just filled out a form attesting to their
qualifications and submitted it; for years, that was the extent of
the screening and verification.277 Moreover, Virginia did not require judges to appoint counsel in capital cases from the list. To the
contrary, it explicitly allowed judges to go off-list (so long as the
lawyer met the minimal qualifications), and a number of judges
routinely did so; indeed, some did not use the list at all.278 Perhaps
most importantly, the minimal qualifications were focused mainly
on an attorney’s experience, and experience was no guarantee that
an attorney was minimally competent.279
This is not to suggest that court-appointed representation in
capital cases was not remarkably good—it was, at times. For example, the Virginia ACLU’s 2000 report noted the work of Craig Cooley, a Richmond-area defense attorney who had served as courtappointed counsel for some sixty capital murder defendants by the
time of the report.280 Cooley went to trial in twenty-five of those
capital cases, and just one ended in a sentence of death.281 He also
represented Beltway sniper Lee Boyd Malvo in 2003, and managed
to convince a Virginia jury not to sentence Malvo to death, despite
276. See id. at 25 (noting 2002 modifications to standards); GARRETT, supra note 154, at
122 (noting the same in 2004).
277. See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 13 (“[T]he [Public Defender] Commission has
no screening policy. Lawyers interested in representing capital defendants can join the list
simply by completing and submitting a form identifying themselves as qualified according
to the standards. The Commission does no independent verification of lawyers’ claims. It
simply compiles the list and distributes it to interested judges.”).
278. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 24 (“Judges may, as an alternative, appoint attorneys who are not on the list as long as they meet the qualifications established
by the Commission. . . . Complaints have . . . been raised about the practice of some judges
who routinely appoint attorneys to defend in capital cases who are not on the list maintained
by the Commission.”); ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 13 (“In a 1999 survey by the Virginia
State Crime Commission, 18[%] of the participating judges said they had never appointed a
lawyer from the list.”).
279. ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 12–13 (“These requirements are all concerned with
past experience rather than past competence. . . . [N]o lawyer has ever been denied a place
on the list or removed from the list . . . .”); 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 24 (“There
is a concern that the standards promulgated by the Commission and its list of ‘qualified
attorneys’ do not adequately distinguish good attorneys from those who met the standards
but do not properly represent their clients.”).
280. ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 16.
281. Id.
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the fact that he had killed ten people and injured three others in a
shooting spree that terrorized entire populations in a three-state
radius.282 We can attest that many other court-appointed attorneys
were phenomenally good as well, particularly those who regularly
worked with the specialized capital defenders we are about to discuss—the ones whom specialized defenders would request as cocounsel any chance they could get.
The problem, in short, was not quality, but rather consistency.
Some court-appointed attorneys in capital cases were not remarkably good, and some were downright terrible. Stories of abysmal
representation in Virginia capital cases are legion.283 Illustrating
the point, a federal judge on habeas review of one Virginia capital
case called an attorney’s direct appeal brief “a shameful disgrace,”284 while another federal judge in another capital case found
that the attorney’s performance amounted to “virtually a complete
absence of representation.”285 The Virginia ACLU’s study found
that for every ten capital trials that ended in a death sentence, one
involved a capital defense lawyer who would later lose their license.286 It also found that lawyers who represented a capital defendant whose trial ended in a death sentence were six times more
likely to be the subject of a bar disciplinary proceeding than other
attorneys.287 Virginia’s 2002 study followed those alarming statistics with one of its own: a whopping twenty-four percent of attorneys who had handled a capital case in the previous five years in
Virginia had been disciplined by the Virginia State Bar.288
As disturbing as the prospect of gross incompetence in a capital
case was in its own right, two aspects of Virginia’s capital
282. See Andrea F. Siegel, Va. Judge Sentences Malvo to Life Terms, BALT. SUN (Mar.
11, 2004), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/bal-te.md.sniper11mar11-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8EFJ-F5KA].
283. For a sample, see infra notes 391–96 and accompanying text. See also ACLU OF VA.,
supra note 234, at 23 n.27 (listing six condemned capital defendants whose attorneys missed
filing deadlines for state habeas review, rendering their claims procedurally barred). For an
iconic discussion of the problem more generally, see Bright, supra note 268.
284. Chichester v. Pruett, No. 97cv155, at 90 (E.D. Va., Richmond Div., Apr. 7, 1998).
285. ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 18 (discussing the case Stout v. Thompson, No. 910719-R (W.D. Va., Roanoke Div., July 31, 1995)).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 17.
288. 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 25.
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punishment system made it worse. First was the fact that, as discussed above, Virginia’s post-trial veto gates were instead propelling death sentences along, so if a capital defendant was going to
avoid execution, trial was the place where that needed to happen.289 Second was the fact that the same court-appointed attorneys who represented capital defendants at trial were assigned to
represent them on their direct appeal when the trial resulted in a
sentence of death.290 This was problematic not only because trial
work and appellate work were two completely different types of litigation practice, but also because it meant that capital defendants
who had substandard counsel at trial were stuck with substandard
counsel on appeal as well. “[T]his system does not ensure that a
defendant receives high quality legal representation on appeal,
which is the last stage that the defendant has a right to effective
counsel,” the ABA noted in its 2013 report.291 Capital defendants
with the bad luck of getting a bad lawyer suffered a double
whammy in Virginia, and, here again, the combination was a
killer.
This was the state of play in 2002. Virginia’s machinery of death
hummed along, and counsel in capital cases were generally powerless to stop it. But that was about to change in dramatic fashion.
II. ENTER SPECIALIZED CAPITAL DEFENDERS
By 2002, the death penalty landscape had shifted significantly
in the United States, and Virginia was not immune to these tectonic changes. In this Part, we first discuss the impetus for the creation of four specialized capital defender offices in 2002 and explain what those offices looked like. We then turn to their impact
in the trial, pretrial, and (most importantly) plea-bargaining context. Our aim here is to share the story behind the story that others

289. See supra section I.B.3. See also ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 20 (quoting capital
defender Gerald Zerkin as explaining: “In a state like this, where there is little opportunity
for relief [on appeal] . . . it is very hard to undo mistakes made at the trial level”).
290. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
291. ABA, supra note 141, at viii; see id. (“Trial counsel frequently are not possessed of
the time or special skills required of appellate representation, which require thorough review of the trial record anew, as well as extensive brief-writing.”).
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have told—to explain why the creation of specialized capital defender offices made a difference, in obvious and less obvious ways.
A. Seeds of Change
It is hard to know where to start this story, but events in the late
1990s at least planted the seeds of change, so we start there. It all
began when a slew of high-profile death row exonerations captured
the public’s attention and would not let it go.292 The enormously
influential book Actual Innocence hit the shelves shortly thereafter,293 and the same year, 2000, the governor of Illinois—a life-long
death penalty supporter who had helped rewrite the state’s capital
punishment statute in the wake of Furman—declared a moratorium on executions in the state.294 The “innocence movement” had
begun.295
Virginia had its own role in this historical moment with the DNA
exoneration of Earl Washington in 2000, which sent shock waves
through Virginia and, likewise, drew national attention.296
292. See Lain, supra note 17, at 43–44 (discussing high-profile exonerations in late
1990s, including Anthony Porter’s exoneration in 1999 after a group of Northwestern journalism students discovered, and then proved, his innocence).
293. See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS
TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED (2000).
294. See Lain, supra note 17, at 44–45 (discussing the Illinois moratorium). See also Dirk
Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2000), https://
www.nytimes.com/2000/0201/us/illinois-citing-faulty-verdicts-bars-executions.html [https:
//perma.cc/K4LL-W29M] (reporting on moratorium and noting that in the modern death
penalty era, Illinois has executed twelve people and exonerated thirteen from death row).
295. See William Claiborne & Paul Duggan, Spotlight on the Death Penalty, WASH. POST.
(June 18, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/06/18/spotlight-ondeath-penalty/71cc957c-8854-4d20-8219-cb5216b52a04/ [https://perma.cc/Q2VG-HWAG]
(“When Gov. George Ryan (R) announced on Jan. 31 that he was imposing a moratorium on
executions in Illinois, little did he know he was igniting a national debate on capital punishment unsurpassed in intensity since the United States Supreme Court allowed reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976.”); The Death Penalty on Trial, NEWSWEEK (June 12,
2000), https://newsweek.com/death-penalty-trial-160473 [https://perma.cc/NSR6-2ZRV]
(discussing impact of exonerations on the cultural reception of the death penalty). For a
discussion of the innocence movement more generally, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeirer, Another
Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 21–39 (2002).
296. See Francis X. Clines, Furor Anew With Release of Man Who Was Innocent, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2001), https://www.newsweek.com/death-penalty-trial-160473 [https://per
ma.cc/PW6Y-ALD7] (discussing Earl Washington exoneration in Virginia); Brooke A. Masters, Missteps On Road To Injustice, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2000), (discussing the
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Washington was an intellectually disabled Black man who falsely
confessed to the rape and murder of a nineteen-year-old White
woman, and was convicted on the basis of that confession in
1984.297 The facts of the crime were egregious—the victim was
stabbed thirty-eight times298—but so were the facts of the false confession. Washington could not tell police the race of his victim, or
where the crime occurred, or even that he had raped her.299 It took
the police five tries to get a confession that they could take to trial,
and that confession was the only evidence of Washington’s guilt in
the case.300
As luck would have it (not the bad luck of being wrongfully convicted of a capital offense, but the good luck of being befriended by
another death row inmate who was receiving pro bono representation from a high-powered New York law firm),301 Washington’s case
was briefly picked up pro bono by some lawyers in New York, who
were able to get a stay of execution just nine days before he was
investigation, trial, and exoneration of Earl Washington); Frank Green, 20th Anniversary
of Earl Washington’s Freedom Nears as Abolition of Va. Death Penalty is Considered, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 27, 2021), https://richmond.com/news/state-and-regional/20th-anniversary-of-earl-washingtons-freedom-nears-as-abolition-of-va-death-penalty-is-considered/article_ 6fc28f53-22f6-5f05-9cf4-667f783ebf46.html [https://perma.cc/68SJ-CPZC
(discussing impact of Earl Washington’s exoneration in Virginia and the role it played as a
catalyst for changing Virginia law).
297. For a detailed account, see MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAREXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON, JR. (2003). For a shorter summary supporting the
facts provided here, see Earl Washington: Other Virginia False Confession Cases, NAT. REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2012), [hereinafter Earl Washington] https://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3721 [https://perma.cc/9SF8-74MJ];
see also David C.N. Swanson, Exonerated and Imprisoned: DNA Exonerates Him, But
Earl Washington Has been in Prison Since 1984, JUSTICE DENIED, https://justicedenied.
org/earl.tm#:~:text=Exonerated%20and%20Imprisoned,been%20in%20prison%20since%2
01984.&text=Rebecca%20Lynn%20Williams%2C%2019%20and,was%20arrested%20for%2
0the%20crime [https://perma.cc/L6MZ-LR36] (noting the race of the victim).
298. Earl Washington, supra note 297.
299. Id.
300. Id. The jury deliberated for just fifty minutes before finding Washington guilty, and
another ninety minutes before sentencing him to death. See EDDS, supra note 297, at 67–
68.
301. See Earl Washington, supra note 297. That inmate was Joseph Giarratano, whose
death sentence was later commuted to life after doubts were raised about his guilt, and who
has since been paroled and now works as a paralegal. See Green, supra note 296. “The hero
of [the Earl Washington] story is absolutely Joe Giarratano,” one of the pro bono attorneys
stated, recalling how Giarratano pressured the New York firm representing him to take
Washington’s case too. Id.; see also Joseph Giarratano, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Foreword, 56 U. RICH. L. REV. 5 (2021).
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scheduled to be executed.302 That set in motion a series of events
(none of which would have happened without excellent pro bono
representation by lawyers in Virginia) that resulted in DNA testing of biological evidence in the case twice—the first time taking
Washington off death row, and the second resulting in a full pardon.303 In both instances, DNA testing ruled out Washington as the
perpetrator, but because well over twenty-one days had passed
since the imposition of the death sentence, Washington was forced
to petition the governor for clemency.304 By the time he finally received it, Washington had spent eighteen years imprisoned for a
crime he did not commit.305
Capital defense attorneys were part of the problem (both in
Washington’s case and more generally)306 and they were part of the
national conversation, too. The well-publicized Liebman study in
2000 showed that most death sentences were reversed on appeal—
68% on average—and the number one reason for reversal was
grossly ineffective assistance of counsel.307 That same year,
302. See Green, supra note 296. The understanding from the start was that someone else
would take over the case if the stay was granted. See id.
303. See id. Again, it took a village, but we would be remiss without noting the representation of Bob Hall and Jerry Zerkin, as well as Marie Dean, whose advocacy work played a
central role in obtaining that representation. See id.
304. It was a long road. Even after DNA testing excluded Washington as a suspect in
1993, he was only able to secure a commutation to a life sentence (which he received in 1994)
because of his confession and an argument that the DNA was inconclusive. In 2000, more
advanced DNA testing definitely ruled him out as a suspect, and he was finally pardoned.
See Earl Washington, supra note 297.
305. See id. A federal jury ultimately awarded Washington $2.25 million for the state’s
handing of the case, which at the time was thought to be the largest award to a single individual in Virginia history. See Green, supra note 296.
306. An excerpt from Margaret Edds’s excellent book, An Expendible Man, provides a
glimpse of the defense in Earl Washington’s case: “[The prosecutor’s] opening statement
took up eleven pages of the transcript; [defense counsel] required three. [The prosecutor]
called fourteen witnesses, and their testimony and cross-examination was 162 pages long.
[Defense counsel] called two, Earl Washington and his sister, Alfreda, and their remarks
filled twenty-seven pages. [The prosecutor’s] closing statement covered nine pages of the
transcript; [defense counsel], two. Then [the prosecutor] made an almost four-page rebuttal.
In virtually every aspect of the trial, from understanding of the forensic evidence to a dissection of the arguments, Earl Washington’s side of the story was inadequately told or never
told at all.” EDDS, supra note 297, at 50–51. For a detailed discussion of the defense strategy,
including portions of the trial transcript, see id. at 50–67. For a famous discussion of the
problem of incompetent counsel in capital cases more generally, along with its tragic consequences, see generally Bright, supra note 268.
307. See Liebman, Fagan, West & Lloyd, supra note 200, at 1850 (finding the most common error in the overall error-rate of 68% in capital cases was “egregiously incompetent

2021]

DISRUPTING DEATH

241

revelations of a capital case in Texas in which defense counsel literally slept through portions of the trial shocked the public’s conscience and attracted national attention of its own.308 With exonerations igniting a firestorm of criticism about the care with which
the death penalty was being applied, it became increasingly clear
that something needed to be done about representation in capital
cases.
Apparently, the Supreme Court of the United States thought so,
too. The Court had never reversed a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital case, but that’s exactly what it did
in the 2000 decision of Williams v. Taylor.309 It was a Virginia case.
In Williams, the attorney did not even begin to prepare for the
all-important sentencing portion of the trial until a week before the
trial began, and utterly failed to conduct any semblance of investigation into the defendant’s social history.310 The attorney’s feeble
attempt at mitigation boiled down to the defendant’s mother

defense lawyering,” which accounted for 37% of all state post-conviction reversals alone).
See also supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s reversal rate of 18%).
308. See Henry Weinstein, Texas Fights Ruling of Legal Incompetence, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 2002), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jan-02-mn-19669-story.html
[https://perma.cc/J98U-S9XR] (noting that a Texas sleeping-lawyer case “became nationally
prominent during the 2000 presidential election” as “a symbol of the troublesome way capital trials are handled in the Lone Star State,” particularly because Bush defended the state’s
procedures); Paul Duggan, Death Sentence Reinstated in ‘Sleeping Lawyer’ Case, WASH.
POST (Oct. 28, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/10/28/deathsentence-reinstated-in-sleeping-lawyer-case/b363fbc3-11e3-4ef3-81c8-70f188a414da/
[https://perma.cc/FES7-H6JE] (discussing the sleeping-lawyer case in Texas and how Bush
defended the case on the basis that the defendant had the benefit of judicial review); Paul
Duggan, George W. Bush: The Record in Texas, WASH. POST (May 12, 2000), at A1, https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/05/12/george-w-bush-the-record-in-texas/
d5285d54-4378-453a-8cd7-deab7798bb7a/ [https://perma.cc/5RV3-U5XR] (relaying several
Texas cases in which a lawyer slept during the trial and others in which lawyers had extensive disciplinary records or drug and alcohol addictions, while noting that Bush vetoed a bill
that would have improved the quality of legal representation to indigent capital defendants); Bob Herbert, In America; The Death Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2000), https://
www.nytimes.com/2000/10/02/opinion/in-america-the-death-factory.html [https://perma.cc/
Z598-8GPW] (lamenting the “consistently unjust and unquestionably inhumane manner in
which Texas sends its prisoners to their doom” and “defense lawyers who slept through the
trials, who were addicted to alcohol or drugs, who knew nothing about trying capital cases
and who did virtually nothing on behalf of their clients”).
309. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). See Garrett, supra note 25, at 676 (“Prior to Williams v. Taylor,
the U.S. Supreme Court had never found defense counsel ineffective in a capital case . . . .”).
310. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 395.

242

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:183

testifying that Williams was “a nice boy at home,”311 but there was
a gold mine of information that the attorney did not know. Williams had endured a “nightmarish childhood,” to borrow from the
Supreme Court’s opinion in the case—he had been removed from
his parents for profound neglect, abused in foster care, and brutally
beaten when he was returned to his parents’ care.312 He was also
borderline intellectually disabled.313
The jury heard none of this. The attorney in the case failed to
request social services records, failed to get mental health experts,
failed to return the call of a potential character witness, and failed
to present the testimony of prison officials, who, by the time of trial,
had awarded Williams two commendations (one for cracking a
prison drug ring and the other for returning a guard’s wallet).314
Even for a Court disinclined to protect capital defendants, the attorney’s (non)performance was over the line.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and Williams eventually pleaded to a life sentence.315 By then, the attorney in his case
was long gone, having been indefinitely suspended from practice
for his own mental health problems.316 His Virginia State Bar record showed a prior private reprimand, a prior public reprimand,
and a prior suspension of his license to practice.317
The Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Taylor spoke to Virginia because, well, the Supreme Court was speaking to Virginia.
But there was reason to think the conversation was not over with

311. GARRETT, supra note 154, at 119.
312. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395 (“[Counsel] failed to conduct an investigation that would
have uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams’ nightmarish childhood,
not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law
barred access to such records. . . . Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal
neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten
by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for
two years during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home),
and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’
custody.”).
313. See id. at 396.
314. See id. at 395–96.
315. See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 23 n.23.
316. See id. at 19.
317. See id. Williams was the attorney’s second court-appointed capital case. His first
client was executed in 1994. See id.
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that case. “People who are well represented at trial do not get the
death penalty,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had stated in a 2001
speech, adding, “I have yet to see a death case among the dozens
coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications
in which the defendant was well represented at trial.”318 Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor chimed in a few months later. “If statistics
are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent
defendants to be executed,” she told a group of women lawyers in
mid-2001, stating, “[p]erhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.”319 Anyone who
could count to five knew the Supreme Court had more to say (and
it did, expressing itself in a string of cases that continues to this
day).320
This, then, was the backdrop against which the Virginia State
Crime Commission issued a report recommending the creation of
regional capital defender offices in 2002.321 In part, the recommendation was a cost-cutting measure. Virginia was already spending
between 1.5 and 2 million dollars per year on court-appointed capital defense, and the Commonwealth could “maximize cost savings”
by going with specialized capital defender units instead.322 But
equally if not more important was the fact that creating the capital
defender offices was a way to shore up the state’s capital defense.
If Virginia was serious about its death penalty—and surely it
was—then it needed to make sure that those death sentences
318. Justice Backs Death Penalty Freeze, CBS NEWS (Apr. 10, 2001), https://www.cbs
news.com/news/justice-blacks-death-penalty-freeze [https://perma.cc/8Z3B-QS4W] (quoting
Justice Ginsburg).
319. AP, O’Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/04/us/o-connor-questions-death-penalty.html [https://per ma.cc/4DP46WJR] (quoting Justice O’Connor).
320. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (reversing for ineffective assistance
of counsel based on counsel’s failure to adequately investigate mitigating evidence); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (same); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (same);
Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (same); Andrus v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1875 (2020) (same).
321. VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, INDIGENT DEFENSE: TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA 4 (2002).
322. See id. at 36 (“The total expenditure for capital cases in the state was
$1,572,359. . . . Based on the findings of the analysis of average cost per charge between
Court Appointed Counsel and Public Defenders, the Crime Commission analyzed where the
state could maximize cost savings through the establishment of new Public Defender Offices.”).
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continued to stick, even as judicial review of capital defense representation became more exacting. “There’s some cost savings, but
really it’s an expertise issue,” a spokesperson for the State Crime
Commission told the press, noting, “It’s such a complex area.”323
The State Crime Commission concluded that the complexity of
the work and sheer volume of capital cases in Virginia created a
capital case workload that could sustain six regional capital defender offices.324 The General Assembly went with four. The patron
of the bill to establish the offices would later recall that the goal
was “to avoid any potential mishaps.”325 Four offices would suffice
for statewide capital defense.
And so it came to be that, in 2002, the Republican-controlled Virginia General Assembly authorized the creation of four regional
capital defender offices at a time when the death penalty enjoyed
widespread public support.326 The four offices were a Richmond office to serve central Virginia, a Roanoke office to serve Southwestern Virginia, a Norfolk office to serve Southeastern Virginia, and a
Manassas office (which later moved to Arlington) to serve Northern
Virginia.327 The offices were established in 2002 and 2003, and
started taking cases in 2004.328 Each office was originally staffed
with three attorneys—a Capital Defender, Deputy Capital Defender, and Assistant Capital Defender—along with one investigator, one mitigation specialist, and an office manager for administrative support.329

323. Where the Newspaper Stands, DAILY PRESS (Dec. 9, 2002), https://www.dailypress.
com/news/dp-xpm-20021209-2002-12-09-0212090011-story.html [https://perma.cc/SKY2-8
SUR] (quoting the acting executive director of the State Crime Commission).
324. See VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, supra note 321, at 36 (“Using the current standards
for workload, six localities in Virginia met the thresholds for existing offices.”).
325. See Ned Oliver, Before Lawmakers Abolished the Death Penalty, Expert Public Defenders Had Quietly Defeated It Themselves, VA. MERCURY (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.vir
giniamercury.com/2021/03/26/before-lawmakers-abolished-the-death-penalty-expert-public
-defenders-had-quietly-defeated-it-themselves/ [https://perma.cc/CH4P-982P] (quoting former state Senator Ken Stolle, a Republican, who is now serving as sheriff of Virginia Beach).
326. See id.
327. Where The Newspaper Stands, supra note 323.
328. See ABA, supra note 141, at 143–44.
329. See Daniel L. Payne, Building the Case for Life: A Mitigation Specialist as a Necessity and a Matter of Right, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43, 59 (2003).
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The staffing was bare bones, but just moving the ancillary defense services in-house was a huge cost savings. As we discuss below, competent capital defense requires investigation and mitigation, and having non-lawyers do the sort of time-consuming investigative work that could save a defendant’s life meant that courtappointed lawyers were not billing that time themselves.330 The
Virginia ACLU’s report noted that Craig Cooley, for example, spent
between 250 to 350 hours preparing for a capital case, and 100 to
200 of those hours were spent investigating.331 Court-appointed
capital defense attorneys could ask the court for funds to hire investigators and “mitigation specialists” (again, more on that below),332 but they, too, billed by the hour and even that racked up
costs. The creation of regional capital defender offices put those
sorts of specialists on a salary and called it a day.
It merits mention that, over time, the offices grew. In the heyday
of their work, they each hired another assistant capital defender
and another specialist, which they allocated in different ways.
Some offices had two investigators and one mitigation specialist,
some had one investigator and two mitigation specialists, and one
office had three mitigation specialists who also served as investigators.333
It is also worth noting an attempt to “defang” the offices in 2013.
That year, the Virginia General Assembly considered a budget
amendment that would have cut twelve positions from the capital
defender offices—more than a third of its staffing.334 In the end,
the General Assembly settled upon a $200,000 “reversion” instead,
along with instructions to the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission (“VIDC”), which oversaw the capital defender offices, to review
the workload of the various offices and reallocate positions “as may
be appropriate.”335 An extensive report followed by the end of the

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
(2013).
335.

See infra text accompanying note 414–17.
See ACLU OF VA., supra note 234, at 16.
See infra text accompanying notes 406–11.
See ABA, supra note 141, at 156 (discussing staffing as of 2012).
See THE VA. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, REVIEW OF THE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICES 3
Id. at 2.
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year, crunching the numbers and concluding that there was no “appropriate” cut or reallocation.336 According to the VIDC report:
Reductions to the current staffing could negatively impact the ability
of the offices to accept appointment of cases resulting in the loss of the
expertise of attorneys and staff practicing solely in capital defense and
the cost efficiencies built into the fixed costs of the capital defender
offices, including capped salaries, investigators and mitigation
staff.337

The message was clear: the General Assembly could cut funding of
the capital defender offices if it wanted, but it would be shooting
itself in the foot. And that was the end of that.
One last point merits mention here, and it goes to the percentage
of capital cases in which regional capital defenders were appointed.
In accordance with ABA guidelines, Virginia required the appointment of two defense attorneys in every capital case, and as of 2004,
it required that one of those attorneys be a regional capital defender.338 That would suggest that regional capital defenders were
appointed in all capital cases as of 2004, but that’s not quite right.
Staffing constraints sometimes limited an office’s ability to take
cases, and from time to time, offices were conflicted out of representation (typically where codefendants were involved). Thus, the
percentage of capital cases that involved regional capital defenders
varied from around thirty percent (depending on the office and volume of cases in the region at the time) to well over seventy percent,
particularly as the offices started stemming the tide of capital
cases going to trial.339 By the time Virginia repealed the death penalty in 2021, regional capital defenders were involved in most every
capital case and, even then, some had begun to run out of work,
336. Id. at 3 (“The information requested of and received from the Sentencing Commission is not indicative of the workload of the capital defender offices. The focus of the data
was the final outcome. It was not intended to capture the number of charges of capital murder that were filed, which triggers the appointment of counsel. Nor was it intended to capture or measure the workload of the capital defender offices.”); id. at 4 (reporting hours
worked by lead and second chair defense counsel in capital cases as “a median of 353 hoursin-court and 2373 hours out-of-court (a total of 2726 hours) spent on cases that went to trial,
and 42 hours in-court and 992 hours out-of-court (a total of 1034) on cases that ended with
pleas”).
337. Id. at 2–3.
338. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Repl. Vol. 2015). For a discussion of ABA guidelines, see infra text accompanying note 373.
339. See THE VA. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, supra note 334, at 6.
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with one office (Norfolk, serving the Southeastern region) already
scheduled to close in June 2021.340 The regional capital defender
offices were literally working themselves out of a job, which brings
us to the difference that those offices made.
B. The Difference that Specialized Capital Defender Offices Made
What happened when capital defense work in Virginia went
from low paid court-appointed lawyers (and, from time to time, under-resourced and overwhelmed public defender offices) to specialized capital defenders with in-house defense team specialists? We
start by taking a closer look at the raw data. Then we look behind
the data, explaining why the capital defender offices had the impact they did.
First, the data. As mentioned early in the discussion, others
have measured the impact that Virginia’s regional capital defender
offices made, both in the plea-bargaining context and at trial.341
Writing in 2015, our colleague John Douglass showed that the capital trial rate—the rate of capital cases actually going to trial—was
sliced in half after the capital defender offices started taking cases
in 2004.342 Importantly, the capital murder indictment rate had not
changed much. It was 79% before 2004 and 73% after.343 Those indictments were still coming down the pike. The difference was in
the percentage of cases going to trial. Before 2004, twice as many
capital cases were going to trial, which meant twice as many cases
carried the possibility of actually resulting in a death sentence.
Death sentences had fallen 80% by 2013,344 and the chief reason
was a steep decline in the sheer number of cases with death on the
table. Those cases were pleading out for a sentence less than death
instead. “Something . . . has happened in the past fifteen years to
increase the chances that prosecutors will choose to resolve capital
cases short of a contested trial with death still on the table,”
340. How Capital Defenders Helped End Virginia’s Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR. (Mar. 30, 2021); also on file with author (i.e., in Doug Ramseur’s head).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26.
342. See Douglass, supra note 26, at 885 (reporting a decline in the capital trial rate from
38% to 19%).
343. See id.
344. See id. at 882.
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Douglass wrote after crunching the numbers.345 “That ‘something,’” he concluded, was “a vigorous defense.”346
In 2017, Brandon Garrett followed Douglass’s study with a study
of his own. The ABA’s 2013 report on Virginia’s death penalty had
shown that the death sentencing rate at trial went from 84% before
2004 to just 47% from 2005 to 2011.347 Garrett’s study showed that
the same 47% death sentencing rate continued through 2015, and
examined trial transcripts to see what was driving it.348 Just
twenty-one capital cases went to trial between 2005 and 2015, and
Garrett read the transcripts of every one of them.349 He then compared those transcripts to the transcripts of twenty contested capital cases between 1996 and 2004.350
The difference was dramatic. The average sentencing phase of a
capital trial was less than two days long in the 1996–2004 set of
cases, and most of the witnesses were called by the prosecution.351
In the 2005–2011 set of cases, the average sentencing phase was
double that—four days—and the defense was calling most of the
witnesses.352 The difference was especially striking in cases where
the defendant was represented by one of the regional capital defender offices. The sentencing phase of trial was consistently
longer in those cases than in the court-appointed counsel cases,
largely because the regional capital defenders called more witnesses—nineteen, on average, compared to eleven when the capital
defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel.353
Little did anyone know that by the time both of these studies
came out, Virginia had already seen its last death sentence. That
was in 2011, and it was reversed on appeal for improperly

345. Id. at 887.
346. Id. For a nod to the role that progressive prosecutors played, see infra notes 517–
18 and accompanying text.
347. See ABA, supra note 141, at 142; see also supra note 231 and accompanying text
(discussing the 2013 ABA report findings on death sentencing rate before 2004).
348. See Garrett, supra note 25, at 664–65.
349. See id. at 664.
350. See id. at 665.
351. See id. at 667.
352. See id. at 692.
353. See id. at 683.
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excluding mitigating evidence.354 Regional capital defenders represented the defendant, and the prosecutor announced he would not
seek death on remand.355 What started as a death sentence would
become a life sentence instead.
With that, we offer a final data point attesting to the impact of
the regional capital defender offices. Altogether, the regional capital defenders handled over 250 capital cases.356 Of those, only ten
went to trial with death as a possible outcome.357 All the other
cases were negotiated for a sentence short of death.
As to those ten cases that went to trial, only four resulted in a
death sentence, and one of them, as just mentioned above, was reversed on appeal and became a life sentence.358 Four was actually
three. And three was actually two, because another of the four
death sentences was commuted by the governor when it was discovered that prosecutors used false evidence to convince the jury
that the defendant deserved death.359 That left just two death sentences intact. Of those, one capital defendant was on death row
when Virginia repealed the death penalty, and one was executed.360 One. Of the more than 250 capital defendants represented
354. See supra note 23 (discussing Lawlor v. Zook, 909 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2018)).
355. See Jackman, supra note 23.
356. See Oliver, supra note 325.
357. See Garrett, supra note 25, at 682–83 (noting that ten of the twenty-one capital
cases that went to trial between 2005 and 2015 were represented by the regional capital
defenders).
358. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 354–55 (referencing Lawlor, 909
F.3d 614).
359. See Virginia Governor Commutes Death Sentence of Ivan Telguz, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/virginia-governor-comm
utes-death-sentence-of-ivan-teleguz [https://perma.cc/PZN6-RB5Q] (quoting then-Governor
McAuliffe as saying, “[D]uring the trial, evidence was admitted implicating Mr. Teleguz in
another murder in a small Pennsylvania town . . . . In arguing for the death penalty, the
prosecutor made explicit reference to this evidence in arguing that Mr. Teleguz was so dangerous that he needed to be put to death. We now know that no such murder occurred, much
less with any involvement by Mr. Teleguz. It was false information, plain and simple, and
while I am sure that the evidence was admitted in a good-faith belief in its truthfulness at
the time, we now know that to be incorrect.”).
360. The one person executed was Ricky Gray, whose case we discuss infra text accompanying notes 481–501. Thomas Porter was one of the two people on Virginia’s death row
at the time of the repeal. Porter’s sentence was commuted to life without parole. See Dean
Mirshahi, Virginia Will End Capital Punishment, What Does That Mean for the Two Men
Still on Virginia’s Death Row?, WRIC (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.wric.com/news/virginianews/virginia-will-end-capital-punishment-what-does-that-mean-for-the-two-men-still-on-
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by the regional capital defender offices, just one was actually put
to death.
In the wake of Virginia’s repeal of the death penalty, the patron
of the bill to create the regional capital defender offices told the
press, “I think it went a little further than I thought it would.”361
Just a tad. With only two people on death row and no new death
sentences in a decade, Virginia’s death penalty was already halfdead when the Commonwealth finally abandoned it, and the regional capital defenders played a massive part in making that happen. “The four regional capital offices just transformed the landscape in Virginia,” Executive Director of the VIDC David Johnson
told the press.362 And it was true. But how did that happen?
In the pages that follow, we answer that question, and here the
discussion gets personal—as in, first person-al. Much of what we
have to say here is actually what Doug Ramseur has to say. Doug
Ramseur began with the regional capital defenders as a Deputy
Capital Defender in the Central Virginia (Richmond) office in 2002.
In 2009, he became the Capital Defender of the Southeastern office
in Norfolk, and then in 2015, he returned to the Richmond office as
its Capital Defender. From 2015 to 2017, he was the head of both
the Central and Southeastern regional offices at the same time. All
that is to say Doug Ramseur knows a thing or two about what was
happening in the trenches, and sharing his knowledge is one of the
core contributions of this piece. In the discussion below, we identify
Doug Ramseur as the source of information when relaying his insights and refer to him in the third person (as we do here) for the
sake of clarity.
We start with a disclaimer from Doug: It’s important to say up
front that this is just the story as I know it. Other capital defenders
could tell this story, too, and they would probably tell it a little

virginias-death-row/ [https://perma.cc/3TJK-ZSEV].
361. See Oliver, supra note 325.
362. Frank Green, ‘It Is the Moral Thing To Do’: Virginia’s Death Penalty Abolished in
Historic Signing, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 24, 2021), https://richmond.com/news/stateand-regional/it-is-the-moral-thing-to-do-virginias-death-penalty-abolished-in-historic-signi
ng/article_93c5ea28-c676-5d23-b84f-1c3181f0d7b6.html [https://perma.cc/GRL7-8ZLG].
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differently. There’s nothing special about my knowledge as opposed
to that of others. I’m just the one who knows Corinna Lain.363
With that bit of housekeeping out of the way, our discussion can
begin. In our minds, understanding why the regional capital defender offices had the impact that they did is easiest when considered in three separate contexts: trial, pretrial, and plea-bargaining. Of the three, plea-bargaining was the most impactful. As noted
above, capital defenders defeated death not so much by winning at
trial as by avoiding it. They were masters at taking death off the
table. But understanding how they were able to do that first requires understanding the calculus they were changing at trial, and
the mayhem they were causing pretrial. As such, we work our way
backwards, starting with the most conspicuous setting—trial—and
then moving to the slightly less conspicuous pretrial context before
turning to the plea-bargaining that was happening in the shadow
of both.
1. Trial
We start by reiterating that the real success of the regional capital defenders came from avoiding trial altogether. That said, their
ability to change the calculus of the outcome at trial played an important part in that success and, as such, is an important part of
our story. In the trial context, we see the impact of the regional
capital defenders as falling into three categories: specialization,
mitigation, and jury selection.
a. Specialization
Practice makes perfect. There, that’s the obvious part. Regional
capital defenders were doing nothing but capital defense. Capital
defense work is a highly complex, specialized area of the law, and
regional capital defenders were the specialists. We would never
363. Corinna Lain here to say: Fair enough. Doug and I have known each other for nearly
twenty-five years. We tried a few cases together when I was a young prosecutor and he was
a young defense attorney. And we both teach death penalty classes at the University of
Richmond School of Law. Doug taught capital litigation, and I taught a survey course on the
death penalty. They were scheduled pretty much back-to-back, so we had “death Tuesdays”
together. Although it’s true that others could share this knowledge, knowing Doug and respecting him is what led me to ask if he wanted to team up with me to write this piece.
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ask a general practitioner to handle a highly complex IRS tax case.
We would not even ask the Turbo Tax people to do that. We would
go to a specialist because we know that specialized knowledge in
the complexities of tax law would get us the best result in the case.
So it is with capital defense work (except the stakes are life and
death).
We pause here to make the point more concretely. As already
discussed, indigent capital defendants before 2004 were represented by overworked public defenders and underpaid court-appointed lawyers, many of whom had limited experience with capital cases.364 The regional capital defenders had more experience
(because that is all they did, day in and day out) as well as more
time to devote to each case (again, because that’s all they did, day
in and day out). They did not have other types of cases vying for
their attention, and their research of the law never started at
square one. The regional capital defenders knew the relevant cases
like the back of their hand. They knew what motions to make and
when. And they knew which strategies worked and which didn’t.
But the advantage of specialization was more than just individual attorneys systematizing capital defense and figuring out what
works. It also gave Virginia’s capital defenders a community. Their
world became the full-time version of consultations and conferences at Washington and Lee’s VC3.365
Doug Ramseur explains: Once we had a dedicated office doing
capital defense work, we had other specialists in the building (and
other regional offices) whom we could strategize with, so it wasn’t
just my expertise that was an advantage. It was plugging into the
expertise of other capital defenders as well, and those were some
smart, talented people. We had these day-long conferences—“bring
your case” day—where we each brought our cases and just brainstormed and strategized with a room full of capital defenders. We

364. See Oliver, supra note 325 (“Before the offices were created, indigent defendants
facing a capital murder charge were either represented by local public defender offices,
which were often overworked and lacked expertise in death penalty cases, or private courtappointed lawyers, who also had limited experience with the cases and had to get the trial
judge’s approval for all but the most basic expenditures.”); see also supra notes 265–79 (discussing indigent capital defense before 2004).
365. For a discussion of Washington and Lee’s VC3, see supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
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were bouncing off each other’s expertise and helping each other out
in a way that just wasn’t possible for court-appointed lawyers who
were practicing on their own.
And that community wasn’t limited to the Virginia capital defender offices. Once created, those offices plugged Virginia’s capital
defenders into a professional community that extended far beyond
the Commonwealth’s borders. The VC3 had brought in nationally
renowned experts to its conferences and training sessions, but now
the capital defender offices had access to those experts on their
own.
Doug Ramseur explains: Once we had the capital defender offices, we started going to the capital defender trainings that were
happening at the national level. We were getting trained on cuttingedge techniques and talking to capital defenders in other states
about what was working elsewhere. There was this cross-pollination that was happening as we brought outside knowledge in and
sent inside knowledge out, and there was a camaraderie among the
people doing this work. Those sorts of exchanges also gave us perspective as to how draconian Virginia’s rules were and where we
could (and should) put energy into challenging them. In my case,
this was magnified by the fact that I spent four years in Georgia
trying capital cases. I came back to Virginia and thought on several
occasions, not even Georgia does that. Another great regional capital defender came from New York, so we had a resident expert in
how defenders beat cases there, and there were others who brought
their own experiences and knowledge to the table, too. That sense of
perspective was just invaluable. We benefitted in all sorts of ways
from our ability to network with the larger capital defender community and access its deep wealth of knowledge.
All this is more or less intuitive. One would expect there to be a
difference between the representation provided by specialized capital defenders and the representation provided by court-appointed
lawyers and public defenders who were not specialized in that area
of practice. It would be weird if there weren’t.
But other advantages of specialization were less intuitive. One
was the fact that the regional capital defenders were not only more
experienced than most of the lawyers who had been handling capital cases, but they were also more experienced than most of the
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prosecutors they were up against. Before the advent of specialized
capital defenders, prosecutors had the experiential advantage.
They tried capital case after capital case, while court-appointed attorneys rotated through. The creation of the regional capital defender offices flipped that, giving the experiential advantage to the
capital defenders instead. Some prosecutors’ offices handled more
capital cases than others, of course, but no prosecutor’s office could
match the experience that the regional capital defenders were getting. Even the busiest death-seeking offices had but a fraction of
the regional capital defenders’ cases, and the experience differential was especially stark in rural counties, which had few capital
cases from the start.
Virginia’s 2002 study of its death penalty found that prosecutors
in low-density population (i.e., rural) jurisdictions were twice as
likely to seek the death penalty in a capital case as those in highdensity population (i.e., urban) jurisdictions.366 Rural counties did
not see a lot of capital murders, but when they did, those murders
shook the communities to the core, and that was reflected in prosecutors’ proclivity to seek death. Yet, as Brandon Garrett noted in
his study of capital cases, by 2017, death sentencing in rural Virginia had all but disappeared.367 As Garrett noted, some of that had
to do with money—capital cases are expensive for prosecutors and
defenders alike—but much had to do with prosecutors’ assessment
of the prospects of losing at trial.368 Our point is that the experience
differential played a part in the latter assessment. The regional
capital defenders knew way more about how to try a capital case
than rural prosecutors, whose experience in trying capital cases
was naturally limited by the number of murders in their

366. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at V.
367. See GARRETT, supra note 154, at 142–43 (“[I]n the 1980s and 1990s, dozens of small
counties [in Virginia] regularly imposed death sentences. . . . In the decade from 2005 to
2016, only seven counties imposed any death sentences, and most were large wealthy counties. . . . The smaller, poorer counties do not bother seeking the death penalty anymore, and
. . . cost may be an important factor in this trend.”).
368. See Brandon L. Garrett, Guest Post, How Virginia Ended the Death Penalty, WASH.
POST: TRUE CRIME (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2021/03/24
/va-ends-death/ [https://perma.cc/34GX-9YTU] (“Prosecutors stopped seeking death sentences in rural counties, due to the expense, but no doubt also because they knew they might
lose.”).
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jurisdiction. Rural prosecutors were getting completely outgunned
when they asked for death, and so over time, they just stopped asking.
Doug Ramseur illustrates the point with an example from a jurisdiction where capital cases were not a rarity. As he tells it: We
were handling way more capital cases than most prosecutors ever
had, and we knew the rules better than they did because we dealt
with them all the time. In one case, the prosecution missed a filing
deadline. The law on court-appointed experts changed in 2010,369
and that mostly affected us because the Commonwealth already
had its experts, but this little provision was added that said both
sides had to give notice of experts testifying at trial. We did our part,
and then we waited. And waited. And when they missed the deadline, we waited some more. We waited until we got right up on the
eve of trial and then dropped the hammer, letting the prosecution
know that it had not complied with the statutory requirements and
so none of its expert testimony was admissible. The judge in the case
had already been upset about continuances in the case, so everyone
knew he was going to blow a gasket. We had them by the—well, we
had them in an uncomfortable place, and it was glorious. Virginia
is all about strict compliance with procedural rules, and we were
able to capitalize on that and make it work for us. We were going to
be able to keep all their experts off the stand, and that allowed us to
leverage their misstep to take death off the table and deal the case
for life.
The same thing happened in a case out of Northern Virginia with
one of the most death-seeking prosecutors in the Commonwealth.
As Doug Ramseur tells it: That prosecutor was notorious for getting
death in capital cases and was well versed in the law, but he also
missed the filing deadline. As a result, the regional capital defenders in the case were able to exclude that evidence. The case didn’t
really turn on expert evidence anyway so the Commonwealth was
able to go forward without it, but these were the sorts of moves we
sometimes could make because we knew the ins and outs of the law
so well. Before opening the regional offices, it was the capital defense attorneys who were getting hung up on the technicalities. That

369. We discuss that change, and the regional capital defenders’ role in it, at infra text
accompanying notes 477–79.
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wasn’t happening when the regional capital defenders had the case,
and, from time to time, we were even able to work those strict procedural rules to our advantage and hang up the prosecution instead.
Another way that the regional capital defenders changed the
landscape of capital defense was the impact they had on the quality
of capital representation by court-appointed counsel. As previously
noted, Virginia required the appointment of two defense attorneys
in every capital case, in accordance with ABA guidelines.370 One of
those attorneys was usually a regional capital defender, and the
other was a local attorney appointed by the court. Again, some of
those attorneys were already remarkably good. But for those who
were not, partnering with the regional capital defenders provided
a front-row seat to what high-end capital defense looked like.
Court-appointed co-counsel saw the motions, and the strategies,
and the mitigation and investigation work—they saw the regional
capital defenders doing whatever they could to mount a vigorous
defense. This exposure proved to be an inadvertent training ground
for high-quality capital defense, while giving the regional capital
defenders a glimpse of what low-end capital defense looked like. In
both ways, the experience highlighted the need to develop new
standards and mandatory training for attorneys doing court-appointed capital defense, laying the groundwork for systemic
change.
Here is Doug Ramseur to explain how that change happened:
Understanding what it took to mount a vigorous defense in a capital
case and seeing what many of the court-appointed attorneys weren’t
doing helped clarify what needed to be done to make sure a vigorous
defense was being mounted in capital cases with court-appointed
counsel, too. We had this list of attorneys who were nominally qualified to take capital cases, but the qualifications were all experiencebased so nobody was getting weeded out for poor performance. And
we had high-end capital defender training available through VC3,
but it wasn’t mandatory and the attorneys who needed it most
weren’t the ones attending. Both were problems that needed to be
fixed, and that led to the creation of a review committee in 2012.
370. See supra text accompanying note 338.
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In 2014, the review committee recommended completely revamping Virginia’s system of qualifying counsel for representation in
capital cases.371 So that’s what we did. We took the list of qualified
counsel in capital cases and purged the entire thing, starting over
from scratch. Under the new system, which came into effect in 2015,
attorneys had to be “certified” to take capital cases—they had to apply, and a committee had to approve the application.372 The certification also had a sunset provision, so attorneys had to get re-certified, which allowed for qualitative assessments. And then, to get
certified, attorneys had to attend training on the basics of quality
representation in a capital case, which staff from our offices often
led. All that goes back to having expertise in what quality capital
representation looked like, and first-hand knowledge of what was
needed to fill the gaps.
Structural changes were one thing but changing the culture of
representation in a capital case was quite another, and the regional capital defender offices made a difference here too. The advent of specialized capital defenders routinized high-quality capital defense, raising the bar of capital representation by setting a
baseline of what competent representation looked like in a capital
case. That changed expectations, and representation that might
have passed as minimally acceptable before 2004 was no longer
adequate after it. As Doug Ramseur puts the point: People think of
the regional capital defenders as raising the level of representation
in capital cases, and they did. But what tends to get lost in that
discussion is the socializing effect that had on the court-appointed
attorneys who were taking capital cases too. They were also mounting a more vigorous defense. In that sense, our offices were like the
rising tide that lifts all ships. It was a cumulative effect.

371. See CAPITAL COUNSEL QUALIFICATIONS STANDARDS REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT
(2014) [https://perma.cc/67G8-S9BG].
372. For a discussion of the new certification system, see generally VA. INDIGENT DEF.
COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2016) (“[T]he list of attorneys qualified to serve as court appointed counsel in capital cases was purged on September 1, 2015 and a new list was created. The list only contains attorneys who have met the new qualification standards promulgated by a committee established by the Supreme Court, State Bar and VIDC to study
capital qualification in Virginia.”).
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b. Mitigation Specialists and Fact Investigators
The ABA’s guidelines for capital representation call for at least
two attorneys, a mitigation specialist, and a fact investigator working on every capital case.373 These are the four members of a minimally staffed capital defense team, and their involvement has become “the accepted ‘standard of care’ in the capital defense community.”374 Understanding why that is so requires understanding
more about what these defense team specialists do and why their
work is so important. As such, we are going to park the discussion
right here for a bit to explain it.
First, mitigation specialists. Mitigation specialists are in some
ways the most important part of a capital defense team. Sometimes, a capital case that goes to trial is a fight over guilt or innocence, but more often, it is a fight over life or death, and that’s
where the work of mitigation specialists comes into play. Mitigation specialists discover and synthesize information that can be
presented at the sentencing phase of trial to save the defendant’s
life, and gathering as much of it as humanly possible is highly specialized work.375
What might lead a jury to spare the life of a defendant who has
just been convicted of capital murder? That’s the question that
drives a mitigation specialist’s work, and the hitch is that they do
not know the answer until they find it. The possibilities for mitigation are endless. A traumatic childhood of profound abuse and neglect. A history of mental illness. Intellectual disability. Brain damage. PTSD. It would be an oversimplification to say that the prosecution in the sentencing phase of a capital trial presents everything bad that the defendant has ever done, while the defense presents everything bad that has ever been done to the defendant. But
not by much. The whole point of the case in mitigation is to show
the jury that the reason that the defendant committed a horrendous crime is not because the defendant is a horrendous person,
373. See ABA, supra note 141, at 149–50 (discussing ABA guidelines).
374. See id. at 149 n.65 (citing Jill Miller, The Defense Team in Capital Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1117, 1120 (2003) (“Today, the defense team concept, in which clients are provided with two attorneys, a mitigation specialist, and an investigator, is well-established
and has become the accepted ‘standard of care’ in the capital defense community.”)).
375. For an excellent in-depth discussion of the work that mitigation specialists do and
the skills involved in doing it, see generally Payne, supra note 329.
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but rather because the defendant is a deeply broken person, usually for reasons well beyond the defendant’s control.
As Doug Ramseur puts the point: The prosecutor shows the jury
our client’s worst day of his life. We try to show the jury all the other
days. We’re not trying to excuse the conduct. We’re trying to explain
it—to help the jury understand why a defendant did what they did,
and to use that understanding to make the case for life.
Because mitigation specialists do not know what they are looking for until they find it, their work requires learning everything
there is to know about a capital defendant. Everything. That means
record checks—medical records, mental health records, school records, social services records, court records, work records, military
records, prison records—every record they can find. And it means
talking to people who know the defendant—friends, neighbors,
teachers, pastors, coworkers, therapists, probation officers, and especially immediate family members. Immediate family members
have the most intimate knowledge of the defendant’s childhood and
the major events in the defendant’s life, but they also may be the
least willing to share it, especially if it makes them look bad or
pertains to sensitive information that is embarrassing for the family, like physical or sexual abuse. To overcome this reticence, mitigation specialists must earn family members’ trust and get them
to understand that the point is not to blame others for what the
defendant has done, but rather to humanize the defendant in an
attempt to save the defendant’s life.376 This trust-building process
takes time. Mitigation specialists conduct multiple visits and follow-up interviews with multiple people as they follow leads and
uncover clues in the other information they are scrutinizing.
At the end of the day, mitigation specialists compile everything
they know into a comprehensive chronology of the defendant’s life
that documents everything from the defendant’s genetic predispositions and prenatal care to the environmental influences that impacted the defendant’s development, identifying multiple risk factors and illustrating their cumulative effect over time. This is often
referred to as a defendant’s “social history,”377 but it is actually a
376. See id. at 46 (discussing challenges of mitigation work, particularly in the context
of family abuse and neglect).
377. ABA, supra note 141, at 152.
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life history. It is the defendant’s life story, and creating it is extremely time-consuming work.
Creating a life history is also highly skilled work that requires
specialized training.378 Mitigation specialists have to know where
to find records and what to look for once they find them. They have
to be able to get people to talk to them. They have to know what
questions to ask. And they need to have the ability to interpret information and see clues to other leads. Mitigation specialists are
the unsung heroes in the story we tell, and our hats go off to them
for the critically important work they do.
The same is true of fact investigators—they also play a critically
important role in defending a capital case. Fact investigators probe
the facts of the case. Their work can result in discoveries that can
be used to contest a defendant’s guilt at trial or give defense counsel leverage in pleading the case.
In Virginia, the role of fact investigators in capital cases was especially important because of the state’s “extraordinarily limited”
discovery rules, as the ABA noted in its 2013 assessment report.379
Until 2020, Virginia’s discovery rules for felony criminal cases provided for just three things: the defendant’s statements, forensic
and other scientific reports, and the inspection (and copying) of
tangible items.380 The rules made no exception for capital cases, so
capital defendants could go to trial without knowing who would
testify against them or what those witnesses had said to the police.381 Indeed, capital defendants could go to trial without ever
having seen the police report that gave rise to the capital
charges.382 Even civil cases in Virginia allowed for more discovery

378. See Payne, supra note 329, at 45 (discussing typical qualifications and training of
mitigation specialists).
379. ABA, supra note 141, at 130.
380. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(b) (2020).
381. See ABA, supra note 141, at 126–27 (noting that Virginia’s discovery rule “expressly
excludes from discovery ‘statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or prospective . . .
internal Commonwealth documents made by agents in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the case.’ Thus, police reports and statements made by witnesses are not
discoverable under Virginia law”).
382. See id. at 130 (“Thus a capital defendant may face the daunting task of preparing
for trial without access to some of the record of the police investigation that gave rise to
capital charges.”).
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than a defendant received in a capital case, and civil cases didn’t
have life on the line.383
As Doug Ramseur puts the point: We were not entitled to know
who was testifying after the bathroom break, that’s how bad it was.
Other states rejected the idea of “trial by ambush”384 as patently unfair and inconsistent with the idea that trials are supposed to get at
the truth. Not Virginia. Virginia embraced it.
Some prosecutors went above and beyond the minimal disclosure requirements with “open file” policies that gave counsel a look
at the prosecution’s case. But many did not, most likely because
they knew that defense counsel would exploit the weaknesses in
their case (that is, after all, what defense counsel are supposed to
do).385 Indeed, one of the most death-seeking prosecutors in Virginia went so far as to tell a court that the reason he didn’t share
information more freely was a concern that defense counsel would
be “able to fabricate a defense around what is provided.”386 This
sense that sharing information might be a little too helpful to the
defense not only resulted in minimal discovery in many capital
cases, but also increased the risk that defense counsel would not
be given exculpatory evidence and other information favorable to

383. See id. at v (“By comparison, discovery rules governing civil cases are far more
widely-encompassing than those required in a death penalty case in the Commonwealth.”).
384. See ABA, HOW COURTS WORK, (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/discovery/
[https://perma.cc/MVB2-Y27U] (“Discovery enables the parties to know before the trial begins what evidence may be presented. It’s designed to prevent ‘trial by ambush,’ where one
side doesn’t learn of the other side’s evidence or witnesses until the trial, when there’s no
time to obtain answering evidence”); see also ABA, supra note 141, at 130 (“Unfortunately,
when it comes to discovery, Virginia’s rules are more restrictive than in other states and the
federal system in providing capital defendants the basic information necessary to prepare
and present a defense.”).
385. See ABA, supra note 141, at 127 (discussing “open file” policies among some prosecutors but not others).
386. Wolfe v. Clarke, 819 F. Supp. 2d 538, 567 n.24 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting Prince William County Commonwealth’s Attorney Paul Ebert as saying, “I have found in the past when
you have information that is given to certain [defense] counsel and certain defendants, they
are able to fabricate a defense around what is provided”). The Eastern District was not impressed. See id. (“In effect, Ebert admits here that his contempt of defendants who ‘fabricate
a defense’ guides his perspective on disclosing information. . . . [Ebert’s] actions served to
deprive Wolfe of any substantive defense in a case where his life would rest on the jury’s
verdict. The Court finds these actions not only unconstitutional in regards to due process,
but abhorrent to the judicial process.”).
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the defense as constitutionally required by Brady v. Maryland.387
The ABA’s 2013 assessment report noted several capital case reversals on Brady grounds that could have been prevented with
broader discovery in the first instance.388 As one headline put the
point in 2019, the gist of the problem was that Virginia was “still
an ambush state.”389
Knowing that, one can readily see why fact investigators were
so important to mounting an effective defense in Virginia capital
cases. Fact investigators could interview police officers, track down
witnesses, and just generally make up for what Virginia’s discovery process lacked. Fact investigators were the key to figuring out
what the prosecution’s case was going to look like, and where its
weaknesses were. And they were the ones who found the Brady
evidence that should have been disclosed but was not. Here too, we
tip our hats to these defense specialists and their important part
in the story we tell.
That brings us to our story, and the difference that having regional capital defender offices made. We know from Brandon Garrett’s work that the average sentencing phase of capital cases doubled after the capital defenders started taking cases in 2004.390 But
Garrett also presented rich narratives from the two sets cases he
reviewed, and we pause here to note a few of those for a sense of
what sentencing in the pre- and post-2004 cases looked like.
One of the cases from Garrett’s first data set—cases tried between 1996 and 2004—is the case of Teresa Lewis, the woman executed by Virginia despite evidence that her intellectual

387. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (finding due process violation where prosecution withheld material evidence favorable to the defense); see also ABA, supra note 141, at 131 (“Despite prosecutors’ efforts to act in good faith, the Virginia discovery system makes Brady violations
more likely . . . .”).
388. See ABA, supra note 141, at 127–29 (discussing Wolfe, 819 F. Supp. 2d 538 and
Hash v. Johnson, 845 F. Supp. 2d 711 (W.D. Va. 2012)). Of course, a prosecutor’s file may
be “open” but not have the exculpatory information in it. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263 (1999).
389. Alex McCarthy, ‘Still an Ambush State’: The Move Toward Discovery Reform is Going Slowly in Virginia, VA. MERCURY (Dec. 23, 2019) (emphasis added), https://www.virgin
iamercury.com/2019/12/23/still-an-ambush-state-the-move-toward-discovery-reform-is-goi
ng-slowly-in-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/NDF6-NBQ3].
390. See supra text accompanying note 352.
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functioning was in the bottom three percent of society.391 Incredibly, the defense did not present any mental health experts in the
sentencing phase of Lewis’s trial, calling just two witnesses—a probation officer and a family friend—instead.392
In two other cases in this first data set, the capital defendants
pleaded guilty, leaving the sentencing decision to the judge, and
defense counsel presented no expert testimony in the case, despite
evidence that both defendants suffered from significant psychological dysfunction.393 In one case, the defendant had told the stateappointed psychiatrist that he would come back to life after his execution and bring his grandfather with him (they had plans to get
a burger).394 In the other case, defense counsel simply submitted
two psychological reports between five and ten years old, prompting the judge in the case to say, “I have a lot of papers dealing with
psychological background and so forth but I really don’t have any
expert testimony to help me with that. It’s just a comment.”395
By way of comments, consider what a judge said in the Edward
Bell case, our last example of what the sentencing phase of a capital trial looked like prior to 2004. “[Y]ou presented literally no mitigating evidence,” the judge stated to the attorney in the case. The
judge added: “There were seven pages of transcript of the defense’s
case in the sentencing phase. Two witnesses were called. There
wasn’t a single question asked about Mr. Bell, about his background, about anything about him.”396
Compare that to the John Joseph “Jose” Rogers case, which was
tried by the regional capital defenders in 2006.397 The defense team
called twenty-one witnesses, compared to the state’s five, and

391. Lewis was Virginia’s only woman to be executed in the modern era. See supra note
243.
392. See Garrett, supra note 25, at 711 (discussing the Teresa Lewis case, Lewis v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 302, 593 S.E.2d 220 (2004)).
393. See id. at 713–14 (discussing the cases of capital defendants Marlon Williams, Williams v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 3, 472 S.E.2d 50 (1996), and Percy Levar Walton, Walton
v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 501 S.E.2d 134 (1998)).
394. See id. at 714 (discussing Walton, 256 Va. 85, 501 S.E.2d, 134).
395. Id. at 713 (discussing Williams, 252 Va. 3, 472 S.E.2d 50).
396. Id. at 708.
397. See id. at 666 (discussing the Jose Rogers case, detailed in Rogers v. Pearson, No.
11cv1281 (E.D. Va., Alexandria Div., Aug. 27, 2012)).
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showed in excruciating detail that the defendant had been subjected to horrific abuse.398 “[M]ost moving was testimony from his
younger brother, who he had tried to shelter from the abuse,” Garrett writes.399 The jury was initially deadlocked on the sentencing
decision, then returned a verdict of life.400
Garrett’s case comparisons focused on the sentencing phase of
trial, and thus his findings are most relevant to our discussion of
mitigation specialists. But we think his study may say something
about fact investigators as well. Garrett did not compare the guilt
phase of the two sets of cases (and since every case is different, the
value of doing so is admittedly limited), but we note that, on average, the guilt phase was thirty percent longer in the 2005–2015 set
of capital cases than it was in the 1996–2004 set of cases, and our
cursory review of the transcripts suggests that a more robust defense was part of the reason why.401 Moreover, of the twenty-one
capital cases that went to trial between 2004 and 2015, a surprisingly large number—seven—involved a defense theory of innocence, relying on alibi testimony or evidence pointing to the guilt
of a third party.402 None of those cases resulted in an acquittal, but,
in light of the fact that residual doubt has been empirically shown
to be one of the most powerful considerations leading jurors to
choose life,403 it is possible that planting even the smallest seeds of
doubt in the guilt phase of these capital trials may have impacted
the jury’s sentencing phase considerations, too.

398. See id.
399. Id.
400. See id.
401. For the raw data serving as the basis for comparison, see id. at 728–29 app. A–B.
The average guilt phase in the 1996–2004 set of cases was 3.6 days, compared to 5.2 days
in the 2005–2011 set of cases. Id. We concede that we cannot determine from that data point
alone whether the additional length is accountable to the defense, but a cursory review of
the trial transcripts suggests that in many cases it is.
402. See id. at 667 (“I was surprised to see how many capital trials continue to involve
contested factual questions regarding guilt. Seven of twenty recent capital trials involved
innocence defenses.”).
403. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1563 (1998) (discussing Capital Jury Project findings
showing that residual doubt over a defendant’s guilt was the most powerful consideration
weighing against a death sentence). Virginia does not allow an instruction on residual
doubt, nor may counsel argue it in sentencing. See Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192,
402 S.E.2d 196 (1991).
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All this is highly speculative, of course, and we recognize that a
strong defense case in the guilt phase of trial is just as likely to
keep the case from going to trial at all. Illustrating the point is a
case that Garrett discusses as an example of the tenacity of the
regional capital defenders. As Garrett tells it, lawyers from the regional capital defenders office listened to countless hours of recorded jail phone calls in hopes of finding impeachment evidence on
jailhouse informants and struck it rich.404 The informants were
calling relatives to get public information about the murder so that
they could fabricate evidence against the defendant in hopes of
benefitting from cooperation in their own pending cases.405
Turns out, it was Doug Ramseur’s case. Here is what Doug had
to say: That was one of those cases where we used every last scrap
of available manpower in the office. We had our investigators listening to the tapes. We were listening to the tapes. We even had some
law students listening to the tapes. There is no way a court would
have paid for all those hours, especially not to find a needle in a
haystack. But we found it, and when we did, it was devastating to
the Commonwealth’s case. We had the Commonwealth’s witnesses
on tape saying that they needed to know the facts of the case so they
could lie to the police about our defendant. It doesn’t get any better
than that. Ultimately, we were able to leverage what we had to take
death off the table and plead the case. That work took the case from
a possible death sentence to a sentence of ten years.
All this is to say that the regional capital defenders appear to
have made more extensive use of mitigation and investigation specialists than court-appointed attorneys. Garrett’s data showed that
the regional capital defender offices presented measurably
stronger cases in mitigation, suggesting more extensive use of mitigation specialists. And the raw data supports a theory that the
regional capital defender offices used fact investigators more extensively, too. But both data points just tell us that the offices had
an impact on the use of these defense specialists. Neither tells us
why.

404. See Garrett, supra note 25, at 682.
405. See id. (“[T]hey talked about how ‘the cooperation thing’ is ‘the key to . . . freedom,’
and how prosecutors and police ‘just want convictions . . . .’”).
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The untold story starts with what is perhaps an obvious point:
court-appointed lawyers in capital cases do not have mitigation
specialists and fact investigators on staff. On the few occasions
when public defender offices represented capital defendants, they
presumably had access to their in-house investigators, but even
they did not have an investigator dedicated to capital cases, let
alone a mitigation specialist. This is not to say that capital defense
counsel had no access to the assistance of mitigation specialists
and investigators. They did. But they had to ask for it.
By statute, indigent capital defendants in Virginia were entitled
to the appointment of a psychiatrist or other mental health expert
to evaluate the defendant and assist in preparation of the defense.406 But they were not entitled to the appointment of any other
experts or assistance other than the appointment of counsel. For
the appointment of ancillary defense services, capital defendants
had to petition the court and demonstrate that the assistance was
“likely to be a significant factor in [the] defense” and that they
would be prejudiced without it.407 The decision to grant funding for
such services was left to the trial court’s discretion. As the Supreme Court of Virginia stated in a case upholding the denial of a
capital defendant’s request for the appointment of a fact investigator: “[A] defendant does not have an absolute right to the assistance of an investigator, even when charged with capital murder.”408
One would think that even though capital defendants did not
have a right to the services of a mitigation specialist and fact investigator, they could make the showing to get one appointed in

406. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015), repealed by Act of Mar. 24,
2021, ch. 344 & 345, 2021 Va. Acts __, __. (“[T]he court shall appoint one or more qualified
mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense in the preparation
and presentation of information concerning the defendant’s history, character, or mental
condition, including (i) whether the defendant acted under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance at the time of the offense; (ii) whether the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
was significantly impaired at the time of the offense; and (iii) whether there are any other
factors in mitigation relating to the history or character of the defendant or the defendant’s
mental condition at the time of the offense.”).
407. Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211–12, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996).
408. Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 91, 580 S.E.2d 834, 840 (2003).
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any given case.409 But it did not work out that way in practice. Although courts usually appointed mitigation specialists and fact investigators in capital cases, they did not always do so. Sometimes,
they denied the request outright; sometimes, they appointed a single individual to perform both defense services; and, sometimes,
they limited the hours and/or total compensation available for the
work.410 Indeed, even when courts allotted funding for these ancillary defense services, they controlled the purse-strings. Counsel
would be allotted a certain number of hours or certain amount of
assistance and would need to seek approval for assistance beyond
that initial allotment.411
It is worth pausing to appreciate the bind this created for courtappointed counsel in a capital case. If a court refused to fund these
defense services or refused to fund them at a level necessary to
meet the needs of the case, the only option was for defense counsel
to do the field work themselves. The defendant’s court-appointed
mental health expert was not going to fill that gap—those experts
performed evaluations, not investigations.412 In fact, they relied on
the work of mitigation specialists to help inform their expert opinion in the case.413
That left defense counsel, and they were a mismatch, too. Defense counsel had no training or experience in the highly specialized work of a mitigation specialist.414 Moreover, most attorneys
came off as too intimidating to be good at getting family members

409. See Payne, supra note 329, at 44–45 (arguing that mitigation will always be a “significant factor” in the defense of a capital case).
410. See ABA, supra note 141, at 158–59 (providing table listing number of requests for
various ancillary defense specialists and number of requests actually granted, as well as
discussing individual instances where courts either denied the request or limited the provision of services in some manner).
411. See id. at 156 (making point and noting, “If the court approves funding for an investigator, mitigation specialist, or expert, capital counsel must then continue to seek court
approval for additional hours or services performed, which may result in significant use of
court’s and counsel’s time for resolution of funding issues”).
412. See Payne, supra note 329, at 51–52 (discussing court-appointed mental health experts’ lack of both expertise and inclination to perform mitigation investigation work).
413. See id. at 53 (making point and noting that mitigation work can also inform the type
of mental health expert appointed to evaluate a capital defendant).
414. See id. at 49–50 (discussing a host of reasons why capital defense attorneys are a
poor choice for conducting mitigation work).
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to reveal their deepest, darkest secrets.415 In addition, defense
counsel put themselves in a precarious position by doing fact investigation work on their own. If a witness turned on them, they
would have to decide whether to pass on impeachment or withdraw
from the case, as they could not take the stand in their own trial to
say that the witness was lying.416 On top of all that, doing the field
work of a mitigation specialist or fact investigator was not a good
use of defense counsel’s time. Their time was precious—and expensive—and was better spent doing the work that only lawyers could
do.417
The regional capital defenders had none of these problems. They
didn’t have to ask for these ancillary defense specialists because
they already had them, and courts were not controlling their hours.
That meant they also didn’t have to wait for a court to approve
these specialists before they could start working. ABA guidelines
recommend that mitigation work begin “immediately upon counsel’s entry into the case,”418 and when the regional capital defenders were involved, it did. In addition, the regional capital defenders
didn’t have to spend time and energy coordinating with an outside

415. See id. at 49.
416. See VA. STATE BAR, PROF. GUIDELINES R. 3.7, https://www.vsb.org/pro-guidelines
/index.php/rules/advocate/rule3-7/ [https://perma.cc/539Q-UX48] (“A lawyer shall not act as
an advocate in an adversarial proceeding in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness except [in limited circumstances.]”); see also ABA, supra note 141, at 159 (“[W]henever counsel is denied appointment of ancillary services, such as an investigator, it results
in counsel having to perform investigative functions at a much greater cost to the Commonwealth than if an investigator were hired to assist the defense. It may also place the lawyer
in the position of becoming a witness on behalf of the defense, causing the attorney to withdraw from the case.”).
417. See Payne, supra note 329, at 50 (making point and discussing differences in hourly
rate for court-appointed counsel and ancillary defense specialists). For an excellent discussion of the point, see Helen G. Berrigan, The Indispensable Role of the Mitigation Specialist
in a Capital Case: A View from the Federal Bench, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 819, 830 (2008)
(making this point about mitigation specialists and summarizing by stating: “Appointing a
mitigation specialist is arguably the best assurance a trial judge can have that all the available mitigation evidence will be available for trial counsel to present at the penalty phase.
The failure to retain such a specialist places the responsibility in the hands of counsel, who
is less qualified, more costly, and has less time to gather what is needed”).
418. See ABA, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 925 (2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc /KN
33-VCWC].
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service provider. Those providers were in-house, on tap, ready to
go.
But the benefit of having mitigation specialists and fact investigators in-house went well beyond these logistical advantages. Because the regional capital defender offices hired these investigators
and mitigation specialists themselves, they were able to set their
minimal qualifications and choose people particularly well-suited
for the work they would be doing. Investigators in the office not
only met minimum education and experience requirements, but
also typically had a background in psychology or mental health.419
The same was true of mitigation specialists, all of whom had a degree in social work, psychology, or some other mental health-related field.420 Between the two, one of these specialists was almost
always trained to screen capital defendants for mental health disorders or impairments, giving capital defenders a heads-up even
before the appointment of a mental health expert in the case.421
Doug Ramseur explains: Having these defense specialists embedded in the office was a game-changer, in part because we were hiring them and in part because they became socialized to the institutional mission. When a court appointed a mitigation specialist, they
might be good, they might not be good. They might just do a minimal job. It was hard to know what you would be getting, and even
harder to control for it. When we were hiring these people at the
regional capital defender offices, we were making sure that they
were highly qualified and good at what they did. And like the rest
of us, they just got better over time as they worked on these cases
day in and day out.
There was also a socializing effect that happened, and that was
really impactful, too. The mitigation specialists and fact investigators were working closely with the capital defenders. They were not
random service providers doing outsourced work. They were part of
the team. That created synergies because we were working on multiple cases together and we knew how each other worked, but even
419. See ABA, supra note 141, at 152 (“Investigators must also meet specific education
and experience requirements, and typically have a psychology background.”).
420. See id. (“The Commission’s description of relevant qualifications for a staff mitigation specialist states that candidates are required to have a bachelor’s degree in social work,
psychology or a related degree in mental health/substance abuse.”).
421. See id.
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more important, those close working relationships assimilated them
into the institutional culture and ethos of the office. They got what
we were trying to do and made it their mission to save lives, too.
The impact was especially important in the context of mitigation
specialists. Here again is Doug Ramseur: We had a client-centered
focus, and the people on the front lines of that were the mitigation
specialists. They saw the client right away and started building relationships with the family right away. That was critically important because mitigation is the name of the game in a capital case.
The guilt phase is basically the same in these cases; it is the sentencing phase and the case in mitigation that makes a capital case
so different. We were successful in a number of these cases because
we had a client-centered focus, and the people who made sure we
did it right were the mitigation specialists.
c. Jury Selection
We start with the recognition that success for a capital defender
means not having to pick a capital jury at all. Assuming guilt, success is pleading the case for a sentence less than death instead. But
here again, the ability to prevail at trial is the key to avoiding it,
and, as Champion Magazine noted in 2010, “[T]he capital defense
community traditionally has done a remarkably poor job in voir
dire and jury selection.”422
Most trials—eighty-five percent, experts say—are won or lost
when the jury is sworn, a reflection of the fact that the worldview
through which jurors filter information is every bit as important
as the information itself.423 That makes choosing a jury one of the
most important things that trial lawyers do in any kind of case. Yet
nowhere is that more important than in a capital case, where the

422. Matthew Rubenstein, Overview of the Colorado Method of Capital Voir Dire, 34
CHAMPION 18, 18 (2010).
423. See Herald Price Fahringer, ‘Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . ’: Body Language, Intuition, and the Art of Jury Selection, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197, 197 (1993); cf. Lee
Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and
Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2002) (“An important truism of social psychology is
that people respond not to some objective reality but to their own subjective interpretations
or definitions of that reality.”).
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stakes are life and death and where jurors almost always come into
the case with preconceived views about the death penalty itself.
Because the stakes are so high and jurors often have preconceived views, voir dire in the capital context is different than in
other contexts. Jurors are “death qualified”—that is, they are excludable for cause if their personal views are such that they would
never consider death as a sentencing option.424 They are also what
one might call “life qualified”—that is, they are equally excludable
for cause if they would only consider death as the appropriate sanction for capital murder.425 For a capital juror to be seated, they
must fall somewhere in between these extremes. They must be able
to consider both life and death sentencing options.
But all too often, capital jurors do not meet this constitutional
requirement. The Capital Jury Project’s (“CJP”) work has shown
that automatic-death jurors sometimes sit on capital juries426 and,
indeed, a CJP study involving a small sample of sixteen capital jurors from six capital cases in Virginia found that one of the jurors
should have been excluded for cause on this basis.427 That juror
should never have been seated, so how did that even happen?
The CJP’s research has largely solved the mystery. Although jurors who would never give death are easily identified and removed
for cause from the venire pool, jurors who would always give death
are not, largely because they themselves are not aware that they
are death-always jurors.428 Doug Ramseur explains: There are all
these people out there who think, “I’m not an automatic-death juror.
I could give a sentence short of death, if the defendant acted in selfdefense or it was an accident or something like that.” The problem
is that none of those scenarios are capital murder. When you take
those considerations away and ask: if none of that was true so there
were no excuses—the defendant meant to murder and the victim
was innocent—do you think death is the only appropriate sentence? A lot of these people will answer “yes,” and they are
424. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
425. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,
729 (1992).
426. See Rubenstein, supra note 422, at 18 (discussing CJP research findings).
427. See Stephen P. Garvey & Paul Marcus, Virginia’s Capital Jurors, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2063, 2068, 2072 (2003).
428. See Rubenstein, supra note 422, at 18–19.
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absolutely excludable for cause. Defendants have a constitutional
right to not have those people on the jury. But they were getting on
the juries anyway.
CJP research has revealed other problems as well. As already
discussed, its work has shown that a distressingly large percentage
of Virginia jurors did not understand that they were not required
to impose a death sentence upon finding future dangerousness or
that the murder was vile.429 In addition, its work has shown that
the death qualification process itself—the very process of asking
questions to ensure that a juror could give death before the guilt
phase even begins—makes jurors more likely to convict and return
a sentence of death.430 Perhaps most disturbingly, CJP studies
have shown that jurors who initially vote for life during jury deliberations are often bullied into changing their vote to death.431 Accounts of life-leaning jurors crying in bathrooms, being shunned
and harassed by other jurors, and caving to pressure for a death
sentence even though they still believed a life sentence was the appropriate punishment are all too common.432
That’s where the “Colorado Method” of voir dire comes into play.
The Colorado Method is “the gold standard in death penalty defense,” and its aim is to neutralize the problems identified by the
CJP work.433 The Colorado Method is highly complex, dividing voir
429. See supra text accompanying notes 136–37.
430. See Rubenstein, supra note 422, at 20. For an excellent discussion of the problem,
see generally Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects
of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984).
431. See Rubenstein, supra note 422, at 19, 24 (discussing CJP research findings). The
CJP’s research has found that jurors’ initial vote in deliberations almost always determines
the sentence that is ultimately returned by the jury. When at least eight jurors vote for
death, the sentence is almost always death. As Law Professor Scott Sundby’s work on the
CJP has shown, life-jurors need a critical mass or they will be isolated and targeted to
change their vote to death. For important works on this issue, see Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and
Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 S.J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 304 (2001) (“The tipping point
is juror eight. If juror eight goes with the prosecution . . . the result will be death; if juror
eight goes with the defense, the result will be life.”); see also SCOTT SUNDBY, A LIFE AND
DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY (2015).
432. For an excellent account of coercion against life-holdouts, and jury dynamics more
generally, see SUNDBY, supra note 431.
433. Sophie E. Honeyman, Escaping Death: The Colorado Method of Capital Jury Selection, 54 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 247, 274 (2021).
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dire into five stages and ranking jurors on a seven-point scale,434
but the basic idea is to turn death-qualification on its head and
make it work for the defense team instead. The Colorado Method
is all about moving from the standard voir dire questions to more
meaningful questions aimed at identifying potential jurors subject
to challenge for cause and making the record to get them excluded,
clarifying what the law does and does not require in a capital case,
and extracting commitments from potential jurors to respect each
other’s views and remain true to their own.435
Doug Ramseur teaches the Colorado Method at the National College of Capital Voir Dire in Boulder, Colorado, each spring—the
premier training ground for capital case voir dire in the country.436
He explains: There are all sorts of problems that keep capital juries
from rendering fair and accurate verdicts, and the Colorado
Method is a way to address those problems while doing a much better job of sussing out automatic-death jurors who don’t belong on a
capital jury in the first place. So, for example, we explain that we
are asking questions about sentencing before the trial begins not because our defendant is guilty, but because this is the only opportunity we have to ask questions about every contingency that might
arise, no matter how small. And we explain that the law never requires a death sentence; it just requires that a jury consider the full
range of punishments. That is such an important message. A juror
is never required to impose a death sentence. We tell them that explicitly and also explain to them the difference between the guilt
phase of trial, which is about figuring out facts—what happened,
who did it, that sort of thing—and the sentencing phase of trial,
which is about figuring out what jurors think is an appropriate
punishment. That is a judgment call. It is a moral decision, and the
law cannot make it for them. The law can tell them when a death
sentence is authorized, but it can never tell them whether it is appropriate. So we explain that, and we make sure they understand
what the law does and does not require.
In Virginia, the Colorado Method took on added importance in
light of the Commonwealth’s problematic jury instructions. Doug
434. For a detailed explanation, see Honeyman, supra note 433, at 275. Or just ask Doug.
435. See Rubenstein, supra note 422, at 18–27.
436. See National Capital Voir Dire Training Program, NAT’L COLL. OF CAP. VOIR DIRE,
https://www.nccvd.org/ [https://perma.cc/7XED-RGD6].
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Ramseur explains: The Colorado Method of voir dire also allowed
us to make up for a lot of what Virginia’s capital jury instructions
lacked. Virginia’s jury instructions did not really talk about mitigating evidence—what that is, what it takes for a jury to consider
it, all that. But we were able to tell jurors that mitigating evidence
could be anything, and a jury could impose a life sentence without
any mitigating evidence whatsoever. We made sure they knew that
the law was always satisfied with a life sentence, and they could
give life for any reason they wanted. I would tell them that they
could give life just because they see some spark of humanity in our
client, even if it is just a look or the twinkling of an eye. They could
give life just because their heart tells them it is the right thing to do,
even if they could not articulate why. A juror never has to justify a
vote for life, and that goes to the respect part of the equation. We
know that life-jurors get bullied into voting for death even though
they do not agree with it, so another thing that the Colorado Method
does is create some space for those life-jurors. We explain that each
juror has a responsibility to bring their own best judgment to the
case, and we ask jurors to commit not only to do that, but also to
respect the personal judgment of other jurors and even stand up for
other jurors if others are not respecting their views. All of this is
critically important to neutralizing the dynamics and misconceptions that could result in a death sentence for our clients, so it is
hard to overstate just how invaluable these questions are.
But there is always a hitch, and the hitch in Virginia was twofold. The first was that court-appointed lawyers handling a capital
case here and there were not trained on the Colorado Method.
Their practice was in Virginia, not Colorado, so even if they had
heard of the Colorado Method (and many had not), they did not
know what it was, or how to do it, or why it was important. The
advent of regional capital defender offices solved that problem in
short order. The regional defenders went to the national trainings
and learned everything there was to know. Then they shared it
with everyone else.
The second problem remained a problem, and it was that Virginia law was not exactly tolerant of the Colorado Method of voir
dire. Virginia had no special provision for voir dire in capital cases,
so all defense counsel had to work with was a generic statute that
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allowed questions that went to bias.437 Worse yet, the Supreme
Court of Virginia strictly limited defense counsel’s ability to ask
the probing sorts of questions that the Colorado Method required.
“[A] party is not entitled to ask potential jurors their views on the
death penalty,” Virginia’s high court had stated, explaining: “The
relative inquiry is whether the juror would adhere to [those views]
in disregard of the jury instructions and in violation of his or her
oath.”438
The upside of this downside was that Virginia’s understanding
of its constitutional obligations in the context of capital case voir
dire was so limited that it was at odds with what the Supreme
Court of the United States required. “[I]t may be that a juror could,
in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware
that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty
would prevent him or her from doing so,” the Supreme Court in
Morgan v. Illinois stated, holding: “A defendant on trial for his life
must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective
jurors function under such misconception.”439 This was exactly
what the Colorado Method was trying to do, and a Court of Appeals
of Virginia opinion written by then-Judge Kelsey (now Supreme
Court of Virginia Justice Kelsey) supported that view. Although
the relevant question was not a prospective juror’s views, the court
of appeals conceded, the question was whether the prospective juror could set aside those views and follow the court’s instructions,
and it was difficult to know the answer to that question without
probing the strength and nature of the views themselves.440
437. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (allowing counsel to ask, among
other things, whether a juror “has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any
bias or prejudice therein”).
438. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 215, 738 S.E.2d 847, 863 (2013) (emphasis
omitted).
439. 504 U.S. 719, 735-36 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
440. See Hopson v. Commonwealth., 52 Va. App. 144, 152, 662 S.E.2d 88, 92 (2008)
(“‘Even though a prospective juror may hold preconceived views, opinions, or misconceptions, the test of impartiality is whether the venireperson can lay aside the preconceived
views and render a verdict based solely on the law and evidence presented at trial.’ Faced
with this problem, trial courts must examine ‘nature and strength of the opinion formed.’
‘The spectrum of opinion can range, by infinite shades and degrees, from a casual impression
to a fixed and abiding conviction. The point at which an impression too weak to warp the
judgment ends and one too strong to suppress begins is difficult to discern.’”) (quoting Cressell v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 744, 761, 531 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2000); and then quoting Briley
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In short, the Supreme Court of Virginia did not appear to allow
the Colorado Method, but decisions by courts both above and below
it did, and that was just the opening that the regional capital defenders needed. Voir dire was a matter left to a trial court’s discretion,441 so the regional capital defenders argued the law and tried
to get courts to exercise discretion in their direction. Doug Ramseur explains: We knew we were right on the law, and we argued it
just enough to let courts know that we had an appealable issue from
the start. Nobody wanted to go through an entire capital trial just
to have it blow up over voir dire and jury selection, so we were able
to have some success in using the Colorado Method despite what the
Supreme Court of Virginia had said. It also didn’t hurt that every
question we were asking, every understanding we were making sure
that jurors had—it was all just clearing up misconceptions so that
we could get a fair trial. Prosecutors had benefitted from these misconceptions, and we were essentially saying: That’s not right and
it’s not fair, and we are not going to let you do that anymore. We
did not always win these battles, but even if a judge let us ask some
of the questions we wanted, it could make a big difference in the
case.
Illustrating the point is Virginia’s last capital jury trial, back in
2018. The defendant was indicted on two counts of capital murder—one for shooting his wife in their home and the other for
shooting one of the police officers who responded to the scene.442 It
was her first day on the job. The prosecutor in the case was the
elected Commonwealth’s Attorney of Prince William County, Paul
Ebert. Ebert was famous for seeking death in capital cases and
equally famous for getting it. In fact, he held the record for securing

v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 180, 185, 279 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1981)).
441. Le Vasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983) (“A
party has no right, statutory or otherwise, to propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum. The court must afford a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospective jurors ‘stand indifferent in the cause,’ but the trial
judge retains the discretion to determine when the parties have had sufficient opportunity
to do so.” (emphasis omitted)).
442. For a discussion of the facts, see Ian Shapira, Va. Jury Deadlocks on Death Sentence
for Man Who Killed Wife and Police Officer, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/local/va-jury-deadlocks-on-death-penalty-for-man-who-killed-wife-and-poli
ce-officer/2018/10/25/c2eeafb2-d6ad-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html [https://perma.cc/
N86J-FY6G].
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more death sentences over the course of his career than any other
prosecutor in Virginia.443
One of the regional capital defender offices represented the defendant and made numerous offers to plead the case for a life sentence.444 Ebert was a hard no. Ed Ungvarsky, the regional capital
defender on the case, later stated, “[The defendant] killed a police
officer. That was the sticking point from when the case came in.
And it was always the sticking point.”445 The case was going to
trial.
At trial, Ungvarsky and his team were allowed extensive use of
the Colorado Method in voir dire, and it made a difference in the
case. As Doug Ramseur tells it: The defense team on that case had
no doubt that the Colorado Method helped them get a favorable jury
pool, and it ended up helping them get favorable jury instructions
in the penalty phase as well.
It is impossible to know how much the Colorado Method impacted what happened in that jury room, but we know that the
jury’s deliberations were heated because people could hear the jurors’ voices through the walls,446 and the result in the case speaks
for itself. After deliberating for three days, the jury came back with
a life sentence on the charge of killing a police officer, and split sixsix on the charge of killing two people.447 Ebert fought for the jury
to keep deliberating, but the judge ruled that it was deadlocked
and entered a life sentence (the default by law) on the second

443. Justin Jouvenal, Virginia’s Longest-Running Prosecutor Plans to Retire at End of
the Year, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
virginias-longest-running-prosecutor-plans-to-resign-at-end-of-year/2019/02/05/824736ea2988-11e9-b2fc-721718903bfc_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q6M5-CK3U] (“Over 13 terms,
Ebert has sent more defendants to death row than any other prosecutor in Virginia’s history.”).
444. The talented Ed Ungvarsky, Capital Defender of the northern office, led the team.
See Ian Shapira, He’s Sent More Killers to Death Row Than Any Va. Prosecutor. But Not
This Time, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/hes-sent-mo
re-killers-to-death-row-than-any-va-prosecutor-but-not-this-time/2018/11/03/7873fbbe-dd
32-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.html [https://perma.cc/356W-AX4H]; see also Commonwealth v. Hamilton, No. CR16000898-00 (Va. Cir. Nov. 15, 2018) (Prince William County).
445. Shapira, supra note 444 (quoting Ed Ungvarsky).
446. See id.
447. See id.
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charge.448 A Washington Post headline said it all: He’s Sent More
Killers to Death Row Than Any Va. Prosecutor. But Not This
Time.449 After a long and laborious trial, the prosecution walked
away with the same two life sentences that it had from day one. It
would turn out to be Ebert’s last capital case, and the only case he
could remember where he did not get a death sentence when he
asked for it.450 He retired the following year.451
The case was momentous, and not just because it turned out to
be Virginia’s last capital jury trial. Three years later, it would also
be the case that helped flip the Virginia legislator widely considered to be “the single biggest obstacle to the [death penalty repeal]
bill’s chances.”452 State Senator Dick Saslaw, Senate Majority
Leader of the Virginia General Assembly, had been a hardline supporter of the death penalty for decades.453 “It’s no secret what my
views are,” he had said as he moved to table the repeal bill in
2020.454 But much had changed between 2020 and 2021, and as
Saslaw explained in an interview after the repeal vote—which he
supported—“one case in particular” helped change his mind.455 It
448. See id.
449. Id.
450. See id. (“Ebert said he thinks the Hamilton case is the first time his office has failed
to persuade a jury to recommend a death sentence.”).
451. See Jouvenal, supra note 443 (also noting that Ebert had served as the elected Commonwealth’s Attorney of Prince William County for more than fifty years).
452. Gregory S. Schneider, Virginia is About to Abolish the Death Penalty. It Was a Long,
Surprising Road to Get There., WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-death-penalty-abolish/2021/03/23/64a5a8fa-88dc-11eb8a8b-5cf82c3dffe4_story.html [https://perma.cc/W5U6-KAVR].
453. To illustrate the point, see lowkell, Audio: Add this to the Long List of Reasons Why
Dick Saslaw Needs to Go, BLUE VA. (Mar. 14, 2016), https://bluevirginia.us/2016/03/audioadd-long-list-reasons-dick-saslaw-needs-go [https://perma.cc/8UMU-VHTU] (quoting Saslaw as saying, “They’ve done these acts and they’ve given up their right to live. Essentially,
you kill 7 people, you’re not a human being, I’m sorry. You kill 7 people, you’ve given up the
title of human being and you deserve whatever you get. Let me repeat that: you deserve
whatever you get”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Row, Calls for Indifference, and Redemption of the Soul, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 105, 110–11 (2016) (quoting Saslaw as saying that he “really could care less how damn long [inmates] suffer [during an execution]”
and discussing media coverage of his statements in the General Assembly imagining “a
world where criminals were executed in the manner of their crimes” and where Oklahoma
City bomber Timothy McVeigh “might be taken to a field and blown up”). For the record,
one of us, the one who writes about the death penalty rather than litigating it, is still traumatized from testifying before Saslaw on lethal injection secrecy legislation in 2015.
454. Schneider, supra note 452 (quoting Virginia Senate majority leader Dick Saslaw).
455. Id.
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was the 2018 Prince William case. If the renowned Paul Ebert
could not get a death sentence on two counts of capital murder, one
of which was for the death of a female police officer on her first day
of work, then Saslaw figured no one could. “[T]he capital punishment system does not make sense if it is no longer used,” he told
the press, adding, “[t]hat was a chief motivator in this.”456 (It didn’t
hurt that in 2019, Saslaw had faced his first primary challenge in
forty years, and having survived it by just a few hundred votes,
needed to shore up his left flank).457
Saslaw’s vote was a wistful goodbye. “Juries are just not handing
out the sentences anymore,” he stated, so it was time to let the
death penalty go.458 And so Virginia did.
2. Pretrial
We now turn to how the advent of regional capital defender offices made a difference pretrial. Here again, the story we tell is a
precursor to where the real success of the regional capital defenders played out—the plea-bargaining context. But plea-bargaining
takes place in the shadow of trial and pretrial positioning, and,
thus, the impact of the regional capital defenders in the pretrial
context is a critically important part of our story as well. As we will
see, some of what the regional capital defenders did in the pretrial
context feeds into a common critique that capital defense litigation
is obstructionism for the sake of obstructionism, a strategy of litigating death to death (others, by the way, would simply call this a
vigorous defense). But much of what the regional capital defenders
did in the pretrial context served important purposes beyond that
narrative, and here we see the advantages of the regional capital
456. Id.
457. See Andrew Dupuy, A Powerful Democrat Faces Off With a Progressive Challenger
in Virginia’s Senate District 35, GREATER GREATER WASHINGTON (Feb. 19, 2019), https://
ggwash.org/view/70977/a-powerful-democrat-faces-off-with-a-progressive-challenger-in-vir
ginias-senate-district-35 [https://perma.cc/8XNH-ERFG]; Daniel Marans, Top Virginia
Democrat Survives Strong Progressive Challenge, HUFFPOST (June 11, 2019), https://www.
huffpost.com/entry/dick-saslaw-survives-progressive-challenge-yasmine-taeb-virginia-prim
ary_n_5d00523fe4b0e7e7816f1fdc [https://perma.cc/U8K6-58BA].
458. Laura Vozzella & Gregory S. Schneider, Virginia Moves Toward Banning Capital
Punishment, in a Shift for Prolific Death Penalty State, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virgina-death-penalty/2021/01/23/5d51d21
a-5c02-11eb-b8bd-ee36b1cd18bf_story.html [https://perma.cc/SY45-ZHVV] (quoting Virginia Senate majority leader Dick Saslaw).
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defenders as falling into three general categories: strategic-positioning, calendar-setting, and relationship-building.
a. Strategic-Positioning
We begin with what is perhaps an obvious point: the regional
capital defenders litigated capital cases to the hilt. Different regional capital defenders took different approaches, with some viewing their pretrial motions practice as more of a surgical strike—
relatively infrequent but highly targeted and successful—and others taking more of a machine-gun approach, crushing prosecutors
with an onslaught of motions that often disrupted the smooth functioning of their entire office. In terms of sheer numbers, the surgical-strike approach averaged around 30 to 40 motions in a capital
case, while the machine-gun approach averaged more like 130 to
140. Either way, that is a lot of pretrial motions.
This aggressive pretrial-motions practice served several strategic purposes. One was making prosecutors have to work hard for a
death sentence, so hard that they were open to just pleading the
case instead. “Death sentences used to come all too easy,” Maria
Jankowski, Deputy Executive Director of the VIDC, explains.
“That changed when the regional capital defenders started taking
cases,” she says, adding, “[a]fter that, no matter how much of a
hardliner the prosecutor was, that prosecutor was up against a formidable opponent. Death sentences should never come easy, and
the regional capital defenders made sure that they didn’t.”459 We
view the regional capital defenders’ pretrial practice as akin to
throwing specks of sand into the gears of a well-oiled machine.
Every motion they filed was a few specks of sand, and they were
throwing handfuls of sand into the gears of Virginia’s machinery
of death, grinding those gears to a halt.
One reason that the regional capital defenders were able to litigate these cases to the hilt was because they had the time and talent to devote to bogging down the machinery of death. But another,
less obvious, reason was the independence that came with not doing court-appointed work. Doug Ramseur explains: The pretrial

459. Interview with Maria Jankowski, Deputy Executive Director of the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission.
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context was the place where not having judges appointing us as
counsel had a massive impact. We did not have to “go along to get
along.” We could afford to be the bad guys because the judges didn’t
pick us. We didn’t care if they did not like us, or did not like what
we were doing, and that was very different from the perspective that
the typical court-appointed counsel had. Court-appointed counsel
were local counsel. They were repeat players, so their relationship
with the judge was bigger than any single case. When courts appoint counsel, those judges are picking the lawyers they like, and
there is a certain sensibility that comes with that, a sense that you
shouldn’t make the judge mad because you won’t get appointed on
the next case. Court-appointed lawyers had to worry about those
sorts of relationships. We didn’t, and that gave us room to do things
that were going to annoy the judge and mess up the court’s docket.
That room was essential to being able to do our job right.
From time to time, the regional capital defenders even managed
to leverage the difference between their approach and that of courtappointed counsel into a strategic advantage of its own. As Doug
Ramseur tells it: Sometimes our court-appointed co-counsel was on
board with our approach to a capital case, and they were fabulous
in their own right. That much just needs to be said. Other times, not
so much. But even then, local counsel could be useful partners in
playing “good cop-bad cop” with the prosecutor in the case. Local
counsel could say to the prosecutor: “Those people are nuts. They
are bat**** crazy, and I am telling you, they are not going to let up
in this case. They are going to make all of our lives us miserable
for as long as they possibly can.” And that could be the opening
salvo to a plea deal in the case.
Importantly, the regional capital defenders’ aggressive pretrial
practice was not just about the fatigue factor. It was also a way to
create and preserve issues for appeal and improve their position at
trial. Here again is Doug Ramseur: Our pretrial motions let prosecutors know that they were in for a fight. We were essentially saying
to them, “You want to go to trial? Okay, here’s a taste of what that’s
going to look like. By the way, we’re about to seriously drain your
resources, so good luck with your other dockets.” But our aggressive
motions practice did other things too. For example, it created opportunities for prosecutors to make mistakes, like when we triggered
notice requirements that they sometimes failed to meet.
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Motions also gave us appealable issues, which created risk. We
wanted prosecutors thinking about the risk that something we were
fighting about would get them overturned on appeal. So, for example, we were fighting about their experts, which in some cases were
quite terrible, and judges were already starting to take note of
that.460 We were fighting about the admissibility of DNA mixture
evidence, which can be incredibly problematic.461 And we were
fighting about whether, and how, certain Supreme Court rulings
applied in our case. Atkins v. Virginia462 is a good example of that.
In theory, Atkins was good for us. But no juries were finding intellectual disability in the sentencing phase of a case. No one was actually winning on those claims. Mostly what Atkins did was give
us claims to litigate, and those were strong claims that introduced
a good amount of risk into the case.
It’s worth adding that even when we lost on the various motions
we were making, those motions would often improve our position at
trial. For example, we weren’t usually able to get experts disqualified, but we could bring some serious heat and embarrass them on
the stand in a pretrial hearing, previewing an impeachment that
was going to cause trouble at trial. And our motions would sometimes lead to favorable jury instructions in the case as well.
460. See, e.g., Atkins v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 144, 153–54, 631 S.E.2d 93, 97–98 (“Dr.
Samenow is not ‘skilled’ in the administration of measures of adaptive behavior. Accordingly, he would also lack the requisite expertise in scoring and interpreting such tests. Thus,
on the record before us, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed to establish that Dr.
Samenow possessed the necessary qualifications [as an expert] and therefore, the circuit
court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Samenow to testify and express an expert opinion
with regard to whether Atkins is [intellectually disabled].”); Atkins v. Commonwealth, 260
Va. 375, 394–95, 534 S.E.2d 312, 323-24 (2000), rev’d 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Hassell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I simply place no credence whatsoever in Dr.
Samenow’s opinion that the defendant possesses at least average intelligence. I would hold
that Dr. Samenow’s opinion that the defendant possesses average intelligence is incredulous
as a matter of law. Indeed, I am perplexed that Dr. Samenow, who did not administer a
complete IQ test to the defendant and admittedly asked the defendant questions based upon
bits and pieces of outdated tests to supposedly evaluate the defendant, would opine that this
defendant possesses at least average intelligence. . . . Dr. Samenow admitted that some of
the questions he administered to the defendant were based upon a test developed in 1939.”).
461. For a discussion of the problems with DNA mixture evidence, see Mark W. Perlin,
When DNA is Not a Gold Standard: Failing to Interpret Mixture Evidence, CHAMPION (2018),
https://www.cybgen.com/information/publication/2018/Champion/Perlin-When-DNA-is-not
-a-gold-standard-failing-to-interpret-mixture-evidence/The_Champion_May_2018_p50-56.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3HB8-SQY8].
462. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Indeed, the regional capital defenders’ pretrial-motions practice
even played a part in changing the law. Before 2010, indigent capital defendants requesting the appointment of an expert had to
make the request in open court. There was no statutory provision
for them to do it in an ex parte hearing, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia had held that there was no constitutional right to an ex
parte hearing on those requests.463 Thus, court-appointed counsel
in capital cases were forced to show why they needed ancillary defense services like a mitigation specialist or investigator in open
court, and the regional capital defenders (who already had their
mitigation specialists and investigators) likewise had to show in
open court why the appointment of an expert was necessary in
their case (think fingerprint experts, pathologists and toxicologists, or any other expert, forensic or otherwise).
This put defense counsel at a serious disadvantage. To get a
court to grant funding for an expert, defense counsel had to show
why the assistance of an expert was needed in the case and how a
defendant would be prejudiced without it.464 This forced them to
reveal their theory of the case or, at the very least, the avenues
they were exploring to figure out what that theory would be.465 The
idea behind these open court hearings was to give prosecutors a
chance to object to the request (and often they did),466 but the damage was done without them ever saying a word. Just by being there,
prosecutors had a front row seat to the defendant’s case. They
learned about potential leads on witnesses, potential defenses to
the charge, and potential challenges to the evidence in the state’s
case.467 These open court hearings amounted to non-reciprocal
463. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-264.3:4 (Repl. Vol. 2015); Ramdass v. Commonwealth,
246 Va. 413, 421–22 (1993) 437 S.E.2d 566, 571; O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 686,
364 S.E.2d 491, 499 (1988).
464. For a discussion of the showing necessary for the appointment of ancillary defense
services, see supra text accompanying note 407.
465. See THE SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 269, at 63 (“[D]efense counsel must show
the need for their requests and reveal their need, which is often their theory of defense, to
the prosecution.”). For an extended, and excellent, discussion of the point, see generally
Justin B. Shane, Money Talks: An Indigent Defendant’s Right to an Ex Parte Hearing for
Expert Funding, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 347 (2005); Donna H. Lee, In the Wake of Ake v. Oklahoma:
An Indigent Criminal Defendant’s Lack of Ex Parte Access to Expert Services, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 154 (1992).
466. See THE SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 269, at 62–63.
467. See id. at 63 (“Even if the prosecution does not oppose the motion, by attending the
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discovery that not only went beyond what prosecutors were entitled to under Virginia’s extremely limited discovery rules, but also
forced the disclosure of information that came from confidential
client communications and legal strategizing protected by the attorney work product doctrine.468
That type of exposure put defense counsel in a tight spot, forcing
them to choose between revealing defense strategies and forgoing
an expert’s assistance before they could even assess its worth.469
That choice was complicated by the fact that these disclosures did
not just give prosecutors a heads-up as to what was coming, but
also had the potential of impacting what they did in the case. If
defense counsel asked for an expert to test a fingerprint, for example, and then sat on the results, prosecutors could infer (correctly
in most cases) that the result was inculpatory, prompting them to
test the sample as well.470 Similarly, if defense counsel asked for a
mitigation specialist to pursue a lead on a theory of sex abuse by a
family member, that could conceivably trigger outreach to the defendant’s family by the prosecution’s investigator—technically,
just to investigate the lead, but strategically, to inform family
members that the defense strategy involved divulging family
hearing they are able to learn the defense’s reasons for the request, the trial strategy, the
name of the expert and the requested amount of the fee.”); Shane, supra note 447, at 353–
54 (discussing information required to make showing for ancillary defense services and how
such disclosures reveal key information about potential defense strategies).
468. See ABA, supra note 141, at 154 (“Historically, however, Virginia capital defendants
did not have the right to request funds for expert services through ex parte proceedings,
thereby forcing disclosure of potential defense strategies, providing non-reciprocal, accelerated discovery to the prosecution, and failing to protect confidential client communications.”); Shane, supra note 465, at 353 (discussing open hearing as a form of informal, nonreciprocal discovery and impact on work-product information and confidential attorney-client communications).
469. See THE SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 269, at 63 (“Too often, indigent defense
attorneys in Virginia are confronted with deciding which is the lesser of two evils: revealing
their defense to the prosecution well in advance of trial in order to have the chance of obtaining the assistance of an expert; or not revealing their defense but not receiving expert
assistances, and further not preserving the issue for appeal.”); Shane, supra note 465, at
348 (“Defense attorneys must choose between applying for expert funding and safeguarding
confidential defense strategy. The choice may cause attorneys not to pursue funds for an
expert if they are unsure of the expert’s value and would need to disclose a large amount of
potentially damaging information in order to prove that the expert is necessary.”).
470. See Shane, supra note 465, at 354 (“Because Virginia’s discovery rules require the
defense to disclose prior to trial the reports of any expert it intends to use at trial, the prosecution will infer that an expert’s studies were not favorable to the defense if . . . the defense
does not turn over any reports from the expert for which it had requested funds.”)
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secrets and blaming the family for what the defendant had done.471
In short, the problem was not just tipping off the prosecutor as to
what was in the defendant’s hand. It was also that the tip could set
off a chain of events that was potentially disastrous for the defense.
For this reason, defense attorneys in capital cases sometimes found
that the risks associated with showing the need for expert assistance outweighed the benefit of the assistance itself, leading them
to forgo certain lines of investigation altogether (which was a problem of its own).472
For a sense of perspective, only three other death penalty states
denied capital defendants the right to an ex parte hearing for the
appointment of experts, and courts in those jurisdictions routinely
allowed ex parte hearings anyway.473 As consultants for the ABA
stated in a scathing 2004 report: “One of the most striking discoveries of our site work in Virginia is the complete inadequacy of access by public defenders and court-appointed counsel to court-approved experts and a similar inadequacy of court-appointed counsel to court-approved investigators.”474 The problem was “pervasive
and long-standing,” the reporters wrote, and it was largely due to
the lack of ex parte hearings.475 “In our experience in studying indigent defense systems across the country,” they stated, “we have
never encountered such a persistent problem of indigent defendants’ right to seek expert funds being extinguished by a widespread
practice of the courts not allowing the requests to be filed ex
parte.”476
For those wondering what all this has to do with the regional
capital defenders, here is Doug Ramseur: Virginia’s refusal to allow ex parte hearings to get court-appointed experts is a nice
471. See id. at 354–55 (discussing “counter-mitigation” strategies of prosecutors in capital cases and prejudice to the defense by forced disclosure of mitigation strategy and investigations).
472. See THE SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 269, at 63 (“Some attorneys . . . told us that
they balance the colliding interests and frequently decide not to reveal the theory of their
case to the prosecution.”); see also Shane, supra note 465, at 353 (noting that the attorneys
for Beltway Sniper John Allen Muhammad obtained funds from another state’s public defender office that was involved in the case for this very reason).
473. See Shane, supra note 465, at 359–62 (discussing the practices of other states and
concluding that “Virginia stands almost alone in refusing to permit such ex parte hearings”).
474. THE SPANGENBERG GRP., supra note 269, at 59.
475. Id. at 60.
476. Id. at 63.
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example of how having access to a professional community beyond
Virginia made a difference. Court-appointed counsel in capital
cases knew the rule was bad, but they didn’t really question it. To
them, that’s just the way things were. But we knew different. In fact,
this was one of those places where I thought, not even Georgia does
that. So, we started arguing that we were entitled to an ex parte
hearing on these motions as a matter of due process. We were winning some of those fights and losing some too. But, here again, we
were making a record for constitutional claims, injecting a certain
amount of risk into the case, and just the fact that we were fighting
over procedure rather than substance was enough to bog the case
down.
In time, this created just enough uncertainty that the Legislature
was willing to do something about it. In 2010, a provision was
added that allowed defense counsel in a capital case to seek expert
assistance in an ex parte fashion.477 That was clearly a response to
the motions we were making because it was limited to capital cases.
The new statute wasn’t a great statute. It was complicated, and we
had to explain in open court why we needed to be in closed court.478
But we made it work, and just having a statutory provision that
allowed ex parte hearings made the courts much more receptive to
granting our requests.479 This was another game changer. All of a
sudden, prosecutors couldn’t get a sneak peek at our case anymore.
They didn’t know what we had or what we were doing, and that not
only put us in a better position at trial, but also set us up better for
plea-bargaining the case.

477. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010), repealed by Act of Mar. 24,
2021, ch. 344 & 345, 2021 Va. Acts __, __.
478. See id. (requiring the defendant to establish a need for confidentiality as part of
request for an ex parte hearing for expert assistance); ABA, supra note 141, at 155 (“It is
also worth noting that in order to make the requisite showing on the need for assignment of
an ex parte judge, defense counsel must explain the need for confidentiality without also
revealing the nature of the confidential information or defense strategy in the case.”).
479. See ABA, supra note 141, at 155 (“The overall impact of the 2010 ex parte statute
appears to have generally changed the courts’ presumption concerning ex parte proceedings:
for example, the existence of the law removes the assumption that ex parte proceedings are
inappropriate in all cases and thus can encourage judges to grant ex parte hearings in cases
in which the judges may have previously believed such proceedings to be impermissible.”).
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b. Calendar Setting
Good things take time, and mitigation work falls in the category
of good things. It takes time to track down witnesses, follow leads,
build relationships, and do all the other things that mitigation specialists do. That makes calendar-setting a critically important part
of a capital defender’s pretrial practice.
Before the advent of the regional capital defender offices, capital
cases in Virginia were typically tried shockingly fast. The attorneys in Williams v. Taylor, for example, had less than two months
to prepare for trial.480 That is nowhere near enough time to put
together a defendant’s life story.
Another example is the Ricky Gray case. The regional capital
defenders were partly involved in the case, and Gray was the one
capital defendant—out of over 250—whose life they did not save.481
Gray was sentenced to death in 2006 and executed in 2017.482
The fact that the regional capital defenders were involved in the
Gray case at all makes it the exception in the story we tell, but the
amount of their involvement, and speed with which Gray was tried,
makes it the exception that proves the rule. The defense had just
six months to prepare for Gray’s trial.483 That is scary fast, and
again, nowhere near the time needed to fully develop a case in mitigation.
Doug Ramseur recalls: In that amount of time, there was only so
much that trial counsel was going to be able to do. Most of the cases
we handled took eighteen to twenty months to go to trial. Gray’s case
480. See GARRETT, supra note 154, at 127. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), is
discussed supra text accompanying notes 309–317.
481. See supra note 360.
482. See Alanna Durkin Richer, Virginia Man Convicted of 2006 Slaying of Family is
Executed, AP (Jan. 18, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/6562ca36b54b4bcb9d79647d3986
613c [https://perma.cc/6CL3-JHME].
483. The murders were January 1, 2006, and Gray was indicted on February 9. His trial
was early August. See Capital Murder Charges Filed in Seven Slayings, WASH. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/feb/9/20060209-120218-3339r/
[https://perma.cc/M8H6-5WY7] (providing the date of indictment); Gary A. Harki, Lawyers
Describe Childhood Abuse as “Sexual Slavery” as They Argue Ricky Gray Should be Spared
Death, VA.-PILOT (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.pilotonline.com/news/crime/article_4e73312
e-3c30-5206-bb96-996e4dc22c04.html [https://perma.cc/KAK6-UB64] (providing the date of
conviction).
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took six. It was bad timing for Gray that the Richmond capital defenders office was short-staffed during that time. As a result, although the office’s mitigation specialist and fact investigator worked
on the case, there was not a regional capital defender assigned to it.
Instead, two court-appointed attorneys were chosen by the trial
court to try the case. One thing that didn’t happen in Gray’s case
was getting the trial pushed way back on the court’s docket. Maybe
it wouldn’t have made a difference. Ricky Gray was a Black man
who brutally killed a prominent White family of four, including two
little girls. There was a high likelihood he was going to get the death
penalty no matter what anybody did. But the subsequent habeas
corpus investigation revealed a ton of evidence that conceivably
could have made a difference if the defense had more time to fully
develop the case in mitigation.
To be fair, the defense did present some mitigating evidence at
trial. In the sentencing phase, Gray’s mother testified that Gray
was repeatedly beaten with a horse strap by his father and raped
at least once by his older half-brother.484 “Sorry, Cooley,” she said
to him on the witness stand, addressing him by his nickname as he
looked back at her, crying.485 Gray’s older sister also testified, corroborating the abuse.486 The jury knew that Gray had been abused.
And it knew that he had tried to escape the trauma of that abuse
through drugs, committing the murders while he was high on
PCP.487
But the testimony was brief,488 and there was much that the jurors did not know. They did not know that the sexual abuse began
484. See Jury Weighing Execution for Killer of Richmond Family Hears Testimony of Violence, FOX NEWS (Aug. 18, 2006), https://www.foxnews.com/story/jury-weighing-execut
ion-for-killer-of-richmond-family-hears-testimony-of-violence [https://perma.cc/6E8D-S54P]
(also noting that Gray’s mother wept as she testified on the abuse).
485. Id.
486. See id.
487. See Ricky Gray Juror Claims Jury Knew of Gray’s Drug Use, NBC 12 (Sept. 17,
2015), https://www.nbc12.com/story/30050274/ricky-gray-juror-claims-jury-knew-of-graysdrug-use/ [https://perma.cc/VH54-VEHU].
488. The entirety of Gray’s mother’s testimony on direct was twenty-six pages in the
transcript, much of which was a cursory recitation of the timeline of Gray’s upbringing and
more general conditions in which he lived. Gray sister’s testimony was half of that, encompassing just thirteen pages of the trial transcript. See Transcript of Record at 1485–1511,
Commonwealth v. Gray, No. CR06F0698, 2006 WL 6625217 (Va. Cir. Oct. 23, 2006) (direct
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when Gray was just five, when the half-brother forced him to perform oral sodomy.489 They did not know that Gray was getting
anally raped on a weekly, sometimes nightly, basis by the time he
was nine, often with Gray’s sister forced to watch.490 They did not
know that the abuse was so bad that Gray bled through his clothes,
and that his sister used balm to try to treat the tears in his anus.491
And they did not know that the brutalization was so severe that
even as an adult, Gray physically recoiled in revulsion at the
memory of certain clothes (the striped socks used to muffle his
screams) and certain sounds (the static of the television that was
often on in the background) and certain smells (Vaseline and other
products used to rape him).492 Gray’s clinical psychologist, who had
been involved in some 150 capital cases, had never seen a case with
such sustained and corroborated abuse.493 “The rapes,” the psychologist would conclude, “were so pervasive—so frequent and over
such a long period of time—that they can only be described as sexual slavery.”494
And that was just the sexual abuse. We could share a similar
account of Gray’s brutal and sustained physical abuse that the jury
did not hear—beatings not just with a horse strap, but also using
a PVC pipe and metal weather stripping, among other things.495
The stories are endless because the physical abuse was relentless.

of Gray’s mother); id. at 1520–33 (direct of Gray’s sister); id. at 1538 (redirect of Gray’s
sister)). For a point of comparison, the chief of operations at the Virginia Department of
Corrections also testified for the defense in the sentencing phase, and his testimony was
forty-three pages. See id. at 1561–1603.
489. See Lain, Three Observations about the Worst of the Worst, Virginia-Style, supra
note 28, at 477–79 (discussing Ricky Gray case based on evidence presented in Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Gray v. Kelly, No. 11-cv630 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2011) (on file with
author)).
490. See id.
491. See id.; Harki, supra note 483.
492. See Lain, Three Observations about the Worst of the Worst, Virginia-Style, supra
note 28, at 479; Harki, supra note 483.
493. See Lain, Three Observations about the Worst of the Worst, Virginia-Style, supra
note 28, at 479.
494. Harki, supra note 483.
495. See Lain, Three Observations about the Worst of the Worst, Virginia-Style, supra
note 28, at 479.
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Indeed, it was so severe that sometimes Gray was not allowed to
go to school out of fear that the authorities would intervene.496
As a result of his abuse, Gray developed a major psychiatric disorder that manifested in bed wetting, which lasted well into late
childhood. The abuse also led to Gray using drugs at an early age.
He was drinking by age eight, smoking marijuana by age nine, and
getting high on PCP by age eleven.497 The jury heard none of that.
The neuropharmacist who later consulted on Gray’s case had never
even heard of a person so young using PCP, which alters the neurotransmitters in the brain and can cause cognitive dysfunction
with long-term use.498 Gray was a case of long-term use.
Would any of this have made a difference? Who knows. What we
do know is that the race to get the case to trial meant that much of
the information that could have been used to ask the jury to spare
Gray’s life was not uncovered until his post-conviction lawyers had
the time to develop it.499 In the end, Gray’s only move was to ask
the governor for a commutation to a life sentence, supported by a
letter signed by over fifty mental health professionals attesting to
the brain damage he suffered from severe childhood trauma and
related drug abuse.500 Executing Gray “would convey the message
that he alone is responsible for his crimes,” Gray’s forensic psychologist wrote in his letter, calling it a “false message.”501 The governor’s answer to the commutation request was no.

496. See id.
497. See id.; Harki, supra note 483.
498. See Harki, supra note 483; see also Kathleen Davis, What is Phencyclidine (PCP),
or Angel Dust?, MED. NEWS TODAY (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/art
icles/305328 [https://perma.cc/93A6-76GF] (discussing effect of PCP on neurotransmitters
in brain); Long-Term Effects of PCP Abuse, AM. ADDICTION CTRS. (Feb. 3, 2020), https://
americanaddictioncenters.org/pcp-abuse/long-term-effects [https://perma.cc/S4MU-UW8U]
https://americanaddictioncenters.org/pcp-abuse/long-term-effects [https://perma.cc/S4MUUW8U] (discussing cognitive dysfunction).
499. Their habeas brief, which we relied on heavily in our discussion here, is cited at
supra note 489. We are grateful to the VCRCC for its work in Ricky Gray’s case, which
although not successful in saving Gray’s life, at least allows his story to be told.
500. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, RELIGIOUS
LEADERS JOIN RICKY GRAY’S PLEA FOR CLEMENCY (Jan. 12, 2017), https://deathpenalty
info.org/news/mental-health-professionals-religious-leaders-join-ricky-grays-plea-for-cleme
ncy [https://perma.cc/84N6-LGRC]. The clemency petition was also supported by two former
commissioners of the Virginia Department of Behavioral Heal and Developmental Services.
See id.
501. Harki, supra note 483.
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We took the time to more closely examine the Gray case for two
reasons. First, it is the one case, out of more than 250 that the regional capital defender offices were involved in, that ended in a
death sentence and execution. But what we now know is that Gray
is also the one case where a regional capital defenders office was
involved but there was no regional capital defender working the
case. In short, to the extent that the Gray case is an exception to
the regional capital defenders’ remarkable success in saving lives,
it is the exception that proves the rule.
Second, and more to the point of the discussion here, the Gray
case shows how important calendar-setting—managing the timing
of trial—is to mounting a vigorous defense. Turns out, time is a
necessary, although not sufficient, condition for gathering the type
of mitigation evidence that could save a defendant’s life. As is true
generally in the pretrial context, independence is a critically important part of getting it.
Doug Ramseur explains: A big part of our success more largely
had to do with our ability to just slow the whole case down, and
again, this is a place where not having judges appointing counsel
had a major impact. We had no interest in keeping judges happy by
adhering to their trial schedules. We didn’t care if we messed up the
court’s docket. In fact, that was part of what we meant to do. Being
specialists also allowed us to push back on judges to get the time we
needed to prepare for trial. Their view was “Let’s move this along.”
Our answer was “You have to allow us to do our mitigation investigation, or we’ll have an appealable issue from the start. The Supreme Court has reversed where that was not done, and in most
cases, that takes eighteen to twenty months.” We crunched the
numbers. We knew what we were talking about, and the judges had
to respect that.
c. Relationship Building
A third area in which having regional capital defenders made a
difference in the pretrial context was relationship-building with
their clients. In part, this went back to having mitigation specialists in-house who could start building connections with clients and
their families right away. And in part, the comparative advantage
of the regional capital defenders in this area went back to their
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independence, which gave them the ability to pick unpopular
fights.
Doug Ramseur explains: Some of the pretrial motions we filed,
we knew we were going to lose. But our clients needed to see us
fighting with all we had. A good example of that was a motion for
the defendant to be able to wear civilian clothes at pretrial hearings.
Sure, we wanted to win that. But even when we didn’t win, it communicated to our clients that we were going to fight for them to be
treated with respect.
Another example, and this is from 2020, just after I had left the
office, was a motion I filed in a capital case in rural Louisa County.
My client was African American, and there was a huge, life-sized
portrait of Robert E. Lee hanging in the courtroom. That was not
okay—not with me, not with my client. So, we filed a motion requesting that my client be tried in a courtroom that didn’t have the
guy who thought Black people should be enslaved hanging on the
wall. The court could give us a change of venue or take it down.502
The court took it down, permanently.503 I just cannot see how a local
lawyer, serving at the pleasure of the judge, was going to pick that
fight. But in our view, that’s what we were there to do—to fight the
good fight, no matter how unpopular. We needed to fight for our
client not only because it was the right thing to do, but also because
it built trust, and that was critically important to our representation.

502. See Emily Davies, Virginia Judge Orders Robert E. Lee Portrait Removed From
Courtroom Ahead of Murder Trial, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/local/virginia-judge-orders-robert-e-lee-portrait-removed-from-courtroom-aheadof-murder-trial/2020/09/11/3c368fa6-f43a-11ea-999c-67ff7bf6a9d2_story.html [https://per
ma.cc/9UL2-KKTL] (reporting that Doug Ramseur, appointed as the capital defense attorney for Darcel Murphy, filed a motion in 2018 “that Murphy should be tried in a courtroom
without images ‘that could be interpreted as glorifying, memorializing, or otherwise endorsing the efforts of those [who] fought on behalf of the Confederate cause or its principles’”).
503. Doug and his co-counsel, Matthew Engle, were able to negotiate trying the case
without a jury and without death on the table. The case proceeded as a bench trial nondeath case, and the defendant was acquitted on a motion to dismiss. The case would turn
out to be the last capital murder trial in Virginia, a fitting end.
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3. Plea-Bargaining
Every point we have made thus far—every advantage that the
regional capital defenders had in the trial and pretrial setting—
brings us here, to the plea-bargaining context. The regional capital
defenders did not grind Virginia’s machinery of death to a halt by
winning cases at trial (although they did some of that, too). They
did it by learning how to avoid trial in the first place.
Doug Ramseur has this to say: If you want to know where the
capital defender offices had the most impact, where our involvement
made the biggest difference in terms of ending the death penalty in
Virginia, it was here. The biggest thing we did was stop death sentences, and we did that mostly by stopping those cases from going
to trial. Trial is bad for capital defendants. Around half the time,
the jury comes back with death. So, job one was keeping those cases
from going to trial, at least if the case was going to come down to
sentencing. There is this impression out there that capital indictments were slowing down, and the death penalty was fading away.
That was not what was happening, at least not until the very end.
It was not that capital indictments were slowing down; it was that
we were pleading them more. That’s why Virginia did not have any
death sentences. We were pleading almost all of those cases for
something less.
We know from John Douglass’s work that since the regional capital defenders started taking cases in 2004, the capital trial rate
plummeted to just half of what it had been beforehand.504 Capital
indictments were still coming down the pike, but prosecutors were
not taking those cases to trial to get death. They were pleading
them out instead.
The numbers are so impressive that we are re-upping them here
to drive the point home. All told, the regional capital defenders represented defendants in over 250 capital cases.505 Only ten went to
trial with death on the table.506 Just ten. The rest were resolved for

504. See Douglass, supra note 26, at 885.
505. See supra text accompanying note 356.
506. See supra text accompanying note 357. Sometimes the regional capital defenders
were able to negotiate an agreement to try the case, but without death on the table.
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a sentence less than death instead. How did they manage to do
that?
Part of the answer was what was happening at trial. Plea-bargaining happens in the shadow of trial, and the regional capital
defenders were making a difference in the outcome of capital cases
that went to trial. As already noted, the death sentencing rate in
capital cases fell from eight-four percent before 2004, when the regional capital defenders started taking cases, to just forty-seven
percent after.507 Prosecutors went from being relatively confident
that they could get a death sentence if they asked for it to being
much less sure, and that factored into their assessment of whether
to take the case to trial. As prosecutors themselves reported, the
risk of “losing” the case (at least by way of asking for death and not
getting it) had an impact on their appetite for aggressively pursuing death in the first place.508
Doug Ramseur explains: It is hard to overstate how important it
was that prosecutors were losing some of the cases that they took to
trial. It made them look bad when they asked for death and didn’t
get it, despite all their time and effort. They started getting worried
that they could lose, and that created an opening for us to deal the
case. It’s hard to say, but it’s also possible that they were affected by
the same mitigating evidence that we were preparing to submit to
the jury. We were sharing that with them in plea negotiations to
show that we had a strong case, but it also may have changed their
personal views about the right outcome. It’s easy to ask for death if
you think the defendant is pure evil. It’s a little harder if you come
to conclude that the person never had a chance from the start.
Another piece of the puzzle was what was happening pretrial.
As discussed above, the regional capital defenders were raising the
risk of reversal with an aggressive pretrial motions practice. The
regional capital defenders were also just wearing prosecutors down

507. See supra text accompanying note 347.
508. We know that Virginia prosecutors were factoring in juries’ willingness to return a
death sentence in deciding whether to seek one because in the 2002 Virginia study, they
explicitly said so. See 2002 JLARC STUDY, supra note 64, at 31 (reporting that prosecutors
in high-density, urban jurisdictions “noted that in capital cases, urban jurors are generally
reluctant to vote in favor of an execution and will sometimes impose a much higher burden
of proof on the prosecution. As a result, these prosecutors indicated that they generally prefer to seek a conviction for first-degree murder”).
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by burying them with motions, mucking up their dockets, and just
generally dragging those cases out. Cost considerations were a part
of the mix too. The regional capital defenders made trying capital
cases more expensive—more expensive to defend, and more expensive to prosecute. We don’t know exactly what those costs were on
the prosecution side, but on the defense side alone, the cost of one
capital case that went to trial was estimated at $750,000, and the
cost of another was estimated at $1.4 million.509 If the prosecution’s
costs were anything even remotely close to those figures, that was
a lot of money to try a case that had a fifty/fifty shot of ending in a
life sentence. Uncertainty. Risk. Time. Effort. Money. In a multitude of ways, the regional capital defenders made pleading the case
the most sensible thing to do.
But a prosecutor’s willingness to take death off the table and
plead the case for life is only half of the equation. The other half is
getting a capital defendant to agree—and that’s the hitch. Here is
a striking statistic to give a sense of the challenge: an estimated
fifty percent to seventy-five percent of condemned capital defendants who have been executed in the modern era had the opportunity to take a plea offer that would have saved their life.510
Doug Ramseur explains: People tend to think that our ability to
negotiate all those cases was because prosecutors were more willing
to plead the case, and that was true. But the biggest challenge in
negotiating a lot of these cases was not the prosecutor. It was our
clients. These are people who are seriously depressed and lack any
sense of self-worth. Their whole lives, they’ve been victimized, and
then they have the added guilt of having massively victimized someone else. They are locked up so they can’t use drugs as a coping
mechanism to escape reality anymore, and the amount of self-loathing is just phenomenal. They don’t not want to be executed. They
hate themselves for what they have done and what they have become, so it’s just really hard for them to not be indifferent in these
cases.

509. See Garrett, supra note 25, at 716–17 (discussing trials of Joshua Andrews and Alfredo Prieto, respectively, noting that Prieto’s $1.4 million defense price tag was before his
lengthy resentencing proceeding in 2010).
510. See Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
671, 671–72 (2008).
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And then if we can get past that, do you know how hard it is for
someone to agree to spend the rest of their life in prison? No hope of
getting out, ever—just lock them up and throw away the key. You
have to be able to appreciate how hard it is for someone to agree to
something like that. It takes a tremendous amount of relationshipbuilding and trust.
Here again, the Ricky Gray case is a prime example. “I just want
to die,” Gray told investigators when he was arrested and confessed to the murders.511 He later apologized for his crimes, saying:
“Remorse is not a deep enough word for how I feel. I know my words
can’t bring anything back but I continuously feel horrible for the
circumstances that I put [the victims] through. . . . There’s nothing
I can do to make up for that.”512 Gray would have to live with what
he had done until Virginia executed him for it.
It merits mention that the standard explanation for capital defendants not taking a plea offer is that they received bad advice
from their lawyers, or their intellectual functioning was such that
they could not appreciate the risks of going to trial, or they had
plausible claims of innocence that they wanted to take to trial.513
And surely those sorts of things are happening, too. But what
“boots on the ground” experience reveals is that a client’s profound
despair is an obstacle of its own. All too often, capital defendants
don’t believe they are worth saving, and that misconception is an
overlooked culprit in explaining these rejected plea-offer cases.
This was another place—and the last stop of our journey—where
the regional capital defenders made a massive difference. Doug
Ramseur explains: Our entire approach was a client-centered focus.
We would meet our clients right away. And we were making motions
that demonstrated that we cared about them and would fight as
hard as we could. Our clients needed to see us fight, and they also
needed to see us lose on some of those motions. They needed to appreciate the risk, to see it for themselves. Everything we did helped
us develop the sort of relationship with the client that built trust so
that they knew we were trying to save their lives, and also that their

511. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings at 1546, Gray v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 290
(2007).
512. Harki, supra note 483 (quoting Ricky Gray).
513. See Douglass, supra note 25, at 891 (discussing various explanations).
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lives were worth saving. Again, it took a tremendous amount of
trust to usher our clients through a capital prosecution in such a
way as to save their lives, and our client-centered focus was the key
to creating it.
That brings us to the end of our story of how specialized capital
defenders made a difference in the trial, pretrial, and plea-bargaining contexts. As for their cumulative impact, we agree with what
Virginia State Senator Scott Surovell, who sponsored the death
penalty repeal legislation, told the press: “I don’t think there’s any
question that the lack of people on death row and the lack of sentences in the last ten years helped legislators feel that this punishment was out of step with where Virginians are today.”514 Regional
capital defenders weren’t the entire story of Virginia’s repeal of the
death penalty, but they played a critically important part of it.
III. QUALIFICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
We have now said most of what we have to say. In this Part, we
bring the discussion to a close with two important points that have
yet to be made. We start by qualifying our claims, acknowledging
others who impacted the ground game in a significant way. We
then turn to the implications of the story we have told, drawing
lessons for those working to end capital punishment in their states
and perhaps even offering lessons for those interested in criminal
justice reform more broadly.
A. Qualifications
It takes a village. We said it once, and we are saying it again.
Our account has set aside a number of factors that also played a
role in Virginia’s repeal of the death penalty in order to highlight
the role that the regional capital defender offices played in thwarting death sentences and grinding the machinery of death to a halt.
But even this part of the story had other players, and we pause to
recognize three that were especially impactful.

514.

Oliver, supra note 325.
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First, advocacy groups. Before there were regional capital defenders, there were advocacy groups that labored tirelessly to
change hearts and minds, and before there were advocacy groups,
there were pioneers who led the way. Some were lawyers, some
were nonlawyer activists, and some were even former death row
inmates.515 These advocacy groups ran information campaigns that
educated the public about the death penalty, and they amplified
the voices of surviving family members of slain victims, bringing
their compassion and credibility to the fore. As Sister Helen
Prejean observed, their activism over the past thirty years was “the
sustaining fire that led to Virginia’s repeal of the death penalty.”516
The regional capital defenders reaped the benefits of this work.
Doug Ramseur explains: The cultural landscape shifted in Virginia, partly due to changing demographics but also partly due to
information campaigns that helped people understand how the
death penalty actually worked. Both had an impact on the juries we
were getting. Death-seeking prosecutors had not caught on to that
yet. They didn’t see it. But we did. We could see the changing attitudes and how that was feeding into our jury pools. We knew that
jurors had less of an appetite for death, and that made them more
receptive to the cases in mitigation that we were bringing. People
tend to think that abolition groups mattered because of their work
in the General Assembly, and that was true, but long before that,
their work made a difference in the ground game we were playing.
It changed the cultural landscape and that changed what we were
able to do.
Second, the VC3 and VCRRC. One of the many reasons that the
regional capital defenders were able to have the success that they
did owes to the VC3, which supported their work with trainings
(especially at first), consultations, and comprehensive research
and litigation guides. The VC3 was preaching the virtues of aggressive representation and negotiating the case to take death off the
table long before the regional capital defenders mastered those
515. We hesitate to list names, knowing that our list would never be complete, but we
are confident that activist Marie Deans has a singular place on the list, and the same is true
of former death row inmate Joe Giarratano. For work about the abolitionist efforts of Marie
Deans, see PEPPERS, supra note 11. For the advocacy work of Joe Giarratano, see Green,
supra note 296.
516. See Brumfield, supra note 8 (quoting Sister Helen Prejean).

2021]

DISRUPTING DEATH

299

techniques. And the VCRRC was an important partner as well. The
VCRRC’s work is what created the risk of reversal on appeal that
allowed the regional capital defenders to take death off the table
at trial. In short, although the record of averted death sentences
rightly belongs to the regional capital defenders, their work was in
tandem with and benefitted from other capital defense organizations also in play.
Third and finally, prosecutors. That’s right, prosecutors. We
would be remiss without also acknowledging the progressive prosecutors who made a difference in the trenches of capital litigation
in Virginia. Over time, a number of Commonwealth’s Attorneys in
Virginia were elected on progressive platforms that included not
seeking the death penalty in capital cases. By 2020, when twelve
of them formally organized, these no-death prosecutors represented over forty percent of the population in Virginia.517 Capital
murder indictments were the spigot feeding the entire capital punishment system, and these twelve progressive prosecutors had
turned off the spigot in huge swaths of the state.518
Here again is Doug Ramseur: Shifting demographics made the
stance that these prosecutors took possible, but it was still bold and
it was still brave. We need to make sure that we acknowledge that
piece of the puzzle, because those prosecutors made a difference in
what we were able to accomplish too. Check.
Although we limit our discussion here to just three other players, the larger point is worth reiterating. The story of how the regional capital defender offices made a difference is not the only
517. See letter from Virginia Progressive Prosecutors for Justice to members of the General Assembly (Jan. 4, 2020) (“We are a group of reform-minded Commonwealth’s Attorneys
who represent and are responsible for the safety of over 40% of Virginia’s population. . . .”)
(on file with author). Thanks to Jim Hingeley for providing us the letter.
518. We note that these same twelve prosecutors also took a stand in the General Assembly, going on record in favor of repeal, which not only added an important voice to the
chorus for repeal, but also resulted in the larger Virginia Association of Commonwealth’s
Attorneys (“VACA”) declining to take a stand on the issue one way or the other. See id.;
Segura, supra note 15 (“With their members divided on the matter, VACA stayed silent on
the abolition bill.”). It may have been difficult for VACA to take a stand in favor of retention
in any event. To the extent prosecutors “needed” the death penalty, they needed it to pleabargain capital cases to life, which is not only controversial but also exceedingly expensive.
See Douglass, supra note 25, at 892–93 (discussing coercion in pleading capital cases and
noting that capital cases ending in a plea are still three times as costly as noncapital cases
that go to trial).
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story important to Virginia’s repeal of the death penalty. It is just
the only story we tell.
B. Implications
We turn now to the implications of the story we have told, offering lessons learned for those working to end capital punishment in
their states and perhaps even for those interested in criminal justice reform more broadly. What made the regional capital defenders successful? And what were the conditions necessary for that
success?
1. Disruption
The first question we can answer in one word: disruption. Before
2004, Virginia had the most lethal death penalty in the country. It
was structurally designed to get death sentences and keep them,
and it hummed along like the well-oiled machine that it was,
churning out death sentences and earning Virginia its place as a
leading executioner nationwide. Prosecutors asked for death often,
and more than eighty percent of the time, they got it.
The regional capital defenders managed to grind Virginia’s machinery of death to a halt by disrupting death at every turn. They
disrupted the provision of incompetent (or at least inconsistent)
representation in capital cases by court-appointed attorneys who
were no match for death-seeking prosecutors. They disrupted settled expectations of what passed for adequate mitigation in the
sentencing phase of a capital case. They disrupted systemic information disadvantages. And court calendars. And the capital jury
selection process. And their clients’ belief that they were not worth
saving. And, just for good measure, they disrupted the workload
and work life of death-seeking prosecutors in every way they could.
Every single thing that the regional capital defenders did forced
prosecutors to spend more time, more effort, and more money to
pursue a death sentence that had also grown more elusive. In virtually every case—all but 10 of over 250—the death penalty was
more trouble than it was worth. That’s how the regional capital
defenders ground the death penalty to a halt, by disrupting the

2021]

DISRUPTING DEATH

301

machinery of death one capital case at a time. What were the conditions that allowed them to do that?
2. Resources
The first necessity is resources. The regional capital defender offices are a case study in what happens when states actually fund
indigent defense. As Doug Ramseur likes to say: We gave poor people a rich person’s defense. Rich people don’t get the death penalty
in this country. That was true in 1972, when Justice Douglas wrote
about it in Furman,519 and it is just as true today. One searches in
vain for a single rich person on death row.
But if a capital defendant were rich, what would that defense
look like? It would look like a case litigated to the hilt, a case that
had mitigation specialists devoted to building relationships with
the client and the client’s family from day one, and private investigators who could spend countless hours listening to taped conversations that might make a difference in the case. It would involve
pretrial strategies that had no regard whatsoever for the judge’s
approval or trial calendar. And it would be led by highly trained
specialists whose full attention would be focused on the case. That
is the defense that indigent capital defendants were given by Virginia’s regional capital defenders.
To those discouraged by the thought that their state would never
appropriate the funding necessary for high quality capital defense,
be of good cheer. To say that states must provide the resources for
indigent capital defense is not to say that they actually have to care
about it. Consider Virginia. It created the regional capital defender
offices as a cost-savings measure and means of protecting its death
sentences, which had become vulnerable under increased scrutiny.
Moreover, when the report recommending creation of the offices
had crunched the numbers and concluded that there was enough
work to sustain six regional offices, the General Assembly authorized four. State Legislatures do not actually have to care about
high-quality indigent capital defense in order to fund it. They just
519. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251–52 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“One
searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this
society.”).
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have to determine that funding indigent capital defense is in their
best interest. The law of unintended consequences will take care of
the rest.
But adequately funding indigent capital defense is a necessary,
not sufficient, condition for capital defense success. We could throw
a lot of money at substandard court-appointed counsel and we
would still have substandard counsel doing indigent capital defense. Some of the conditions that led to the regional capital defenders’ success were things that money cannot buy. We turn to
those next.
3. Specialization
Capital litigation is a specialty law practice, and the regional
capital defenders were the specialists. They had a deep reservoir
of knowledge and experience, and that allowed them to be exceptionally good at what they did. Practice makes perfect.
But that rather obvious advantage was just the tip of the iceberg.
Specialization also gave the regional capital defenders a community inside Virginia and out, and that gave them perspective, and
camaraderie, and specialized training, which, in turn, allowed
them to challenge outlier practices, maneuver their cases into
strong strategic positions, and choose juries more strategically.
Equally important, specialization came with a team of highly qualified defense team specialists who were in-house, on tap, and ready
to go. Specialization even played a role in creating systemic change
in Virginia, setting in motion a series of events that led to a new
system for certifying court-appointed capital defense counsel, mandatory training in high-end capital defense, and a cultural shift in
the standard of capital defense practice. It’s fair to say that specialization had a profound effect on the capital litigation landscape.
4. Independence
Independence was another necessary ingredient in the regional
capital defenders’ success. Independence to file a ton of motions.
Independence to mess up the trial court’s docket. Independence to
pick unpopular fights. The regional capital defenders had a clientcentered defense, and a defense can’t be client-centered when it
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depends on a court’s approval. The key to the capital defenders’
success was their ability to put the client first, and that required
independence.
5. Neutralizing Systemic Unfairness
Our last answer to the question of what conditions were necessary for the capital defenders’ success has to do with neutralizing
systemic unfairness—leveling the playing field. When the regional
capital defenders began taking cases in 2004, the rules were
stacked against them in numerous ways. Requests for expert assistance that gave prosecutors a sneak peek at a capital defendant’s case. Capital voir dire that failed to identify automatic-death
jurors who could (and should) be struck for cause. Jury instructions
that allowed the mistaken impression that death was mandatory
in a given case. Discovery so limited that capital defendants were
not even entitled to the police report regarding the charge for
which they could lose their life. And the list went on.
The regional capital defender offices had an institutional structure that worked to neutralize some of these inequities. For example, top-notch investigators made up for much of what Virginia’s
“trial by ambush” discovery rules lacked, and specialization
worked to neutralize Virginia’s procedural traps for the unwary.
But many of these systemic failings were remedied because the regional capital defenders remedied them. They learned the Colorado
Method of voir dire and used it every chance they could get. They
asked for jury instructions that made clear that death was never
mandatory. And they asserted a due process right to an ex parte
hearing for the appointment of experts.
All this was just leveling the playing field so that capital defendants were not being systematically disadvantaged in what was
supposed to be a fair trial. And what a difference providing an actually fair trial made. When the regional capital defenders came
along, “The playing field was leveled,” VIDC Executive Director
David Johnson explained, adding, “and with a level playing field,
the death penalty was going away.”520 And so it did.

520.

Oliver, supra note 325.
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CONCLUSION
Virginia’s repeal of the death penalty in 2021 was the product of
a perfect storm wrought by a number of forces. Some were political.
Some were legal. Some were incremental. And some were incidental. But a critical part of the landscape that made repeal possible was the fact that, as a practical matter, Virginia’s death penalty was already dead. For that, we can (largely) thank Virginia’s
regional capital defenders, who literally worked themselves out of
a job by making the death penalty more trouble than it was worth.
Specialized capital defenders ground Virginia’s machinery of death
to a halt by beating death sentences one capital case at a time. And
if that can happen in Virginia, where the deck was stacked against
capital defendants in most every conceivable way, it can happen
anywhere. And by that, we mean everywhere.

